fix: sync temp auth key expiry boundaries
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A
parent
305e8a0008
commit
20a310f6ca
50 changed files with 3626 additions and 335 deletions
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@ -27,6 +27,10 @@ var (
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ErrCodeExpired = errors.New("phone code expired or not found")
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ErrCodeInvalid = errors.New("phone code invalid")
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ErrEncryptedMessageInvalid = errors.New("encrypted message invalid")
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ErrExpiresAtInvalid = errors.New("temporary auth key request expiry invalid")
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ErrTempAuthKeyEmpty = errors.New("temporary auth key missing or expired")
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ErrTempAuthKeyAlreadyBound = errors.New("temporary auth key already bound")
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ErrAuthKeyPermEmpty = errors.New("permanent auth key required")
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// ErrLoginCodeDeliveryUnavailable 表示已有账号的 app-code 没有可用的
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// durable message/event/outbox 投递边界。这是服务端配置错误，不能降级成
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// “继续返回 sentCode，等 signIn 后补发”。
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@ -193,26 +197,44 @@ func NewService(users store.UserStore, auths store.AuthorizationStore, codes sto
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// BindTempAuthKey 校验并记录 TDesktop PFS temp→perm auth key 绑定。
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func (s *Service) BindTempAuthKey(ctx context.Context, sessionID int64, binding domain.TempAuthKeyBinding) error {
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if s.authKeys != nil {
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inner, err := s.validateBindTempAuthKey(ctx, sessionID, binding)
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inner, protocolExpiresAt, err := s.validateBindTempAuthKey(ctx, sessionID, binding)
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if err != nil {
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return err
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}
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binding.TempSessionID = inner.TempSessionID
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// The bind request's expires_at is a signed client assertion. TDesktop
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// intentionally adds a small grace interval, while Android derives its
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// value at handshake completion. Retention and edge admission must use the
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// server's p_q_inner_data_temp lifetime, never the client value.
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binding.ExpiresAt = protocolExpiresAt
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}
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if binding.ExpiresAt <= int(time.Now().Unix()) {
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// The edge may admit the frame immediately before the temporary key's
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// absolute boundary and the encrypted proof may cross it. This is a temp-key
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// rotation condition, never a destructive permanent-key proof failure.
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return ErrTempAuthKeyEmpty
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}
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if s.tempKeys == nil {
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return nil
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}
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return s.tempKeys.Save(ctx, binding)
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if err := s.tempKeys.Save(ctx, binding); err != nil {
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if errors.Is(err, store.ErrTempAuthKeyAlreadyBound) {
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return ErrTempAuthKeyAlreadyBound
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}
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if errors.Is(err, store.ErrAuthKeyBindingInvalid) {
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return s.classifyBindingStoreInvalid(ctx, binding)
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}
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return err
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}
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return nil
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}
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// ResolveAuthKey 将已绑定的 temp auth_key 解析为对应 perm auth_key。
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//
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// 过期处理是有意的连续性权衡（见 TestResolveAuthKeyAllowsExpiredTempBindingForAuthorizedPermKey）：
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// temp 绑定 expires_at 已过时，仅当 perm key 也未授权才拒绝；perm 仍授权则继续解析，
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// 避免已登录会话因 temp key 过期而被强制踢下线。严格 PFS 要求过期 temp key 一律失效
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// （不以 perm 授权豁免），但收紧前需先核实目标客户端（TDesktop/DrKLO）会在过期前主动
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// 轮换 temp key 并优雅处理拒绝，否则会造成在线会话掉线。RetentionWorker 的 DeleteExpired
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// 已把残留窗口限制在 expires_at + 宽限（约 24h）内。收紧为显式硬化任务，需客户端验证。
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// temp→perm 是握手/绑定形成的协议身份关系，与 perm 当前是否登录完全无关。即使
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// auth.logOut 已删除 authorization，只要绑定仍存在，后续登录 RPC 也必须继续落到同一
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// perm key，绝不能把 raw temp key 当成新的业务身份。协议过期由 mtprotoedge 在解密/RPC
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// 之前返回 -404 并关闭连接；这里不再用 authorization 状态猜测 key 类型。
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func (s *Service) ResolveAuthKey(ctx context.Context, authKeyID [8]byte) ([8]byte, bool, error) {
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if s == nil || s.tempKeys == nil {
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return [8]byte{}, false, nil
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@ -221,19 +243,7 @@ func (s *Service) ResolveAuthKey(ctx context.Context, authKeyID [8]byte) ([8]byt
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if err != nil || !found {
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return [8]byte{}, found, err
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}
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permID := authKeyIDFromInt64(binding.PermAuthKeyID)
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if binding.ExpiresAt <= int(time.Now().Unix()) && !s.permAuthKeyAuthorized(ctx, permID) {
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return [8]byte{}, false, nil
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}
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return permID, true, nil
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}
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func (s *Service) permAuthKeyAuthorized(ctx context.Context, authKeyID [8]byte) bool {
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if s == nil || s.auths == nil {
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return false
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}
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_, found, err := s.auths.ByAuthKey(ctx, authKeyID)
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return err == nil && found
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return authKeyIDFromInt64(binding.PermAuthKeyID), true, nil
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}
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// UserID 返回 auth_key 当前绑定的用户。未登录、或两步验证未完成时 found=false。
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@ -1228,11 +1238,29 @@ func (s *Service) authorizationsByUserExcept(ctx context.Context, userID int64,
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}
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func (s *Service) bind(ctx context.Context, auth domain.Authorization, userID int64) error {
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if s.authKeys != nil {
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key, found, err := s.authKeys.Get(ctx, auth.AuthKeyID)
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if err != nil {
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return err
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}
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// Defense in depth: Router normally converts a bound temp key to its perm
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// identity and edge rejects expired temp keys. Never let an unbound/sticky
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// temp key create authorization even if either outer boundary regresses.
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if !found || key.ExpiresAt != 0 {
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return ErrAuthKeyPermEmpty
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}
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}
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auth.UserID = userID
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// Bind 是授权切换的持久化状态边界：生产 store 会先清同 auth key 的旧用户
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// update state，再原子建立新用户 baseline。RPC 层不得在 Bind 成功后清整个 key，
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// 否则会把刚建立的 retained-floor checkpoint 一并删除。
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return s.auths.Bind(ctx, auth)
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if err := s.auths.Bind(ctx, auth); err != nil {
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if errors.Is(err, store.ErrAuthKeyNotPermanent) {
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return ErrAuthKeyPermEmpty
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}
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return err
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}
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return nil
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}
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func (s *Service) passwordNeeded(ctx context.Context, userID int64) (bool, error) {
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@ -1282,32 +1310,60 @@ func (s *Service) recordLoginMessage(ctx context.Context, userID int64, code str
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return msg, nil
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}
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func (s *Service) validateBindTempAuthKey(ctx context.Context, sessionID int64, binding domain.TempAuthKeyBinding) (mtcrypto.BindAuthKeyInner, error) {
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func (s *Service) validateBindTempAuthKey(ctx context.Context, sessionID int64, binding domain.TempAuthKeyBinding) (mtcrypto.BindAuthKeyInner, int, error) {
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if binding.ExpiresAt <= int(time.Now().Unix()) {
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return mtcrypto.BindAuthKeyInner{}, ErrEncryptedMessageInvalid
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return mtcrypto.BindAuthKeyInner{}, 0, ErrExpiresAtInvalid
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}
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temp, found, err := s.authKeys.Get(ctx, binding.TempAuthKeyID)
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if err != nil {
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return mtcrypto.BindAuthKeyInner{}, 0, err
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}
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// expires_at in auth.bindTempAuthKey is client-supplied and must only attest
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// to a still-live binding. It may never create or reclassify a protocol key;
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// the caller normalizes durable retention to this handshake-authoritative
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// temp.ExpiresAt instead of trusting the client value.
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if !found || temp.ExpiresAt <= int(time.Now().Unix()) {
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return mtcrypto.BindAuthKeyInner{}, 0, ErrTempAuthKeyEmpty
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}
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permID := authKeyIDFromInt64(binding.PermAuthKeyID)
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perm, found, err := s.authKeys.Get(ctx, permID)
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if err != nil {
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return mtcrypto.BindAuthKeyInner{}, err
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return mtcrypto.BindAuthKeyInner{}, 0, err
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}
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if !found {
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return mtcrypto.BindAuthKeyInner{}, ErrEncryptedMessageInvalid
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if !found || perm.ExpiresAt != 0 {
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return mtcrypto.BindAuthKeyInner{}, 0, ErrEncryptedMessageInvalid
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}
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inner, err := decryptBindAuthKeyInner(perm, binding.EncryptedMessage)
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if err != nil {
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return mtcrypto.BindAuthKeyInner{}, ErrEncryptedMessageInvalid
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return mtcrypto.BindAuthKeyInner{}, 0, ErrEncryptedMessageInvalid
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}
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if inner.Nonce != binding.Nonce ||
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inner.TempAuthKeyID != authKeyIDInt64(binding.TempAuthKeyID) ||
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inner.PermAuthKeyID != binding.PermAuthKeyID ||
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inner.TempSessionID != sessionID ||
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inner.ExpiresAt != binding.ExpiresAt {
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return mtcrypto.BindAuthKeyInner{}, ErrEncryptedMessageInvalid
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return mtcrypto.BindAuthKeyInner{}, 0, ErrEncryptedMessageInvalid
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}
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return inner, nil
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if temp.ExpiresAt <= int(time.Now().Unix()) {
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return mtcrypto.BindAuthKeyInner{}, 0, ErrTempAuthKeyEmpty
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}
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return inner, temp.ExpiresAt, nil
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}
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func (s *Service) classifyBindingStoreInvalid(ctx context.Context, binding domain.TempAuthKeyBinding) error {
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if s == nil || s.authKeys == nil {
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return ErrEncryptedMessageInvalid
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}
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temp, found, err := s.authKeys.Get(ctx, binding.TempAuthKeyID)
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if err != nil {
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return err
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}
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if !found || temp.ExpiresAt <= int(time.Now().Unix()) {
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return ErrTempAuthKeyEmpty
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}
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return ErrEncryptedMessageInvalid
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}
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func decryptBindAuthKeyInner(perm store.AuthKeyData, encrypted []byte) (mtcrypto.BindAuthKeyInner, error) {
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