perf: sync protocol and core hardening updates
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152fed3b87
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4390ebf5a9
283 changed files with 29231 additions and 2295 deletions
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@ -28,7 +28,111 @@ func (s *AuthorizationStore) Bind(ctx context.Context, a domain.Authorization) e
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if a.Hash == 0 {
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a.Hash = authorizationHash(a.AuthKeyID)
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}
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_, err := s.db.Exec(ctx, `
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bind := func(db sqlcgen.DBTX) error {
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return bindAuthorization(ctx, db, a)
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}
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var err error
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if tx, ok := s.db.(pgx.Tx); ok {
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err = bind(tx)
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} else {
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err = withTx(ctx, s.db, "bind authorization", func(tx pgx.Tx) error {
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return bind(tx)
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})
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}
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if err != nil {
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return fmt.Errorf("upsert authorization: %w", err)
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}
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return nil
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}
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// bindAuthorization 把 auth_key→user 绑定和设备 update baseline 作为同一个状态边界提交。
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//
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// 锁顺序固定为：auth_keys 母行 → 目标 user_update_watermarks →
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// user_update_retention → 目标 update_states。前两个 user 锁与
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// pruneConfirmedUserPrefixTx 一致，使新授权的 observed baseline 和 retained floor 不会
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// 交叉提交成静默空洞。母行锁又能在首次 authorization 尚不存在时串行化同一
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// raw auth key 的并发登录/换号。
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func bindAuthorization(ctx context.Context, db sqlcgen.DBTX, a domain.Authorization) error {
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keyID := authKeyIDToInt64(a.AuthKeyID)
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var lockedKeyID int64
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if err := db.QueryRow(ctx, `
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SELECT auth_key_id
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FROM auth_keys
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WHERE auth_key_id = $1
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FOR UPDATE`, keyID).Scan(&lockedKeyID); err != nil {
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return fmt.Errorf("lock auth key for authorization: %w", err)
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}
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if _, err := db.Exec(ctx, `
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INSERT INTO user_update_watermarks (user_id, contiguous_pts)
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VALUES ($1, 0)
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ON CONFLICT (user_id) DO NOTHING`, a.UserID); err != nil {
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return fmt.Errorf("ensure authorization user update watermark: %w", err)
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}
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var currentPts int
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if err := db.QueryRow(ctx, `
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SELECT contiguous_pts
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FROM user_update_watermarks
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WHERE user_id = $1
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FOR UPDATE`, a.UserID).Scan(¤tPts); err != nil {
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return fmt.Errorf("lock authorization user update watermark: %w", err)
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}
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if _, err := db.Exec(ctx, `
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INSERT INTO user_update_retention (user_id)
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VALUES ($1)
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ON CONFLICT (user_id) DO NOTHING`, a.UserID); err != nil {
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return fmt.Errorf("ensure authorization user update retention: %w", err)
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}
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var retainedFloor int
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if err := db.QueryRow(ctx, `
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SELECT retained_through_pts
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FROM user_update_retention
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WHERE user_id = $1
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FOR UPDATE`, a.UserID).Scan(&retainedFloor); err != nil {
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return fmt.Errorf("lock authorization user update retention: %w", err)
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}
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if retainedFloor > currentPts {
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return fmt.Errorf(
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"authorization update baseline invariant violation: user %d retained floor %d exceeds contiguous watermark %d",
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a.UserID, retainedFloor, currentPts,
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)
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}
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// 每次 Bind 都是一次显式登录 baseline：delivered pts 推进到已锁定的账号连续水位；
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// observed 只推进到已删除的 retained floor，不把 live tail 伪装成客户端确认。
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// 历史遗留的 state 若超出账号 contiguous watermark，必须 fail-fast；不得用
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// GREATEST 把非法 future cursor 保留下来。WHERE 也封住“预检后并发插入”的竞态。
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tag, err := db.Exec(ctx, `
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INSERT INTO update_states (auth_key_id, user_id, pts, qts, date, seq, observed_pts)
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VALUES ($1, $2, $3, 0, EXTRACT(EPOCH FROM now())::int, 0, $4)
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ON CONFLICT (auth_key_id, user_id) DO UPDATE SET
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pts = GREATEST(update_states.pts, EXCLUDED.pts),
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qts = GREATEST(update_states.qts, EXCLUDED.qts),
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date = GREATEST(update_states.date, EXCLUDED.date),
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seq = GREATEST(update_states.seq, EXCLUDED.seq),
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observed_pts = GREATEST(update_states.observed_pts, EXCLUDED.observed_pts),
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updated_at = now()
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WHERE update_states.pts >= 0
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AND update_states.pts <= $3
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AND update_states.observed_pts <= $3`, keyID, a.UserID, currentPts, retainedFloor)
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if err != nil {
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return fmt.Errorf("upsert authorization update baseline: %w", err)
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}
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if tag.RowsAffected() != 1 {
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return fmt.Errorf(
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"authorization update baseline invariant violation: auth key %x user %d has pts or observed_pts outside contiguous watermark %d",
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a.AuthKeyID, a.UserID, currentPts,
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)
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}
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if _, err := db.Exec(ctx, `
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DELETE FROM update_states
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WHERE auth_key_id = $1
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AND user_id <> $2`, keyID, a.UserID); err != nil {
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return fmt.Errorf("delete stale cross-user update states: %w", err)
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}
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if _, err := db.Exec(ctx, `
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INSERT INTO authorizations (auth_key_id, user_id, hash, layer, device_model, platform, system_version, api_id, app_version, ip, password_pending)
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VALUES ($1,$2,$3,$4,$5,$6,$7,$8,$9,$10,$11)
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ON CONFLICT (auth_key_id) DO UPDATE SET
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@ -43,10 +147,9 @@ ON CONFLICT (auth_key_id) DO UPDATE SET
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ip = EXCLUDED.ip,
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password_pending = EXCLUDED.password_pending,
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active_at = now()`,
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authKeyIDToInt64(a.AuthKeyID), a.UserID, a.Hash, int32(a.Layer), a.DeviceModel, a.Platform, a.SystemVersion, int32(a.APIID), a.AppVersion, a.IP, a.PasswordPending,
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)
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if err != nil {
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return fmt.Errorf("upsert authorization: %w", err)
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keyID, a.UserID, a.Hash, int32(a.Layer), a.DeviceModel, a.Platform, a.SystemVersion, int32(a.APIID), a.AppVersion, a.IP, a.PasswordPending,
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); err != nil {
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return fmt.Errorf("write authorization: %w", err)
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}
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return nil
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}
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@ -129,7 +232,8 @@ RETURNING auth_key_id, user_id, hash, layer, device_model, platform, system_vers
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}
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// RevokeByHash 删除协议 auth_key 作为远程踢设备的持久化事实入口。
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// authorizations/update_states 通过 FK cascade 删除；关联 temp auth key 显式删除，避免 raw temp key 重连。
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// authorizations 通过 FK cascade 删除；update_states 没有 auth_keys FK，必须显式清理；
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// 关联 temp auth key 也显式删除，避免 raw temp key 重连。
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func (s *AuthorizationStore) RevokeByHash(ctx context.Context, userID, hash int64) (domain.Authorization, bool, error) {
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row := s.db.QueryRow(ctx, `
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WITH target AS MATERIALIZED (
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@ -144,12 +248,18 @@ WITH target AS MATERIALIZED (
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WHERE perm_auth_key_id IN (SELECT auth_key_id FROM target)
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)
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RETURNING auth_key_id
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), deleted_update_states AS (
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DELETE FROM update_states
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WHERE auth_key_id IN (SELECT auth_key_id FROM target)
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RETURNING auth_key_id
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), deleted_keys AS (
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DELETE FROM auth_keys
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WHERE auth_key_id IN (SELECT auth_key_id FROM target)
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RETURNING auth_key_id
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), touched AS (
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SELECT count(*) FROM deleted_temp
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SELECT
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(SELECT count(*) FROM deleted_temp) +
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(SELECT count(*) FROM deleted_update_states) AS count
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)
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SELECT target.auth_key_id, target.user_id, target.hash, target.layer, target.device_model, target.platform,
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target.system_version, target.api_id, target.app_version, target.ip, target.password_pending,
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@ -207,12 +317,18 @@ WITH target AS MATERIALIZED (
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WHERE perm_auth_key_id IN (SELECT auth_key_id FROM target)
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)
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RETURNING auth_key_id
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), deleted_update_states AS (
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DELETE FROM update_states
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WHERE auth_key_id IN (SELECT auth_key_id FROM target)
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RETURNING auth_key_id
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), deleted_keys AS (
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DELETE FROM auth_keys
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WHERE auth_key_id IN (SELECT auth_key_id FROM target)
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RETURNING auth_key_id
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), touched AS (
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SELECT count(*) FROM deleted_temp
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SELECT
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(SELECT count(*) FROM deleted_temp) +
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(SELECT count(*) FROM deleted_update_states) AS count
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)
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SELECT target.auth_key_id, target.user_id, target.hash, target.layer, target.device_model, target.platform,
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target.system_version, target.api_id, target.app_version, target.ip, target.password_pending,
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