chore: refresh gramsrv public release

This commit is contained in:
A 2026-06-30 14:37:43 +08:00
parent 75cebe8dbf
commit 70b6820474
1274 changed files with 378751 additions and 59919 deletions

View file

@ -4,6 +4,7 @@ import (
"context"
"crypto/aes"
"crypto/rand"
"crypto/subtle"
"encoding/binary"
"encoding/hex"
"errors"
@ -25,8 +26,39 @@ var (
ErrCodeExpired = errors.New("phone code expired or not found")
ErrCodeInvalid = errors.New("phone code invalid")
ErrEncryptedMessageInvalid = errors.New("encrypted message invalid")
// ErrPhoneNumberInvalid 表示手机号为空或非纯数字/长度越界。
// 0090 把 users.phone 唯一约束改为忽略空串的部分索引(bot 行 phone=''),
// 因此 phone 校验必须前移到 auth 入口,否则 sendCode/signUp 可无限铸造
// phone='' 的幽灵人类账号(且因 ByPhone('') 短路永远无法再登录)。
ErrPhoneNumberInvalid = errors.New("phone number invalid")
// ErrSystemUserLoginForbidden 表示内置系统账号被尝试绑定为普通业务会话。
ErrSystemUserLoginForbidden = errors.New("system user login forbidden")
)
// validPhone 校验规范化后的手机号:5-32 位纯数字(上限对齐 users.phone 列宽)。
// 核心目的是拒绝空/非数字 phone(防 0090 partial index 下无限铸造幽灵账号),
// 长度上限从宽,不强求 E.164 精确位数(测试常用更长的唯一 phone)。
func validPhone(phone string) bool {
if len(phone) < 5 || len(phone) > 32 {
return false
}
for _, r := range phone {
if r < '0' || r > '9' {
return false
}
}
return true
}
func systemUserLoginForbidden(u domain.User) bool {
return domain.IsSystemUserID(u.ID)
}
func systemLoginPhoneForbidden(phone string) bool {
_, ok := domain.SystemUserByPhone(phone)
return ok
}
// Service 实现登录/注册业务。第一阶段为开发固定验证码(不真实下发短信)。
type Service struct {
users store.UserStore
@ -37,8 +69,16 @@ type Service struct {
passwords store.PasswordStore
messages store.MessageStore
dialogs store.DialogStore
bots store.BotStore
fixedCode string
codeTTL time.Duration
// premiumGrantMonths 是新注册账号默认赠送的会员月数;0 表示关闭赠送。
premiumGrantMonths int
}
type authorizationRevoker interface {
RevokeByHash(ctx context.Context, userID, hash int64) (domain.Authorization, bool, error)
RevokeByUserExcept(ctx context.Context, userID int64, keepAuthKeyID [8]byte) ([]domain.Authorization, error)
}
// Option 调整登录服务的可选依赖。
@ -59,6 +99,21 @@ func WithPasswords(passwords store.PasswordStore) Option {
}
}
// WithBotLogin 启用 auth.importBotAuthorization 的 bot token 登录。
func WithBotLogin(bots store.BotStore) Option {
return func(s *Service) {
s.bots = bots
}
}
// WithPremiumGrant 让新注册账号默认获得 months 个月会员(0 = 关闭赠送)。
// 存量账号的同等赠送由迁移 0094 一次性 backfill。
func WithPremiumGrant(months int) Option {
return func(s *Service) {
s.premiumGrantMonths = months
}
}
// NewService 创建登录服务。fixedCode 为开发固定验证码。
func NewService(users store.UserStore, auths store.AuthorizationStore, codes store.CodeStore, authKeys store.AuthKeyStore, tempKeys store.TempAuthKeyBindingStore, fixedCode string, opts ...Option) *Service {
s := &Service{users: users, auths: auths, codes: codes, authKeys: authKeys, tempKeys: tempKeys, fixedCode: fixedCode, codeTTL: 5 * time.Minute}
@ -84,6 +139,13 @@ func (s *Service) BindTempAuthKey(ctx context.Context, sessionID int64, binding
}
// ResolveAuthKey 将已绑定的 temp auth_key 解析为对应 perm auth_key。
//
// 过期处理是有意的连续性权衡(见 TestResolveAuthKeyAllowsExpiredTempBindingForAuthorizedPermKey):
// temp 绑定 expires_at 已过时,仅当 perm key 也未授权才拒绝;perm 仍授权则继续解析,
// 避免已登录会话因 temp key 过期而被强制踢下线。严格 PFS 要求过期 temp key 一律失效
// (不以 perm 授权豁免),但收紧前需先核实目标客户端(TDesktop/DrKLO)会在过期前主动
// 轮换 temp key 并优雅处理拒绝,否则会造成在线会话掉线。RetentionWorker 的 DeleteExpired
// 已把残留窗口限制在 expires_at + 宽限(约 24h)内。收紧为显式硬化任务,需客户端验证。
func (s *Service) ResolveAuthKey(ctx context.Context, authKeyID [8]byte) ([8]byte, bool, error) {
if s == nil || s.tempKeys == nil {
return [8]byte{}, false, nil
@ -92,13 +154,22 @@ func (s *Service) ResolveAuthKey(ctx context.Context, authKeyID [8]byte) ([8]byt
if err != nil || !found {
return [8]byte{}, found, err
}
if binding.ExpiresAt <= int(time.Now().Unix()) {
permID := authKeyIDFromInt64(binding.PermAuthKeyID)
if binding.ExpiresAt <= int(time.Now().Unix()) && !s.permAuthKeyAuthorized(ctx, permID) {
return [8]byte{}, false, nil
}
return authKeyIDFromInt64(binding.PermAuthKeyID), true, nil
return permID, true, nil
}
// UserID 返回 auth_key 当前绑定的用户。未登录时 found=false。
func (s *Service) permAuthKeyAuthorized(ctx context.Context, authKeyID [8]byte) bool {
if s == nil || s.auths == nil {
return false
}
_, found, err := s.auths.ByAuthKey(ctx, authKeyID)
return err == nil && found
}
// UserID 返回 auth_key 当前绑定的用户。未登录、或两步验证未完成时 found=false。
func (s *Service) UserID(ctx context.Context, authKeyID [8]byte) (int64, bool, error) {
if s == nil || s.auths == nil {
return 0, false, nil
@ -107,16 +178,56 @@ func (s *Service) UserID(ctx context.Context, authKeyID [8]byte) (int64, bool, e
if err != nil || !found {
return 0, found, err
}
if a.PasswordPending {
// 两步验证未完成:业务鉴权视为未登录,仅允许 auth.checkPassword 继续。
return 0, false, nil
}
if domain.IsSystemUserID(a.UserID) {
_ = s.auths.Delete(ctx, authKeyID)
return 0, false, nil
}
return a.UserID, true, nil
}
// PendingPasswordUserID 返回处于"待两步验证"状态的 auth_key 对应的用户。
// UserID 对 password_pending 的 auth_key 返回未登录,auth.checkPassword 借此仍能定位待验证用户。
func (s *Service) PendingPasswordUserID(ctx context.Context, authKeyID [8]byte) (int64, bool, error) {
if s == nil || s.auths == nil {
return 0, false, nil
}
a, found, err := s.auths.ByAuthKey(ctx, authKeyID)
if err != nil || !found || !a.PasswordPending {
return 0, false, err
}
if domain.IsSystemUserID(a.UserID) {
_ = s.auths.Delete(ctx, authKeyID)
return 0, false, nil
}
return a.UserID, true, nil
}
// CompletePasswordSignIn 在两步验证通过后清除 password_pending,使 auth_key 转为完全授权。
func (s *Service) CompletePasswordSignIn(ctx context.Context, authKeyID [8]byte) error {
if s == nil || s.auths == nil {
return nil
}
return s.auths.MarkPasswordPassed(ctx, authKeyID)
}
// SendCode 为 phone 生成 phone_code_hash,暂存(开发)固定验证码,返回 hash。
func (s *Service) SendCode(ctx context.Context, phone string) (string, error) {
phone = normalizePhone(phone)
if !validPhone(phone) {
return "", ErrPhoneNumberInvalid
}
if systemLoginPhoneForbidden(phone) {
return "", ErrSystemUserLoginForbidden
}
hash, err := randomHex(8)
if err != nil {
return "", err
}
if err := s.codes.Set(ctx, hash, store.PhoneCode{Phone: normalizePhone(phone), Code: s.fixedCode}, s.codeTTL); err != nil {
if err := s.codes.Set(ctx, hash, store.PhoneCode{Phone: phone, Code: s.fixedCode}, s.codeTTL); err != nil {
return "", fmt.Errorf("store code: %w", err)
}
return hash, nil
@ -159,6 +270,9 @@ func (s *Service) CancelCode(ctx context.Context, phone, phoneCodeHash string) e
// needSignUp=true 表示验证码正确但用户不存在,调用方应引导注册(此时不删验证码,留给 SignUp)。
func (s *Service) SignIn(ctx context.Context, auth domain.Authorization, phone, phoneCodeHash, code string) (u domain.User, loginMessage domain.Message, needSignUp bool, err error) {
phone = normalizePhone(phone)
if systemLoginPhoneForbidden(phone) {
return domain.User{}, domain.Message{}, false, ErrSystemUserLoginForbidden
}
rec, found, err := s.codes.Get(ctx, phoneCodeHash)
if err != nil {
return domain.User{}, domain.Message{}, false, err
@ -177,14 +291,61 @@ func (s *Service) SignIn(ctx context.Context, auth domain.Authorization, phone,
if !found {
return domain.User{}, domain.Message{}, true, nil // 验证码对、但需注册
}
return s.finishSignIn(ctx, auth, existing, phoneCodeHash, rec.Code)
}
// SignInWithEmail 处理带 email_verification 的 auth.signIn:账号设置了登录邮箱后,新设备
// 的验证码改投递到邮箱,客户端凭邮箱码(而非短信码)登录。开发环境接受任意非空邮箱码
// (与短信固定码同口径,"随意输入");仍校验 phone_code_hash 有效、手机号匹配,并与短信
// 登录共用 2FA 门控——即便走邮箱验证,开启了两步验证的账号同样会停在 SESSION_PASSWORD_NEEDED。
func (s *Service) SignInWithEmail(ctx context.Context, auth domain.Authorization, phone, phoneCodeHash, code string) (domain.User, domain.Message, bool, error) {
phone = normalizePhone(phone)
if systemLoginPhoneForbidden(phone) {
return domain.User{}, domain.Message{}, false, ErrSystemUserLoginForbidden
}
rec, found, err := s.codes.Get(ctx, phoneCodeHash)
if err != nil {
return domain.User{}, domain.Message{}, false, err
}
if !found {
return domain.User{}, domain.Message{}, false, ErrCodeExpired
}
if rec.Phone != phone {
return domain.User{}, domain.Message{}, false, ErrCodeInvalid
}
if strings.TrimSpace(code) == "" {
return domain.User{}, domain.Message{}, false, ErrCodeInvalid
}
existing, found, err := s.users.ByPhone(ctx, phone)
if err != nil {
return domain.User{}, domain.Message{}, false, err
}
if !found {
return domain.User{}, domain.Message{}, true, nil
}
return s.finishSignIn(ctx, auth, existing, phoneCodeHash, rec.Code)
}
// finishSignIn 是短信/邮箱两条登录路径在「验证码已通过、用户已存在」之后的共用收尾:
// 处理 2FA password_pending 绑定、写登录消息、消费验证码。
func (s *Service) finishSignIn(ctx context.Context, auth domain.Authorization, existing domain.User, phoneCodeHash, loginCode string) (domain.User, domain.Message, bool, error) {
if systemUserLoginForbidden(existing) {
_ = s.codes.Del(ctx, phoneCodeHash)
return domain.User{}, domain.Message{}, false, ErrSystemUserLoginForbidden
}
// 开启两步验证的账号:把授权标记为 password_pending 再写入,业务鉴权据此拒绝该 auth_key,
// 直到 auth.checkPassword 通过。绝不能先以完全授权写入再返回 SESSION_PASSWORD_NEEDED,
// 否则客户端忽略该错误即可直接调用业务 RPC 绕过两步验证。
passwordNeeded := s.passwordNeeded(ctx, existing.ID)
auth.PasswordPending = passwordNeeded
if err := s.bind(ctx, auth, existing.ID); err != nil {
return domain.User{}, domain.Message{}, false, err
}
if s.passwordNeeded(ctx, existing.ID) {
if passwordNeeded {
_ = s.codes.Del(ctx, phoneCodeHash)
return existing, domain.Message{}, false, domain.ErrSessionPasswordNeeded
}
loginMessage, err = s.recordLoginMessage(ctx, existing.ID, rec.Code)
loginMessage, err := s.recordLoginMessage(ctx, existing.ID, loginCode)
if err != nil {
return domain.User{}, domain.Message{}, false, err
}
@ -196,6 +357,12 @@ func (s *Service) SignIn(ctx context.Context, auth domain.Authorization, phone,
// signUp 的 TL 请求不带验证码,这里校验 phone_code_hash 仍有效且手机号匹配。
func (s *Service) SignUp(ctx context.Context, auth domain.Authorization, phone, phoneCodeHash, firstName, lastName string) (domain.User, domain.Message, error) {
phone = normalizePhone(phone)
if !validPhone(phone) {
return domain.User{}, domain.Message{}, ErrPhoneNumberInvalid
}
if systemLoginPhoneForbidden(phone) {
return domain.User{}, domain.Message{}, ErrSystemUserLoginForbidden
}
firstName = strings.TrimSpace(firstName)
lastName = strings.TrimSpace(lastName)
if firstName == "" || utf8.RuneCountInString(firstName) > 64 || utf8.RuneCountInString(lastName) > 64 {
@ -216,12 +383,18 @@ func (s *Service) SignUp(ctx context.Context, auth domain.Authorization, phone,
if err != nil {
return domain.User{}, domain.Message{}, err
}
u, err := s.users.Create(ctx, domain.User{
newUser := domain.User{
AccessHash: accessHash,
Phone: phone,
FirstName: firstName,
LastName: lastName,
})
}
// 新账号默认赠送会员:到期时间 = 注册时刻 + N 个月(与迁移 0094 对存量
// 账号的 backfill 同一语义)。premium 状态由下发路径按该时间即时派生。
if s.premiumGrantMonths > 0 {
newUser.PremiumUntil = int(time.Now().AddDate(0, s.premiumGrantMonths, 0).Unix())
}
u, err := s.users.Create(ctx, newUser)
if err != nil {
return domain.User{}, domain.Message{}, err
}
@ -236,11 +409,115 @@ func (s *Service) SignUp(ctx context.Context, auth domain.Authorization, phone,
return u, loginMessage, nil
}
// SignInBot 处理 auth.importBotAuthorization:校验 bot token 并把当前 auth_key
// 绑定到 bot 账号。token 校验必须先于 bind(bind 即授权生效);bot 无 2FA,
// PasswordPending 恒 false;不写登录消息、不推 signIn 通知(手机登录语义)。
// 任何校验失败统一返回 domain.ErrBotTokenInvalid,不区分原因避免泄漏存在性。
func (s *Service) SignInBot(ctx context.Context, auth domain.Authorization, token string) (domain.User, error) {
if s == nil || s.bots == nil || s.users == nil {
return domain.User{}, domain.ErrBotTokenInvalid
}
botUserID, secret, ok := domain.ParseBotToken(strings.TrimSpace(token))
if !ok {
return domain.User{}, domain.ErrBotTokenInvalid
}
profile, found, err := s.bots.GetBot(ctx, botUserID)
if err != nil {
return domain.User{}, err
}
// 空 secret(内置 BotFather)永不可登录;比较走常数时间。
if !found || profile.TokenSecret == "" ||
subtle.ConstantTimeCompare([]byte(profile.TokenSecret), []byte(secret)) != 1 {
return domain.User{}, domain.ErrBotTokenInvalid
}
u, found, err := s.users.ByID(ctx, botUserID)
if err != nil {
return domain.User{}, err
}
if !found || !u.Bot {
return domain.User{}, domain.ErrBotTokenInvalid
}
if systemUserLoginForbidden(u) {
return domain.User{}, domain.ErrBotTokenInvalid
}
auth.PasswordPending = false
if err := s.bind(ctx, auth, u.ID); err != nil {
return domain.User{}, err
}
// check-bind-recheck:SignInBot 的「校验 secret → bind」非原子,并发 /revoke
// 可能在两步之间换 secret 并删除已有 authorization。此处 bind 写入的新行不会被
// 那次删除覆盖(删除发生在 bind 之前),会逃过 session 撤销。bind 后复核 secret:
// 若已被换掉,撤销刚写入的授权并拒登,闭合竞态窗口。
if again, found, err := s.bots.GetBot(ctx, botUserID); err != nil {
_ = s.auths.Delete(ctx, auth.AuthKeyID)
return domain.User{}, err
} else if !found || again.TokenSecret == "" ||
subtle.ConstantTimeCompare([]byte(again.TokenSecret), []byte(secret)) != 1 {
_ = s.auths.Delete(ctx, auth.AuthKeyID)
return domain.User{}, domain.ErrBotTokenInvalid
}
return u, nil
}
// BindVerifiedLogin 把当前 auth_key 绑定到一个已由外部强因子(如 passkey)验证过身份的
// 用户,直接完成授权。passkey 是独立强因子,不再叠加 2FA password(PasswordPending=false),
// 与官方"passkey 登录跳过密码步骤"一致。校验已发生在调用方(passkey 断言验证),此处只负责绑定。
func (s *Service) BindVerifiedLogin(ctx context.Context, auth domain.Authorization, userID int64) (domain.User, error) {
if s == nil || s.users == nil || userID == 0 {
return domain.User{}, domain.ErrPasskeyInvalid
}
u, found, err := s.users.ByID(ctx, userID)
if err != nil {
return domain.User{}, err
}
if !found {
return domain.User{}, domain.ErrPasskeyNotFound
}
if systemUserLoginForbidden(u) {
return domain.User{}, ErrSystemUserLoginForbidden
}
auth.PasswordPending = false
if err := s.bind(ctx, auth, userID); err != nil {
return domain.User{}, err
}
return u, nil
}
// AcceptLoginToken 把 QR 登录请求方的 auth_key 绑定到扫码确认的 user。
func (s *Service) AcceptLoginToken(ctx context.Context, auth domain.Authorization, userID int64) (domain.Authorization, error) {
if s == nil || s.auths == nil || userID == 0 || auth.AuthKeyID == ([8]byte{}) {
return domain.Authorization{}, fmt.Errorf("accept login token: invalid authorization")
}
if domain.IsSystemUserID(userID) {
return domain.Authorization{}, ErrSystemUserLoginForbidden
}
auth.PasswordPending = false
if err := s.bind(ctx, auth, userID); err != nil {
return domain.Authorization{}, err
}
bound, found, err := s.auths.ByAuthKey(ctx, auth.AuthKeyID)
if err != nil {
return domain.Authorization{}, err
}
if found {
return bound, nil
}
auth.UserID = userID
return auth, nil
}
// LogOut 解绑当前 auth_key 的授权。
func (s *Service) LogOut(ctx context.Context, authKeyID [8]byte) error {
return s.auths.Delete(ctx, authKeyID)
}
func (s *Service) Authorization(ctx context.Context, authKeyID [8]byte) (domain.Authorization, bool, error) {
if s == nil || s.auths == nil || authKeyID == ([8]byte{}) {
return domain.Authorization{}, false, nil
}
return s.auths.ByAuthKey(ctx, authKeyID)
}
func (s *Service) ListAuthorizations(ctx context.Context, userID int64) ([]domain.Authorization, error) {
if s == nil || s.auths == nil || userID == 0 {
return nil, nil
@ -252,14 +529,78 @@ func (s *Service) ResetAuthorization(ctx context.Context, userID, hash int64) (d
if s == nil || s.auths == nil || userID == 0 {
return domain.Authorization{}, false, nil
}
return s.auths.DeleteByHash(ctx, userID, hash)
if revoker, ok := s.auths.(authorizationRevoker); ok {
return revoker.RevokeByHash(ctx, userID, hash)
}
target, found, err := s.authorizationByHash(ctx, userID, hash)
if err != nil || !found {
return target, found, err
}
if err := s.deleteAuthKey(ctx, target.AuthKeyID); err != nil {
return target, true, err
}
deleted, found, err := s.auths.DeleteByHash(ctx, userID, hash)
if err != nil || !found {
return deleted, found, err
}
return deleted, true, nil
}
func (s *Service) ResetAuthorizations(ctx context.Context, userID int64, keepAuthKeyID [8]byte) ([]domain.Authorization, error) {
if s == nil || s.auths == nil || userID == 0 {
return nil, nil
}
return s.auths.DeleteByUserExcept(ctx, userID, keepAuthKeyID)
if revoker, ok := s.auths.(authorizationRevoker); ok {
return revoker.RevokeByUserExcept(ctx, userID, keepAuthKeyID)
}
targets, err := s.authorizationsByUserExcept(ctx, userID, keepAuthKeyID)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
for _, a := range targets {
if err := s.deleteAuthKey(ctx, a.AuthKeyID); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
}
deleted, err := s.auths.DeleteByUserExcept(ctx, userID, keepAuthKeyID)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
return deleted, nil
}
func (s *Service) deleteAuthKey(ctx context.Context, authKeyID [8]byte) error {
if s == nil || s.authKeys == nil || authKeyID == ([8]byte{}) {
return nil
}
return s.authKeys.Delete(ctx, authKeyID)
}
func (s *Service) authorizationByHash(ctx context.Context, userID, hash int64) (domain.Authorization, bool, error) {
items, err := s.auths.ListByUser(ctx, userID)
if err != nil {
return domain.Authorization{}, false, err
}
for _, a := range items {
if a.Hash == hash {
return a, true, nil
}
}
return domain.Authorization{}, false, nil
}
func (s *Service) authorizationsByUserExcept(ctx context.Context, userID int64, keepAuthKeyID [8]byte) ([]domain.Authorization, error) {
items, err := s.auths.ListByUser(ctx, userID)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
out := make([]domain.Authorization, 0, len(items))
for _, a := range items {
if a.AuthKeyID != keepAuthKeyID {
out = append(out, a)
}
}
return out, nil
}
func (s *Service) bind(ctx context.Context, auth domain.Authorization, userID int64) error {
@ -301,11 +642,10 @@ func (s *Service) recordLoginMessage(ctx context.Context, userID int64, code str
if err != nil {
return domain.Message{}, err
}
if err := s.dialogs.Upsert(ctx, userID, domain.Dialog{
if err := s.dialogs.UpsertInbox(ctx, userID, domain.Dialog{
Peer: msg.Peer,
TopMessage: msg.ID,
TopMessageDate: msg.Date,
UnreadCount: 1,
}); err != nil {
return domain.Message{}, err
}
@ -406,17 +746,7 @@ func authKeyIDInt64(id [8]byte) int64 {
}
func normalizePhone(phone string) string {
var b strings.Builder
b.Grow(len(phone))
for _, r := range phone {
if r >= '0' && r <= '9' {
b.WriteRune(r)
}
}
if b.Len() == 0 {
return phone
}
return b.String()
return domain.NormalizePhone(phone)
}
func randomHex(n int) (string, error) {