chore: refresh gramsrv public release
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1274 changed files with 378751 additions and 59919 deletions
187
internal/store/postgres/encrypted_queue_integration_test.go
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187
internal/store/postgres/encrypted_queue_integration_test.go
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package postgres
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import (
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"context"
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"testing"
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"telesrv/internal/domain"
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)
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// TestEncryptedQueueStorePostgres 验证密聊 qts 投递队列 PG 实现：qts 单调分配（首值 1、
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// 无空洞）、幂等去重（同 random_id 返既有 qts/date）、按 qts seek 补差分、reserved/
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// confirmed 水位、ack 标记。门控于 TELESRV_TEST_POSTGRES_DSN。
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func TestEncryptedQueueStorePostgres(t *testing.T) {
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pool := testPool(t)
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ctx := context.Background()
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store := NewEncryptedQueueStore(pool)
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const device = int64(0x7700AA01)
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cleanup := func() {
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_, _ = pool.Exec(ctx, `DELETE FROM encrypted_message_queue WHERE receiver_auth_key_id = $1`, device)
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_, _ = pool.Exec(ctx, `DELETE FROM secret_qts_watermarks WHERE auth_key_id = $1`, device)
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}
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cleanup()
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t.Cleanup(cleanup)
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mk := func(randomID int64, b byte) domain.SecretChatMessage {
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return domain.SecretChatMessage{
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ReceiverAuthKeyID: device,
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ReceiverUserID: 99,
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ChatID: 7,
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RandomID: randomID,
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Date: int(1000 + randomID),
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Bytes: []byte{b, b, b},
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}
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}
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// qts 从 1 起单调分配。
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m1, existing, err := store.AppendEncryptedMessage(ctx, mk(101, 0x11))
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if err != nil || existing || m1.Qts != 1 {
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t.Fatalf("append 1 = qts %d existing %v err %v, want qts=1 existing=false", m1.Qts, existing, err)
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}
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m2, _, err := store.AppendEncryptedMessage(ctx, mk(102, 0x22))
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if err != nil || m2.Qts != 2 {
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t.Fatalf("append 2 = qts %d err %v, want 2", m2.Qts, err)
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}
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// 幂等：同 random_id 返既有 qts/date，不重分配。
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dup, existing, err := store.AppendEncryptedMessage(ctx, mk(101, 0x99))
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if err != nil || !existing || dup.Qts != 1 || dup.Date != m1.Date {
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t.Fatalf("dedup = qts %d date %d existing %v, want qts=1 date=%d existing=true", dup.Qts, dup.Date, existing, m1.Date)
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}
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if string(dup.Bytes) != string([]byte{0x11, 0x11, 0x11}) {
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t.Fatalf("dedup must return first-stored bytes, got %x", dup.Bytes)
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}
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// reserved qts = 2。
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if q, err := store.ReservedQts(ctx, device); err != nil || q != 2 {
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t.Fatalf("reserved qts = %d err %v, want 2", q, err)
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}
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// 补差分：since 0 → 2 条；since 1 → 1 条（qts=2）。
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msgs, err := store.ListEncryptedMessagesSince(ctx, device, 0, 0)
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if err != nil || len(msgs) != 2 || msgs[0].Qts != 1 || msgs[1].Qts != 2 {
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t.Fatalf("list since 0 = %+v err %v, want qts 1,2", msgs, err)
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}
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msgs, _ = store.ListEncryptedMessagesSince(ctx, device, 1, 0)
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if len(msgs) != 1 || msgs[0].Qts != 2 {
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t.Fatalf("list since 1 = %+v, want qts 2", msgs)
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}
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// ack 到 1：confirmed 推进；回退 ack（0）幂等忽略。
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if err := store.AckEncryptedMessages(ctx, device, 1); err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("ack: %v", err)
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}
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if err := store.AckEncryptedMessages(ctx, device, 0); err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("ack rollback should be no-op: %v", err)
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}
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var confirmed int
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if err := pool.QueryRow(ctx, `SELECT confirmed_qts FROM secret_qts_watermarks WHERE auth_key_id = $1`, device).Scan(&confirmed); err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("read confirmed: %v", err)
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}
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if confirmed != 1 {
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t.Fatalf("confirmed qts = %d, want 1", confirmed)
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}
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// 未参与设备 reserved = 0。
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if q, err := store.ReservedQts(ctx, int64(0xDEADBEEF)); err != nil || q != 0 {
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t.Fatalf("unrelated device reserved = %d err %v, want 0", q, err)
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}
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}
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// TestEncryptedStateEventsPostgres 验证密聊状态事件 PG 实现：账号级（target_auth_key_id=0）
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// 对该 user 所有设备可见、设备级仅对绑定设备可见、未投递标记一次性投递。
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func TestEncryptedStateEventsPostgres(t *testing.T) {
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pool := testPool(t)
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ctx := context.Background()
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store := NewEncryptedQueueStore(pool)
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const (
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user = int64(0x7700BB01)
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devA = int64(0x7700BB0A)
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devB = int64(0x7700BB0B)
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otherKy = int64(0x7700BB0C)
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)
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cleanup := func() {
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_, _ = pool.Exec(ctx, `DELETE FROM encrypted_state_events WHERE target_user_id = $1`, user)
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}
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cleanup()
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t.Cleanup(cleanup)
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// 账号级事件（target_auth_key_id=0）+ 设备级事件（绑定 devA）。
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accountEvID, err := store.AppendStateEvent(ctx, domain.EncryptedStateEvent{
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TargetUserID: user, TargetAuthKeyID: 0, ChatID: 11, Type: domain.EncryptedStateEventEncryption, Date: 1000,
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})
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if err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("append account event: %v", err)
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}
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devAEvID, err := store.AppendStateEvent(ctx, domain.EncryptedStateEvent{
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TargetUserID: user, TargetAuthKeyID: devA, ChatID: 12, Type: domain.EncryptedStateEventRead, MaxDate: 1500, Date: 1001,
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})
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if err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("append device event: %v", err)
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}
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// devA 未投递：账号级 + 设备级 = 2 条。
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evs, err := store.ListUndeliveredStateEvents(ctx, user, devA, 0)
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if err != nil || len(evs) != 2 {
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t.Fatalf("devA undelivered = %d err %v, want 2", len(evs), err)
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}
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// devB 未投递：仅账号级 = 1 条（看不到 devA 的设备级事件）。
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evs, _ = store.ListUndeliveredStateEvents(ctx, user, devB, 0)
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if len(evs) != 1 || evs[0].ID != accountEvID {
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t.Fatalf("devB undelivered = %+v, want only account event %d", evs, accountEvID)
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}
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// devA 标记两条已投递 → 再列为空；devB 仍能看到账号级（独立投递标记）。
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if err := store.MarkStateEventsDelivered(ctx, devA, []int64{accountEvID, devAEvID}); err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("mark delivered: %v", err)
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}
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if evs, _ := store.ListUndeliveredStateEvents(ctx, user, devA, 0); len(evs) != 0 {
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t.Fatalf("devA after deliver = %d, want 0", len(evs))
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}
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if evs, _ := store.ListUndeliveredStateEvents(ctx, user, devB, 0); len(evs) != 1 {
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t.Fatalf("devB after devA deliver = %d, want 1 (独立标记)", len(evs))
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}
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// 幂等重复 mark 不报错。
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if err := store.MarkStateEventsDelivered(ctx, devA, []int64{accountEvID}); err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("idempotent mark: %v", err)
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}
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// 无关设备（不同 user 维度）：用同 user 但全新 key 仍看账号级。
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if evs, _ := store.ListUndeliveredStateEvents(ctx, user, otherKy, 0); len(evs) != 1 {
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t.Fatalf("fresh device undelivered = %d, want 1 account-level", len(evs))
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}
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}
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// TestEncryptedFilesPostgres 验证密聊文件元数据 PG 实现：put/get round-trip、access_hash
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// 校验、不存在返回 found=false。门控于 TELESRV_TEST_POSTGRES_DSN。
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func TestEncryptedFilesPostgres(t *testing.T) {
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pool := testPool(t)
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ctx := context.Background()
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store := NewEncryptedQueueStore(pool)
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const fileID = int64(0x7700CC01)
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cleanup := func() { _, _ = pool.Exec(ctx, `DELETE FROM encrypted_files WHERE id = $1`, fileID) }
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cleanup()
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t.Cleanup(cleanup)
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ref := domain.EncryptedFileRef{ID: fileID, AccessHash: 0xABCD, Size: 4096, DCID: 2, KeyFingerprint: 12345}
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if err := store.PutEncryptedFile(ctx, 77, ref); err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("put: %v", err)
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}
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got, found, err := store.GetEncryptedFile(ctx, fileID, 0xABCD)
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if err != nil || !found {
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t.Fatalf("get: found=%v err=%v", found, err)
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}
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if got != ref {
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t.Fatalf("round-trip mismatch: %+v vs %+v", got, ref)
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}
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// 错 access_hash → 不命中。
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if _, found, _ := store.GetEncryptedFile(ctx, fileID, 0x9999); found {
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t.Fatal("wrong access_hash must not match")
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}
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// 幂等覆盖。
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if err := store.PutEncryptedFile(ctx, 77, ref); err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("idempotent put: %v", err)
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}
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}
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