feat: sync multilayer td integration
This commit is contained in:
A
parent
20a310f6ca
commit
766c5db992
491 changed files with 26235 additions and 35340 deletions
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@ -8,7 +8,6 @@ import (
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"time"
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"github.com/jackc/pgx/v5"
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"github.com/jackc/pgx/v5/pgconn"
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"github.com/jackc/pgx/v5/pgtype"
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"telesrv/internal/store"
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@ -56,24 +55,26 @@ WHERE auth_keys.body = EXCLUDED.body
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// 注册进 SessionManager”的窗口被后台清理。
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func (s *AuthKeyStore) Get(ctx context.Context, id [8]byte) (store.AuthKeyData, bool, error) {
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var (
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body []byte
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serverSalt int64
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expiresAt int
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createdAt pgtype.Timestamptz
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layer int
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deviceModel string
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platform string
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systemVersion string
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apiID int
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appVersion string
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body []byte
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serverSalt int64
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expiresAt int
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createdAt pgtype.Timestamptz
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layer int
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layerObservationID int64
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deviceModel string
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platform string
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systemVersion string
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apiID int
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appVersion string
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)
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err := s.db.QueryRow(ctx, `
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UPDATE auth_keys
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SET last_used_at = now()
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WHERE auth_key_id = $1
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RETURNING auth_key_id, body, server_salt, created_at,
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expires_at, layer, device_model, platform, system_version, api_id, app_version
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`, authKeyIDToInt64(id)).Scan(new(int64), &body, &serverSalt, &createdAt, &expiresAt, &layer, &deviceModel, &platform, &systemVersion, &apiID, &appVersion)
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expires_at, layer, layer_observation_id,
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device_model, platform, system_version, api_id, app_version
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`, authKeyIDToInt64(id)).Scan(new(int64), &body, &serverSalt, &createdAt, &expiresAt, &layer, &layerObservationID, &deviceModel, &platform, &systemVersion, &apiID, &appVersion)
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if err != nil {
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if errors.Is(err, pgx.ErrNoRows) {
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return store.AuthKeyData{}, false, nil
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@ -84,15 +85,16 @@ RETURNING auth_key_id, body, server_salt, created_at,
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return store.AuthKeyData{}, false, fmt.Errorf("auth key body length = %d, want 256", len(body))
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}
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data := store.AuthKeyData{
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ID: id,
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ServerSalt: serverSalt,
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ExpiresAt: expiresAt,
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Layer: layer,
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DeviceModel: deviceModel,
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Platform: platform,
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SystemVersion: systemVersion,
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APIID: apiID,
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AppVersion: appVersion,
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ID: id,
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ServerSalt: serverSalt,
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ExpiresAt: expiresAt,
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Layer: layer,
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LayerObservationID: layerObservationID,
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DeviceModel: deviceModel,
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Platform: platform,
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SystemVersion: systemVersion,
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APIID: apiID,
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AppVersion: appVersion,
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}
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copy(data.Value[:], body)
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if createdAt.Valid {
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@ -148,7 +150,8 @@ WHERE auth_key_id = ANY($1::bigint[])`, batch)
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}
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func (s *AuthKeyStore) UpdateClientInfo(ctx context.Context, id [8]byte, info store.AuthKeyClientInfo) error {
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if _, err := s.db.Exec(ctx, `
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var updated int
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err := s.db.QueryRow(ctx, `
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UPDATE auth_keys
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SET layer = CASE WHEN $2::integer > 0 THEN $2 ELSE layer END,
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device_model = CASE WHEN $3::text <> '' THEN $3 ELSE device_model END,
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@ -157,7 +160,31 @@ SET layer = CASE WHEN $2::integer > 0 THEN $2 ELSE layer END,
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api_id = CASE WHEN $6::integer <> 0 THEN $6 ELSE api_id END,
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app_version = CASE WHEN $7::text <> '' THEN $7 ELSE app_version END
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WHERE auth_key_id = $1
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`, authKeyIDToInt64(id), info.Layer, info.DeviceModel, info.Platform, info.SystemVersion, info.APIID, info.AppVersion); err != nil {
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AND ($2::integer <= 0 OR layer_observation_id = 0 OR layer = $2::integer)
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RETURNING 1
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`, authKeyIDToInt64(id), info.Layer, info.DeviceModel, info.Platform, info.SystemVersion, info.APIID, info.AppVersion).Scan(&updated)
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if err != nil {
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if errors.Is(err, pgx.ErrNoRows) {
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var (
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currentLayer int
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observation int64
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)
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lookupErr := s.db.QueryRow(ctx, `
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SELECT layer, layer_observation_id
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FROM auth_keys
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WHERE auth_key_id = $1
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`, authKeyIDToInt64(id)).Scan(¤tLayer, &observation)
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switch {
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case errors.Is(lookupErr, pgx.ErrNoRows):
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return store.ErrAuthKeyNotFound
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case lookupErr != nil:
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return fmt.Errorf("classify auth key client info update: %w", lookupErr)
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case info.Layer > 0 && observation > 0 && currentLayer != info.Layer:
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return store.ErrAuthKeySessionLayerConflict
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default:
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return fmt.Errorf("update auth key client info: guarded update affected no row")
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}
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}
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return fmt.Errorf("update auth key client info: %w", err)
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}
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return nil
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@ -171,25 +198,20 @@ WHERE auth_key_id = $1
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// RESTRICT FK 防止悬空，因此被踢/销毁 perm key 时必须先把关联 temp key 一并删掉。否则 Web/上传连接用
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// raw temp key 重连时仍能进入 RPC 层，只得到 AUTH_KEY_UNREGISTERED，而不是连接层 404。
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func (s *AuthKeyStore) Delete(ctx context.Context, id [8]byte) error {
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for attempt := 0; attempt < 3; attempt++ {
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err := s.deleteAuthKeyOnce(ctx, id)
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if err == nil {
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return nil
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}
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if !isPermAuthKeyDeleteRace(err) {
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return err
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}
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if _, inTx := s.db.(pgx.Tx); inTx {
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return err
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}
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}
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return fmt.Errorf("delete auth key: permanent-key binding changed during all retries")
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return withAuthIdentityTx(ctx, s.db, "delete auth key", func(tx pgx.Tx) error {
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return deleteAuthKeyTx(ctx, tx, authKeyIDToInt64(id))
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})
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}
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func (s *AuthKeyStore) deleteAuthKeyOnce(ctx context.Context, id [8]byte) error {
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keyID := authKeyIDToInt64(id)
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func deleteAuthKeyTx(ctx context.Context, tx pgx.Tx, keyID int64) error {
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if _, _, _, err := lockRawAuthKeyInIdentityOrder(ctx, tx, keyID); err != nil {
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if errors.Is(err, store.ErrAuthKeyNotFound) {
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return nil
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}
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return err
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}
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var touched int
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if err := s.db.QueryRow(ctx, `
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if err := tx.QueryRow(ctx, `
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WITH doomed_temp AS MATERIALIZED (
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SELECT temp_auth_key_id
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FROM temp_auth_key_bindings
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@ -225,13 +247,6 @@ SELECT
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const tempAuthKeyPermFKConstraint = "temp_auth_key_bindings_perm_auth_key_id_fkey"
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func isPermAuthKeyDeleteRace(err error) bool {
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var pgErr *pgconn.PgError
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return errors.As(err, &pgErr) &&
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pgErr.Code == "23503" &&
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pgErr.ConstraintName == tempAuthKeyPermFKConstraint
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}
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// DeleteOrphaned 回收握手已落库、但从未形成 authorization/temp binding 且当前没有
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// 活跃物理连接的旧 auth key。last_used_at 与 Get 的 UPDATE ... RETURNING 行锁配对，封住
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// active-key 快照之后新连接开始使用旧 key 的竞态；所有引用条件仍在最终 DELETE 中复核。
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@ -248,51 +263,140 @@ func (s *AuthKeyStore) DeleteOrphaned(ctx context.Context, olderThan time.Durati
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protectedIDs = append(protectedIDs, authKeyIDToInt64(id))
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}
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var deleted int
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err := s.db.QueryRow(ctx, `
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WITH candidates AS MATERIALIZED (
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err := withAuthIdentityTx(ctx, s.db, "delete orphaned auth keys", func(tx pgx.Tx) error {
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var err error
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deleted, err = deleteOrphanedAuthKeysTx(ctx, tx, olderThan, limit, protectedIDs)
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return err
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})
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if err != nil {
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return 0, fmt.Errorf("delete orphaned auth keys: %w", err)
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}
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return deleted, nil
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}
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func deleteOrphanedAuthKeysTx(
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ctx context.Context,
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tx pgx.Tx,
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olderThan time.Duration,
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limit int,
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protectedIDs []int64,
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) (int, error) {
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// Phase 1 is only a bounded hint. It must not lock rows before the complete
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// permanent-identity advisory set has been derived and acquired.
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rows, err := tx.Query(ctx, `
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/* orphan_identity_candidates */
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SELECT k.auth_key_id, k.expires_at
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FROM auth_keys AS k
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WHERE k.last_used_at < now() - make_interval(secs => $1::double precision)
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AND NOT (k.auth_key_id = ANY($2::bigint[]))
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AND NOT EXISTS (
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SELECT 1 FROM authorizations AS a WHERE a.auth_key_id = k.auth_key_id
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)
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AND NOT EXISTS (
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SELECT 1
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FROM temp_auth_key_bindings AS b
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WHERE b.temp_auth_key_id = k.auth_key_id OR b.perm_auth_key_id = k.auth_key_id
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)
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ORDER BY k.last_used_at, k.auth_key_id
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LIMIT $3`, olderThan.Seconds(), protectedIDs, limit)
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if err != nil {
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return 0, fmt.Errorf("select orphan auth key candidates: %w", err)
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}
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candidates := make([]int64, 0, limit)
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permanentCandidates := make([]int64, 0, limit)
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for rows.Next() {
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var (
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id int64
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expiresAt int
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)
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if err := rows.Scan(&id, &expiresAt); err != nil {
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rows.Close()
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return 0, fmt.Errorf("scan orphan auth key candidate: %w", err)
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}
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candidates = append(candidates, id)
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if expiresAt == 0 {
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permanentCandidates = append(permanentCandidates, id)
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}
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}
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if err := rows.Err(); err != nil {
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rows.Close()
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return 0, fmt.Errorf("iterate orphan auth key candidates: %w", err)
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}
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rows.Close()
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if len(candidates) == 0 {
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return 0, nil
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}
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if err := lockPermanentAuthIdentities(ctx, tx, permanentCandidates); err != nil {
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return 0, err
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}
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// Phase 2 locks only the hinted raw rows, in real-ID order, after every P
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// gate is held. A temp bind already holding its raw row is skipped; if it
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// committed immediately before this lock, phase 3's new READ COMMITTED
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// statement sees the binding and excludes it.
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lockRows, err := tx.Query(ctx, `
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SELECT auth_key_id
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FROM auth_keys
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WHERE auth_key_id = ANY($1::bigint[])
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ORDER BY auth_key_id
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FOR UPDATE SKIP LOCKED`, candidates)
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if err != nil {
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return 0, fmt.Errorf("lock orphan auth key candidates: %w", err)
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}
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lockedIDs := make([]int64, 0, len(candidates))
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for lockRows.Next() {
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var id int64
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if err := lockRows.Scan(&id); err != nil {
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lockRows.Close()
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return 0, fmt.Errorf("scan locked orphan auth key: %w", err)
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}
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lockedIDs = append(lockedIDs, id)
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}
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if err := lockRows.Err(); err != nil {
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lockRows.Close()
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return 0, fmt.Errorf("iterate locked orphan auth keys: %w", err)
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}
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lockRows.Close()
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if len(lockedIDs) == 0 {
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return 0, nil
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}
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// Phase 3 is a separate statement snapshot and repeats every ownership,
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// activity and protection predicate. Never delete from the phase-1 hint.
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var deleted int
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err = tx.QueryRow(ctx, `
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WITH still_orphaned AS MATERIALIZED (
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SELECT k.auth_key_id
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FROM auth_keys k
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WHERE k.last_used_at < now() - make_interval(secs => $1::double precision)
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AND NOT (k.auth_key_id = ANY($2::bigint[]))
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AND NOT EXISTS (
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SELECT 1 FROM authorizations a WHERE a.auth_key_id = k.auth_key_id
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)
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AND NOT EXISTS (
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SELECT 1
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FROM temp_auth_key_bindings b
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WHERE b.temp_auth_key_id = k.auth_key_id OR b.perm_auth_key_id = k.auth_key_id
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)
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ORDER BY k.last_used_at ASC, k.auth_key_id ASC
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LIMIT $3
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FOR UPDATE OF k SKIP LOCKED
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), deleted_update_states AS (
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-- Historical authorization-only deletion could leave a cursor without an
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-- auth_keys FK. GC owns that stale row once the raw key is proven orphaned.
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DELETE FROM update_states s
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USING candidates c
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WHERE s.auth_key_id = c.auth_key_id
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RETURNING s.auth_key_id
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), deleted_keys AS (
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DELETE FROM auth_keys k
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USING candidates c
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WHERE k.auth_key_id = c.auth_key_id
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FROM auth_keys AS k
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WHERE k.auth_key_id = ANY($3::bigint[])
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AND k.last_used_at < now() - make_interval(secs => $1::double precision)
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AND NOT (k.auth_key_id = ANY($2::bigint[]))
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AND NOT EXISTS (
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SELECT 1 FROM authorizations a WHERE a.auth_key_id = k.auth_key_id
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SELECT 1 FROM authorizations AS a WHERE a.auth_key_id = k.auth_key_id
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)
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AND NOT EXISTS (
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SELECT 1
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FROM temp_auth_key_bindings b
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FROM temp_auth_key_bindings AS b
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WHERE b.temp_auth_key_id = k.auth_key_id OR b.perm_auth_key_id = k.auth_key_id
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)
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RETURNING k.auth_key_id
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), deleted_update_states AS (
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DELETE FROM update_states AS state
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USING still_orphaned AS orphan
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WHERE state.auth_key_id = orphan.auth_key_id
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RETURNING state.auth_key_id
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), deleted_keys AS (
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DELETE FROM auth_keys AS key
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USING still_orphaned AS orphan
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WHERE key.auth_key_id = orphan.auth_key_id
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RETURNING key.auth_key_id
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)
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SELECT count(*)::int
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SELECT count(*)::integer
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FROM deleted_keys
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CROSS JOIN LATERAL (SELECT count(*) FROM deleted_update_states) AS touched`, olderThan.Seconds(), protectedIDs, limit).Scan(&deleted)
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CROSS JOIN LATERAL (SELECT count(*) FROM deleted_update_states) AS touched`,
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olderThan.Seconds(), protectedIDs, lockedIDs,
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).Scan(&deleted)
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if err != nil {
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return 0, fmt.Errorf("delete orphaned auth keys: %w", err)
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return 0, fmt.Errorf("delete revalidated orphan auth keys: %w", err)
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}
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return deleted, nil
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}
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