feat: sync multilayer td integration

This commit is contained in:
A 2026-07-15 13:32:06 +08:00
parent 20a310f6ca
commit 766c5db992
491 changed files with 26235 additions and 35340 deletions

View file

@ -29,17 +29,9 @@ func (s *AuthorizationStore) Bind(ctx context.Context, a domain.Authorization) e
if a.Hash == 0 {
a.Hash = authorizationHash(a.AuthKeyID)
}
bind := func(db sqlcgen.DBTX) error {
return bindAuthorization(ctx, db, a)
}
var err error
if tx, ok := s.db.(pgx.Tx); ok {
err = bind(tx)
} else {
err = withTx(ctx, s.db, "bind authorization", func(tx pgx.Tx) error {
return bind(tx)
})
}
err := withAuthIdentityTx(ctx, s.db, "bind authorization", func(tx pgx.Tx) error {
return bindAuthorization(ctx, tx, a)
})
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("upsert authorization: %w", err)
}
@ -55,20 +47,35 @@ func (s *AuthorizationStore) Bind(ctx context.Context, a domain.Authorization) e
// raw auth key 的并发登录/换号。
func bindAuthorization(ctx context.Context, db sqlcgen.DBTX, a domain.Authorization) error {
keyID := authKeyIDToInt64(a.AuthKeyID)
tx, ok := db.(pgx.Tx)
if !ok {
return fmt.Errorf("bind authorization requires a transaction")
}
if err := lockPermanentAuthIdentities(ctx, tx, []int64{keyID}); err != nil {
return err
}
var (
lockedKeyID int64
expiresAt int
lockedKeyID int64
expiresAt int
authLayer int
layerObservationID int64
)
if err := db.QueryRow(ctx, `
SELECT auth_key_id, expires_at
SELECT auth_key_id, expires_at, layer, layer_observation_id
FROM auth_keys
WHERE auth_key_id = $1
FOR UPDATE`, keyID).Scan(&lockedKeyID, &expiresAt); err != nil {
FOR UPDATE`, keyID).Scan(&lockedKeyID, &expiresAt, &authLayer, &layerObservationID); err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("lock auth key for authorization: %w", err)
}
if expiresAt != 0 {
return store.ErrAuthKeyNotPermanent
}
if authLayer < 0 || layerObservationID < 0 || (layerObservationID > 0 && authLayer == 0) {
return fmt.Errorf(
"authorization auth-key layer invariant violation: auth key %x has layer %d observation %d",
a.AuthKeyID, authLayer, layerObservationID,
)
}
if _, err := db.Exec(ctx, `
INSERT INTO user_update_watermarks (user_id, contiguous_pts)
@ -154,7 +161,7 @@ ON CONFLICT (auth_key_id) DO UPDATE SET
ip = EXCLUDED.ip,
password_pending = EXCLUDED.password_pending,
active_at = now()`,
keyID, a.UserID, a.Hash, int32(a.Layer), a.DeviceModel, a.Platform, a.SystemVersion, int32(a.APIID), a.AppVersion, a.IP, a.PasswordPending,
keyID, a.UserID, a.Hash, int32(authLayer), a.DeviceModel, a.Platform, a.SystemVersion, int32(a.APIID), a.AppVersion, a.IP, a.PasswordPending,
); err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("write authorization: %w", err)
}
@ -178,18 +185,6 @@ FROM authorizations WHERE auth_key_id = $1`, authKeyIDToInt64(id))
return a, true, nil
}
func (s *AuthorizationStore) UpdateLayer(ctx context.Context, id [8]byte, layer int) error {
if layer <= 0 {
return nil
}
if _, err := s.db.Exec(ctx, `
UPDATE authorizations SET layer = $2, active_at = now() WHERE auth_key_id = $1`,
authKeyIDToInt64(id), int32(layer)); err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("update authorization layer: %w", err)
}
return nil
}
func (s *AuthorizationStore) UpdateClientInfo(ctx context.Context, id [8]byte, info domain.AuthKeyClientInfo) error {
if _, err := s.db.Exec(ctx, `
UPDATE authorizations SET
@ -261,34 +256,19 @@ RETURNING auth_key_id, user_id, hash, layer, device_model, platform, system_vers
// authorizations 通过 FK cascade 删除update_states 没有 auth_keys FK必须显式清理
// 关联 temp auth key 也显式删除,避免 raw temp key 重连。
func (s *AuthorizationStore) RevokeByHash(ctx context.Context, userID, hash int64) (domain.Authorization, bool, error) {
for attempt := 0; attempt < 3; attempt++ {
var (
a domain.Authorization
found bool
)
err := s.withRevocationTx(ctx, "revoke authorization by hash", func(tx pgx.Tx) error {
var err error
a, found, err = revokeByHashTx(ctx, tx, userID, hash)
return err
})
if err == nil {
return a, found, nil
}
if !isPermAuthKeyDeleteRace(err) {
return domain.Authorization{}, false, err
}
if _, inTx := s.db.(pgx.Tx); inTx {
return domain.Authorization{}, false, err
}
var (
a domain.Authorization
found bool
)
err := withAuthIdentityTx(ctx, s.db, "revoke authorization by hash", func(tx pgx.Tx) error {
var err error
a, found, err = revokeByHashTx(ctx, tx, userID, hash)
return err
})
if err != nil {
return domain.Authorization{}, false, err
}
return domain.Authorization{}, false, fmt.Errorf("revoke authorization by hash: permanent-key binding changed during all retries")
}
func (s *AuthorizationStore) withRevocationTx(ctx context.Context, op string, fn func(pgx.Tx) error) error {
if tx, ok := s.db.(pgx.Tx); ok {
return fn(tx)
}
return withTx(ctx, s.db, op, fn)
return a, found, nil
}
// revokeByHashTx deliberately uses separate READ COMMITTED statements. The first
@ -307,6 +287,9 @@ WHERE user_id = $1 AND hash = $2`, userID, hash).Scan(&candidate); err != nil {
}
return domain.Authorization{}, false, fmt.Errorf("select revoke candidate by hash: %w", err)
}
if err := lockPermanentAuthIdentities(ctx, tx, []int64{candidate}); err != nil {
return domain.Authorization{}, false, err
}
var locked int64
if err := tx.QueryRow(ctx, `
@ -368,24 +351,13 @@ RETURNING auth_key_id, user_id, hash, layer, device_model, platform, system_vers
// RevokeByUserExcept 批量删除协议 auth_key保留 keepAuthKeyID 对应的当前设备。
func (s *AuthorizationStore) RevokeByUserExcept(ctx context.Context, userID int64, keepAuthKeyID [8]byte) ([]domain.Authorization, error) {
for attempt := 0; attempt < 3; attempt++ {
var out []domain.Authorization
err := s.withRevocationTx(ctx, "revoke authorizations by user", func(tx pgx.Tx) error {
var err error
out, err = revokeByUserExceptTx(ctx, tx, userID, authKeyIDToInt64(keepAuthKeyID))
return err
})
if err == nil {
return out, nil
}
if !isPermAuthKeyDeleteRace(err) {
return nil, err
}
if _, inTx := s.db.(pgx.Tx); inTx {
return nil, err
}
}
return nil, fmt.Errorf("revoke authorizations by user: permanent-key binding changed during all retries")
var out []domain.Authorization
err := withAuthIdentityTx(ctx, s.db, "revoke authorizations by user", func(tx pgx.Tx) error {
var err error
out, err = revokeByUserExceptTx(ctx, tx, userID, authKeyIDToInt64(keepAuthKeyID))
return err
})
return out, err
}
func revokeByUserExceptTx(ctx context.Context, tx pgx.Tx, userID, keepAuthKeyID int64) ([]domain.Authorization, error) {
@ -414,9 +386,12 @@ ORDER BY auth_key_id`, userID, keepAuthKeyID)
if len(candidates) == 0 {
return []domain.Authorization{}, nil
}
if err := lockPermanentAuthIdentities(ctx, tx, candidates); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
// Stable parent-row lock order matches every concurrent batch revocation and
// serializes each candidate with Bind's auth_keys-first ownership change.
// Advisory keys are already all held in final int32-hash order. Parent rows
// are then locked by their real bigint IDs for deterministic batch behavior.
lockRows, err := tx.Query(ctx, `
SELECT auth_key_id
FROM auth_keys