test(mtproto): cover single-backend DC aliases

Follow up gramsrv PR #17 with boundary coverage and public configuration docs.

Canonical-Telesrv: b4df3e72c24470e4ce09e5fc1d46e0c2944f6d3e

Reviewed-Head: e7eb07b9eb

Co-authored-by: onysd <beatvin128@gmail.com>

.env.example

@@ -7,6 +7,8 @@
 TELESRV_LISTEN=0.0.0.0:2398
 TELESRV_ADVERTISE_IP=127.0.0.1
 TELESRV_DC=2
+# Single-backend default: accept any client wire DC label during key exchange.
+TELESRV_STRICT_DC_CHECK=false
 TELESRV_DEV_AUTH_CODE=12345
 TELESRV_AUTH_CODE_TTL=5m
 TELESRV_AUTH_CODE_MAX_ATTEMPTS=5

docs/configuration.en.md

@@ -21,7 +21,8 @@ This document describes every setting loaded by `internal/config`. Defaults and
 | `TELESRV_LISTEN` | string / `0.0.0.0:2398` | MTProto TCP listen address. Must match the address/port reachable by patched clients. |
 | `TELESRV_ADVERTISE_IP` | string / `127.0.0.1` | Client-reachable server IP used by media/call fallbacks. The current static Desktop DC patch does not derive its MTProto endpoint from this value. |
 | `TELESRV_RSA_KEY` | path / `data/server_rsa.pem` | MTProto RSA private key. Generated when missing. Treat the file as a secret and keep it stable across restarts. |
-| `TELESRV_DC` | int / `2` | Server DC ID. Must match patched client expectations and stored media/DC metadata. |
+| `TELESRV_DC` | int / `2` | Canonical server DC ID used in server-originated configuration and media/DC metadata. It does not partition key-exchange state on the current single backend. |
+| `TELESRV_STRICT_DC_CHECK` | bool / `false` | Default `false` accepts every wire int32 DC label for permanent and temporary key exchange. `true` requires permanent `dc_id == TELESRV_DC` and temporary `abs(dc_id) == TELESRV_DC`; it is only a diagnostic and does not provide multi-DC isolation. |
 | `TELESRV_WEBSOCKET_ENABLE` | bool / `true` | Enables MTProto-over-WebSocket demultiplexing on the MTProto listener. |
 | `TELESRV_WEBSOCKET_ALLOWED_ORIGINS` | list / `http://localhost:1234,http://127.0.0.1:1234` | Browser WebSocket origin allow-list. `*` is for temporary debugging only. |
 | `TELESRV_MTPROTO_MAX_CONNECTIONS` | int / `200000` | Global physical connection admission limit. Negative disables this gate. |

docs/configuration.zh-CN.md

@@ -21,7 +21,8 @@
 | `TELESRV_LISTEN` | string / `0.0.0.0:2398` | MTProto TCP 监听地址，必须与 patched 客户端可达地址/端口一致。 |
 | `TELESRV_ADVERTISE_IP` | string / `127.0.0.1` | 媒体、通话等回退路径使用的客户端可达 IP；当前 TDesktop 静态 DC patch 不从这里获取 MTProto 地址。 |
 | `TELESRV_RSA_KEY` | path / `data/server_rsa.pem` | MTProto RSA 私钥；缺失时自动生成。属于敏感文件，重启和升级间必须稳定保存。 |
-| `TELESRV_DC` | int / `2` | 服务端 DC ID，必须与客户端 patch 及媒体/DC 元数据一致。 |
+| `TELESRV_DC` | int / `2` | 服务端输出配置及媒体/DC 元数据使用的规范 DC ID；当前单后端不会按它分区密钥交换状态。 |
+| `TELESRV_STRICT_DC_CHECK` | bool / `false` | 默认 `false`，永久与临时密钥交换接受任意 wire int32 DC 标签。设为 `true` 时永久标签必须等于 `TELESRV_DC`、临时标签绝对值必须等于 `TELESRV_DC`；它仅是诊断开关，不提供多 DC 隔离。 |
 | `TELESRV_WEBSOCKET_ENABLE` | bool / `true` | 在 MTProto 监听端口启用 MTProto-over-WebSocket 分流。 |
 | `TELESRV_WEBSOCKET_ALLOWED_ORIGINS` | list / `http://localhost:1234,http://127.0.0.1:1234` | 浏览器 WebSocket origin 白名单；`*` 只用于临时调试。 |
 | `TELESRV_MTPROTO_MAX_CONNECTIONS` | int / `200000` | 全局物理连接 admission 上限；负数关闭该门禁。 |

internal/config/config.go

@@ -31,12 +31,10 @@ type Config struct {
 	RSAKeyPath string
 	// DC 是本 server 的 DC ID。
 	DC int
-	// StrictDCCheck turns on exact DC-ID validation for the permanent-key
+	// StrictDCCheck enables the default-off key-exchange DC-label diagnostic.
-	// exchange (default off = lenient). See mtprotoedge.Options.StrictDC doc
+	// The normal single-backend mode accepts every wire int32 label without
-	// for the full rationale: telesrv is always a single physical backend, but
+	// partitioning auth keys, sessions, or business state. See
-	// many client forks alias dc_id 1..5 to it, so a mismatched client-chosen
+	// mtprotoedge.Options.StrictDC for the optional strict behavior.
-	// dc_id is expected, not an attack — strict mode exists only for a
-	// hypothetical future real multi-DC deployment.
 	StrictDCCheck bool
 	// MTProtoMaxConnections / PerIP 覆盖 raw Accept、codec sniff、握手到认证 session
 	// 的完整物理连接生命周期；负数关闭对应 admission 上限。

internal/config/config_test.go

@@ -49,6 +49,34 @@ func TestLoadUsesExplicitAdvertiseIP(t *testing.T) {
 	}
 }
 
+func TestLoadStrictDCCheck(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Run("defaults off", func(t *testing.T) {
+		disableDefaultConfigFile(t)
+		t.Setenv("TELESRV_STRICT_DC_CHECK", "")
+
+		cfg, err := Load()
+		if err != nil {
+			t.Fatalf("Load: %v", err)
+		}
+		if cfg.StrictDCCheck {
+			t.Fatal("StrictDCCheck = true, want default false")
+		}
+	})
+
+	t.Run("explicitly enabled", func(t *testing.T) {
+		disableDefaultConfigFile(t)
+		t.Setenv("TELESRV_STRICT_DC_CHECK", "true")
+
+		cfg, err := Load()
+		if err != nil {
+			t.Fatalf("Load: %v", err)
+		}
+		if !cfg.StrictDCCheck {
+			t.Fatal("StrictDCCheck = false, want true")
+		}
+	})
+}
+
 func TestLoadMTProtoAdmissionAndRPCBudgets(t *testing.T) {
 	disableDefaultConfigFile(t)
 	t.Setenv("TELESRV_MTPROTO_MAX_CONNECTIONS", "12345")

internal/mtprotoedge/exchange_compat.go

@@ -25,14 +25,12 @@ import (
 
 // runServerExchange is a gotd server exchange compatibility shim.
 //
-// DrKLO Android marks media temporary auth-key exchange with a negative DC in
+// In the default single-backend mode, p_q_inner_data_dc and
-// p_q_inner_data_temp_dc (for example DC 2 -> -2). gotd v0.158.0 validates this
+// p_q_inner_data_temp_dc carry client routing labels only: every int32 value is
-// field by exact equality and rejects that legitimate media-temp path. The
+// admitted and the label is not persisted or used for key/session identity.
-// temp-key DC check accepts any value whose absolute value matches this
+// This also covers DrKLO Android's negative media-temp labels. StrictDC retains
-// server DC. The permanent-key check is lenient by default too (see
+// exact permanent / absolute-value temporary validation as an explicit,
-// Options.StrictDC doc) — self-hosted single-server deployments commonly
+// default-off diagnostic for a future real multi-DC deployment.
-// have clients that alias dc_id 1..5 to the one backend, so a client-chosen
-// dc_id that isn't our configured DC is expected, not an error.
 func (s *Server) runServerExchange(ctx context.Context, conn transport.Conn) (exchange.ServerExchangeResult, error) {
 	ex := serverExchangeCompat{
 		conn:      conn,
@@ -351,14 +349,7 @@ func (s serverExchangeCompat) validatePQInnerDataDC(d mt.PQInnerDataClass) error
 	case *mt.PQInnerDataDC:
 		if innerDataDC.DC != s.dc {
 			if !s.strictDC {
-				// Lenient by default (Options.StrictDC doc has the full
+				s.log.Debug("Accepted permanent auth key DC alias",
-				// rationale): telesrv is a single physical backend, and
-				// self-hosted client forks commonly alias dc_id 1..5 to this
-				// one server, so a client-chosen dc_id that isn't our
-				// configured DC is expected, not an error. dc_id plays no
-				// role in key derivation, so accepting it doesn't weaken the
-				// exchange.
-				s.log.Debug("Accepted permanent auth key DC mismatch (lenient mode)",
 					zap.Int("server_dc", s.dc),
 					zap.Int("client_dc", innerDataDC.DC))
 				return nil
@@ -369,8 +360,8 @@ func (s serverExchangeCompat) validatePQInnerDataDC(d mt.PQInnerDataClass) error
 		if !sameDCByAbs(innerDataDC.DC, s.dc) && s.strictDC {
 			return wrongDCError(s.dc, innerDataDC.DC)
 		}
-		if innerDataDC.DC < 0 {
+		if !sameDCByAbs(innerDataDC.DC, s.dc) {
-			s.log.Warn("Accepted Android media temp auth key negative DC",
+			s.log.Debug("Accepted temporary auth key DC alias",
 				zap.Int("server_dc", s.dc),
 				zap.Int("client_dc", innerDataDC.DC),
 				zap.Int("expires_in", innerDataDC.ExpiresIn))

internal/mtprotoedge/exchange_test.go

@@ -7,6 +7,7 @@ import (
 	"crypto/rsa"
 	"encoding/binary"
 	"errors"
+	"fmt"
 	"math/big"
 	"net"
 	"testing"
@@ -366,41 +367,85 @@ func TestKeyExchangeAcceptsAndroidMediaTempNegativeDC(t *testing.T) {
 	}
 }
 
-func TestKeyExchangeRejectsWrongNegativeTempDCWhenStrict(t *testing.T) {
+func TestKeyExchangeAcceptsAnyDCLabelByDefault(t *testing.T) {
-	ex := serverExchangeCompat{dc: 2, strictDC: true, log: zaptest.NewLogger(t)}
-	err := ex.validatePQInnerDataDC(&mt.PQInnerDataTempDC{DC: -3})
-	var exErr *exchange.ServerExchangeError
-	if !errors.As(err, &exErr) {
-		t.Fatalf("err = %T %v, want ServerExchangeError", err, err)
-	}
-	if exErr.Code != codec.CodeWrongDC {
-		t.Fatalf("error code = %d, want %d", exErr.Code, codec.CodeWrongDC)
-	}
-}
-
-// TestKeyExchangeAcceptsMismatchedDCByDefault asserts that, in the default
-// lenient mode, neither permanent nor temp key exchange requires dc_id to
-// equal the server's configured DC. telesrv is always a single physical
-// backend; self-hosted client forks commonly alias dc_id 1..5 to it (see
-// Options.StrictDC doc), so a mismatched client-chosen dc_id must not be
-// rejected — doing so previously broke every account whose client picked a
-// starting dc_id other than the server's.
-func TestKeyExchangeAcceptsMismatchedDCByDefault(t *testing.T) {
 	ex := serverExchangeCompat{dc: 2, log: zaptest.NewLogger(t)}
-	if err := ex.validatePQInnerDataDC(&mt.PQInnerDataDC{DC: 3}); err != nil {
+	labels := []int{
-		t.Fatalf("permanent DC mismatch: err = %v, want nil (lenient by default)", err)
+		2,      // canonical
+		3,      // another production DC
+		0,      // no conventional DC mapping
+		-2,     // Android media-temp convention
+		10002,  // test-environment style label
+		-10002, // negative test-environment style label
+		-1 << 31,
+		1<<31 - 1,
 	}
-	if err := ex.validatePQInnerDataDC(&mt.PQInnerDataTempDC{DC: -3}); err != nil {
+
-		t.Fatalf("temp DC mismatch: err = %v, want nil (lenient by default)", err)
+	for _, label := range labels {
+		t.Run(fmt.Sprintf("permanent_%d", label), func(t *testing.T) {
+			if err := ex.validatePQInnerDataDC(&mt.PQInnerDataDC{DC: label}); err != nil {
+				t.Fatalf("validate permanent DC label %d: %v", label, err)
+			}
+		})
+		t.Run(fmt.Sprintf("temporary_%d", label), func(t *testing.T) {
+			if err := ex.validatePQInnerDataDC(&mt.PQInnerDataTempDC{DC: label, ExpiresIn: 60}); err != nil {
+				t.Fatalf("validate temporary DC label %d: %v", label, err)
+			}
+		})
 	}
 }
 
-// TestKeyExchangeRejectsMismatchedPermanentDCWhenStrict asserts that
+func TestKeyExchangePersistsArbitraryPermanentDCLabelByDefault(t *testing.T) {
-// strictDC=true still enforces exact DC-ID equality for permanent-key
+	const clientDC = 10002
-// exchange (kept for a hypothetical future real multi-DC deployment).
+	keys := memory.NewAuthKeyStore()
-func TestKeyExchangeRejectsMismatchedPermanentDCWhenStrict(t *testing.T) {
+	addr, pub, _ := startTestServer(t, Options{DC: 2, AuthKeys: keys})
+
+	_, auth, _ := dialHandshake(t, addr, clientDC, pub)
+	saved, found, err := keys.Get(context.Background(), auth.AuthKey.ID)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("get persisted auth key: %v", err)
+	}
+	if !found {
+		t.Fatalf("auth key %x was not persisted", auth.AuthKey.ID)
+	}
+	if saved.Value != [256]byte(auth.AuthKey.Value) {
+		t.Fatal("persisted auth key value mismatch")
+	}
+}
+
+func TestKeyExchangeStrictDCValidation(t *testing.T) {
 	ex := serverExchangeCompat{dc: 2, strictDC: true, log: zaptest.NewLogger(t)}
-	err := ex.validatePQInnerDataDC(&mt.PQInnerDataDC{DC: 3})
+	tests := []struct {
+		name    string
+		data    mt.PQInnerDataClass
+		wantErr bool
+	}{
+		{name: "permanent exact", data: &mt.PQInnerDataDC{DC: 2}},
+		{name: "permanent other", data: &mt.PQInnerDataDC{DC: 3}, wantErr: true},
+		{name: "permanent zero", data: &mt.PQInnerDataDC{DC: 0}, wantErr: true},
+		{name: "temporary positive exact", data: &mt.PQInnerDataTempDC{DC: 2}},
+		{name: "temporary negative exact", data: &mt.PQInnerDataTempDC{DC: -2}},
+		{name: "temporary other", data: &mt.PQInnerDataTempDC{DC: 3}, wantErr: true},
+		{name: "temporary negative other", data: &mt.PQInnerDataTempDC{DC: -3}, wantErr: true},
+		{name: "temporary test label", data: &mt.PQInnerDataTempDC{DC: 10002}, wantErr: true},
+		{name: "temporary min int32", data: &mt.PQInnerDataTempDC{DC: -1 << 31}, wantErr: true},
+	}
+
+	for _, test := range tests {
+		t.Run(test.name, func(t *testing.T) {
+			err := ex.validatePQInnerDataDC(test.data)
+			if !test.wantErr {
+				if err != nil {
+					t.Fatalf("validate: %v", err)
+				}
+				return
+			}
+			assertWrongDCError(t, err)
+		})
+	}
+}
+
+func assertWrongDCError(t *testing.T, err error) {
+	t.Helper()
 	var exErr *exchange.ServerExchangeError
 	if !errors.As(err, &exErr) {
 		t.Fatalf("err = %T %v, want ServerExchangeError", err, err)

internal/mtprotoedge/server.go

@@ -303,20 +303,12 @@ type Options struct {
 
 	// DC 是本 server 的 DC ID。默认 2。
 	DC int
-	// StrictDC turns on exact DC-ID validation for the permanent-key exchange
+	// StrictDC enables DC-label validation during key exchange. It is false by
-	// (default off = lenient). telesrv is always a single physical backend —
+	// default: this single physical backend accepts every wire int32 label for
-	// there is no real multi-DC federation behind it — but self-hosted client
+	// permanent and temporary keys, and the label never changes auth-key
-	// forks commonly run in "single-server backend" mode, where dc_id 1..5 all
+	// persistence, session identity, or business state. When enabled,
-	// alias to this one server so that any old data referencing a specific
+	// permanent labels must equal DC and temporary labels may equal +/-DC.
-	// dc_id still resolves correctly. When a client adds a new local account it
+	// This diagnostic switch does not itself provide multi-DC isolation.
-	// picks its own starting dc_id (its usual multi-DC load-spreading
-	// behavior, unrelated to which physical server it's actually talking to)
-	// — that choice is not guaranteed to equal our configured DC. Strict
-	// validation would reject those accounts with "-444 wrong dc_id" even
-	// though they are connecting to the right (and only) server; dc_id is a
-	// client-side routing label here, not part of key derivation, so
-	// accepting the mismatch does not weaken the exchange. The switch exists
-	// for a hypothetical future real multi-DC deployment.
 	StrictDC bool
 	// RSAKey 是 server RSA 私钥，用于密钥交换。nil 时无法完成握手。
 	RSAKey *rsa.PrivateKey