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fix: sync protocol and discussion stability fixes

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A 2026-07-12 07:05:02 +08:00
parent 9f73dc20da
commit aa21bd04e1
43 changed files with 7258 additions and 503 deletions
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103
internal/mtprotoedge/encrypted_test.go
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@ -40,25 +40,72 @@ func TestEncryptedPingPong(t *testing.T) {
}
}
// TestDuplicateMsgIDIdempotent 验证 M4：相同 msg_id 的重复 content 请求被幂等处理，
// server 重发已缓存的 rpc_result，并重新 ack，不重复执行业务。
// TestDuplicateMsgIDIdempotent 验证相同物理连接上的重复 content 请求只重新 ACK，
// 原 owner 仍是唯一 rpc_result 发送者。若每次重复都重放完整结果，Android 的
// bad_server_salt 全量重试会把一个启动批次放大成 N 轮孤儿结果并饿死新 request id。
func TestDuplicateMsgIDIdempotent(t *testing.T) {
const dc = 2
addr, pub, _ := startTestServer(t, Options{DC: dc})
handler := &admissionCountingRPC{}
addr, pub, _ := startTestServer(t, Options{DC: dc, RPC: handler})
conn, auth, cipher := dialHandshake(t, addr, dc, pub)
clientMsgID := proto.NewMessageIDGen(time.Now)
msgID := clientMsgID.New(proto.MessageFromClient)
sendEncrypted(t, conn, cipher, auth, msgID, &mt.RPCDropAnswerRequest{ReqMsgID: msgID - 4})
first := collectReplies(t, conn, cipher, auth.AuthKey, mt.MsgsAckTypeID)
mustHave(t, first, proto.ResultTypeID, "first rpc_result")
sendEncrypted(t, conn, cipher, auth, msgID, &tg.HelpGetConfigRequest{})
collectReplyFrames(t, conn, cipher, auth.AuthKey, map[uint32]int{
proto.ResultTypeID: 1,
mt.MsgsAckTypeID: 1,
})
waitForAtomicCalls(t, &handler.calls, 1)
// 相同 msg_id —— 幂等：重发已有 rpc_result，并重新 ack。
sendEncrypted(t, conn, cipher, auth, msgID, &mt.RPCDropAnswerRequest{ReqMsgID: msgID - 4})
second := collectReplies(t, conn, cipher, auth.AuthKey, mt.MsgsAckTypeID)
mustHave(t, second, proto.ResultTypeID, "resent rpc_result")
mustHave(t, second, mt.MsgsAckTypeID, "second ack")
// 用一个小型重试风暴覆盖完成后的 duplicate 路径。TCP 仍存活时原结果已在同一
// 可靠字节流上；每个 duplicate 只需 ACK，不应产生第二个 rpc_result。
const duplicateCount = 16
for i := 0; i < duplicateCount; i++ {
sendEncrypted(t, conn, cipher, auth, msgID, &tg.HelpGetConfigRequest{})
}
frames := collectReplyFrames(t, conn, cipher, auth.AuthKey, map[uint32]int{
mt.MsgsAckTypeID: duplicateCount,
})
for _, frame := range frames {
if frame.TypeID == proto.ResultTypeID {
t.Fatalf("same-connection duplicate emitted an extra rpc_result")
}
}
if got := handler.calls.Load(); got != 1 {
t.Fatalf("same-connection duplicate business calls = %d, want 1", got)
}
}
func TestServiceDuplicateCannotReplaceOriginallyAdmittedPayload(t *testing.T) {
const dc = 2
addr, pub, _ := startTestServer(t, Options{DC: dc})
conn, auth, cipher := dialHandshake(t, addr, dc, pub)
ids := proto.NewMessageIDGen(time.Now)
msgID := ids.New(proto.MessageFromClient)
sendEncryptedWithSeq(t, conn, cipher, auth, msgID, 1, &mt.PingRequest{PingID: 11})
collectReplyFrames(t, conn, cipher, auth.AuthKey, map[uint32]int{
mt.PongTypeID: 1,
mt.MsgsAckTypeID: 1,
})
// Same id/seq/content parity but a destructive replacement body. Duplicate
// handling must use the original committed request class and never execute it.
sendEncryptedWithSeq(t, conn, cipher, auth, msgID, 1, &destroyAuthKeyRequest{})
collectReplyFrames(t, conn, cipher, auth.AuthKey, map[uint32]int{mt.MsgsAckTypeID: 1})
freshID := ids.New(proto.MessageFromClient)
sendEncryptedWithSeq(t, conn, cipher, auth, freshID, 3, &mt.PingRequest{PingID: 22})
replies := collectReplies(t, conn, cipher, auth.AuthKey, mt.PongTypeID)
var pong mt.Pong
if err := pong.Decode(mustHave(t, replies, mt.PongTypeID, "pong after replacement attempt")); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("decode pong: %v", err)
}
if pong.MsgID != freshID || pong.PingID != 22 {
t.Fatalf("pong after replacement = %+v, want msg=%d ping=22", pong, freshID)
}
}
// TestGetFutureSalts 验证 MTProto service message get_future_salts 由连接层直接响应，
@ -268,6 +315,14 @@ func TestOldMessageInFreshContainerAccepted(t *testing.T) {
})
replies := collectReplies(t, conn, cipher, auth.AuthKey, mt.PongTypeID)
createdBuf := mustHave(t, replies, mt.NewSessionCreatedTypeID, "new_session_created")
var created mt.NewSessionCreated
if err := created.Decode(createdBuf); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("decode new_session_created: %v", err)
}
if created.FirstMsgID != oldPingMsgID {
t.Fatalf("new_session_created.first_msg_id = %d, want accepted inner msg_id %d", created.FirstMsgID, oldPingMsgID)
}
buf := mustHave(t, replies, mt.PongTypeID, "pong")
var pong mt.Pong
if err := pong.Decode(buf); err != nil {
@ -382,8 +437,10 @@ func TestBadServerSalt(t *testing.T) {
wrongSalt := auth.ServerSalt + 1
sendEncryptedWithSalt(t, conn, cipher, auth, wrongSalt, reqMsgID, &mt.PingRequest{PingID: 1})
replies := collectReplies(t, conn, cipher, auth.AuthKey, mt.BadServerSaltTypeID)
buf := mustHave(t, replies, mt.BadServerSaltTypeID, "bad_server_salt")
envelope, typeID, buf := readServerMessage(t, conn, cipher, auth.AuthKey)
if typeID != mt.BadServerSaltTypeID {
t.Fatalf("bad salt reply type = %#x, want %#x", typeID, mt.BadServerSaltTypeID)
}
var bad mt.BadServerSalt
if err := bad.Decode(buf); err != nil {
@ -398,6 +455,11 @@ func TestBadServerSalt(t *testing.T) {
if bad.NewServerSalt != auth.ServerSalt {
t.Fatalf("bad_server_salt.new_server_salt = %#x, want %#x", bad.NewServerSalt, auth.ServerSalt)
}
// DrKLO stores the salt from the encrypted envelope, not only the TL payload.
// A mismatch makes every correction ineffective and re-enters the resend storm.
if envelope.Salt != bad.NewServerSalt {
t.Fatalf("bad_server_salt envelope salt = %#x, payload = %#x", envelope.Salt, bad.NewServerSalt)
}
}
func TestBadMsgSeqOddExpected(t *testing.T) {
@ -470,7 +532,7 @@ func TestBadMsgSeqTooHigh(t *testing.T) {
func TestSessionChangeResetsClientSeqState(t *testing.T) {
const dc = 2
addr, pub, _ := startTestServer(t, Options{DC: dc})
addr, pub, srv := startTestServer(t, Options{DC: dc})
conn, auth, cipher := dialHandshake(t, addr, dc, pub)
clientMsgID := proto.NewMessageIDGen(time.Now)
@ -492,6 +554,19 @@ func TestSessionChangeResetsClientSeqState(t *testing.T) {
}
mustHave(t, replies, mt.NewSessionCreatedTypeID, "new_session_created after session change")
mustHave(t, replies, mt.MsgsAckTypeID, "msgs_ack after session change")
oldKey := sessionKey{authKeyID: auth.AuthKey.ID, sessionID: auth.SessionID}
newKey := sessionKey{authKeyID: auth.AuthKey.ID, sessionID: nextSessionID}
srv.conns.mu.RLock()
_, oldVisible := srv.conns.bySession[oldKey]
newConn := srv.conns.bySession[newKey]
claims := len(srv.conns.claims)
online := len(srv.conns.bySession)
srv.conns.mu.RUnlock()
if oldVisible || newConn == nil || !newConn.isActive() || claims != 0 || online != 1 {
t.Fatalf("same-transport switch state: old=%v new=%p active=%v claims=%d online=%d",
oldVisible, newConn, newConn != nil && newConn.isActive(), claims, online)
}
}
func readBadMsgNotification(t *testing.T, conn transport.Conn, cipher crypto.Cipher, key crypto.AuthKey) mt.BadMsgNotification {