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Merge remote-tracking branch 'upstream/main' into merge-gramsrv-9106877

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onysd 2026-08-03 23:29:20 +03:00
commit ac6a50c5ff
697 changed files with 100880 additions and 8052 deletions
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53
internal/mtprotoedge/exchange_compat.go
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@ -25,11 +25,12 @@ import (
// runServerExchange is a gotd server exchange compatibility shim.
//
// DrKLO Android marks media temporary auth-key exchange with a negative DC in
// p_q_inner_data_temp_dc (for example DC 2 -> -2). gotd v0.158.0 validates this
// field by exact equality and rejects that legitimate media-temp path. Keep the
// permanent-key check strict, but allow temp-key DC values whose absolute value
// matches this server DC.
// In the default single-backend mode, p_q_inner_data_dc and
// p_q_inner_data_temp_dc carry client routing labels only: every int32 value is
// admitted and the label is not persisted or used for key/session identity.
// This also covers DrKLO Android's negative media-temp labels. StrictDC retains
// exact permanent / absolute-value temporary validation as an explicit,
// default-off diagnostic for a future real multi-DC deployment.
func (s *Server) runServerExchange(ctx context.Context, conn transport.Conn) (exchange.ServerExchangeResult, error) {
ex := serverExchangeCompat{
conn: conn,
@ -355,7 +356,7 @@ func (s serverExchangeCompat) validatePQInnerDataDC(d mt.PQInnerDataClass) error
// configured DC is expected, not an error. dc_id plays no
// role in key derivation, so accepting it doesn't weaken the
// exchange.
s.log.Debug("Accepted permanent auth key DC mismatch (lenient mode)",
s.log.Debug("Accepted permanent auth key DC alias",
zap.Int("server_dc", s.dc),
zap.Int("client_dc", innerDataDC.DC))
return nil
@ -366,8 +367,8 @@ func (s serverExchangeCompat) validatePQInnerDataDC(d mt.PQInnerDataClass) error
if !sameDCByAbs(innerDataDC.DC, s.dc) && s.strictDC {
return wrongDCError(s.dc, innerDataDC.DC)
}
if innerDataDC.DC < 0 {
s.log.Warn("Accepted Android media temp auth key negative DC",
if !sameDCByAbs(innerDataDC.DC, s.dc) {
s.log.Debug("Accepted temporary auth key DC alias",
zap.Int("server_dc", s.dc),
zap.Int("client_dc", innerDataDC.DC),
zap.Int("expires_in", innerDataDC.ExpiresIn))
@ -440,7 +441,7 @@ func (s serverExchangeCompat) readUnencrypted(ctx context.Context, b *bin.Buffer
if err := msg.Decode(b); err != nil {
return err
}
if !validClientMessageIDBits(msg.MessageID) {
if !validUnencryptedHandshakeMessageID(msg.MessageID, msg.MessageData) {
return gofaster.New("bad msg type")
}
b.ResetTo(msg.MessageData)
@ -448,6 +449,40 @@ func (s serverExchangeCompat) readUnencrypted(ctx context.Context, b *bin.Buffer
return data.Decode(b)
}
// validUnencryptedHandshakeMessageID preserves the normal client message-id
// rules while admitting the two sentinel ids emitted by official TDLib:
//
// - PingConnectionReqPQ sends req_pq_multi with message_id=1.
// - HandshakeConnection sends every auth-key exchange request with message_id=0.
//
// The exception is deliberately constructor-scoped and is only called after an
// auth_key_id=0 envelope has been decoded. Encrypted traffic continues through
// validClientMessageIDBits and the full inbound preflight without this carve-out.
func validUnencryptedHandshakeMessageID(messageID int64, messageData []byte) bool {
if validClientMessageIDBits(messageID) {
return true
}
payload := &bin.Buffer{Buf: messageData}
typeID, err := payload.PeekID()
if err != nil {
return false
}
switch messageID {
case 1:
return typeID == mt.ReqPqMultiRequestTypeID
case 0:
switch typeID {
case mt.ReqPqMultiRequestTypeID,
mt.ReqDHParamsRequestTypeID,
mt.SetClientDHParamsRequestTypeID:
return true
}
}
return false
}
type compatReqPQ struct {
Type uint32
Nonce bin.Int128