diff --git a/internal/mtprotoedge/auth_key_switch_test.go b/internal/mtprotoedge/auth_key_switch_test.go index 229e1a32..4d47eeb3 100644 --- a/internal/mtprotoedge/auth_key_switch_test.go +++ b/internal/mtprotoedge/auth_key_switch_test.go @@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ func TestEncryptedConnectionSwitchesAuthKeyEvenWhenSessionIDIsReused(t *testing. _, authB, cipherB := dialHandshake(t, addr, dc, pub) msgID := proto.NewMessageIDGen(time.Now) - sendEncrypted(t, connA, cipherA, authA, msgID.New(proto.MessageFromClient), &mt.PingRequest{PingID: 1}) + sendEncryptedWithSeq(t, connA, cipherA, authA, msgID.New(proto.MessageFromClient), 1, &mt.PingRequest{PingID: 1}) for range 3 { // new_session_created + pong + msgs_ack; leave no A-key frame on the socket. readServerMessage(t, connA, cipherA, authA.AuthKey) } diff --git a/internal/mtprotoedge/encrypted.go b/internal/mtprotoedge/encrypted.go index 11947849..96cc0f23 100644 --- a/internal/mtprotoedge/encrypted.go +++ b/internal/mtprotoedge/encrypted.go @@ -1481,15 +1481,15 @@ func validateClientEnvelope(now time.Time, msgID int64, seqNo int32, typeID uint if msgTime.After(now.Add(30 * time.Second)) { return badMsgIDTooHigh } - if clientMessageAllowsEitherSeqParity(typeID) { - return 0 - } - if clientMessageNeedsAck(typeID) { + switch clientMessageContentPolicyFor(typeID) { + case clientMessageContentRequired: if seqNo%2 == 0 { return badMsgSeqNotOdd } - } else if seqNo%2 != 0 { - return badMsgSeqNotEven + case clientMessageContentForbidden: + if seqNo%2 != 0 { + return badMsgSeqNotEven + } } return 0 } @@ -1498,48 +1498,68 @@ func validateClientContainerEnvelope(msgID int64, seqNo int32, typeID uint32) in if !validClientMessageIDBits(msgID) { return badMsgIDInvalidBits } - if clientMessageAllowsEitherSeqParity(typeID) { - return 0 - } - if clientMessageNeedsAck(typeID) { + switch clientMessageContentPolicyFor(typeID) { + case clientMessageContentRequired: if seqNo%2 == 0 { return badMsgSeqNotOdd } - } else if seqNo%2 != 0 { - return badMsgSeqNotEven + case clientMessageContentForbidden: + if seqNo%2 != 0 { + return badMsgSeqNotEven + } } return 0 } -func clientMessageAllowsEitherSeqParity(typeID uint32) bool { - switch typeID { - case mt.PingDelayDisconnectRequestTypeID, - // get_future_salts 的 seqno 奇偶在客户端间不一致：部分客户端按内容消息发奇数， - // gotd 按服务消息发偶数。两者都合法（官方服务器都接受），故不在此卡奇偶，避免 - // 误判 bad_msg 触发客户端重连风暴。ack/content 行为仍由 clientMessageNeedsAck 决定。 - mt.GetFutureSaltsRequestTypeID: - return true - default: - return false - } -} +type clientMessageContentPolicy uint8 -func clientMessageNeedsAck(typeID uint32) bool { +const ( + clientMessageContentRequired clientMessageContentPolicy = iota + 1 + clientMessageContentForbidden + clientMessageContentOptional +) + +// clientMessageContentPolicyFor classifies the client envelope, not merely the +// constructor's usual sending convention. MTProto requires API RPCs to be +// content-related and requires containers/acknowledgements to be irrelevant, +// but clients may mark the other service constructors as either. TDLib uses +// even sequence numbers for its reconnect state/resend/cancel service batch, +// while gotd and DrKLO use odd sequence numbers for some of the same requests. +func clientMessageContentPolicyFor(typeID uint32) clientMessageContentPolicy { switch typeID { case proto.MessageContainerTypeID, mt.MsgsAckTypeID, + mt.MsgCopyTypeID: + return clientMessageContentForbidden + case mt.PingRequestTypeID, mt.PingDelayDisconnectRequestTypeID, - mt.DestroySessionRequestTypeID, - mt.HTTPWaitRequestTypeID, - mt.BadMsgNotificationTypeID, - mt.BadServerSaltTypeID, + mt.GetFutureSaltsRequestTypeID, + mt.MsgsStateReqTypeID, + mt.MsgResendReqTypeID, mt.MsgsAllInfoTypeID, mt.MsgsStateInfoTypeID, + mt.DestroySessionRequestTypeID, + mt.HTTPWaitRequestTypeID, + mt.RPCDropAnswerRequestTypeID, + mt.BadMsgNotificationTypeID, + mt.BadServerSaltTypeID, mt.MsgDetailedInfoTypeID, - mt.MsgNewDetailedInfoTypeID: - return false + mt.MsgNewDetailedInfoTypeID, + destroyAuthKeyRequestTypeID: + return clientMessageContentOptional default: + return clientMessageContentRequired + } +} + +func clientMessageIsContentRelated(typeID uint32, seqNo int32) bool { + switch clientMessageContentPolicyFor(typeID) { + case clientMessageContentRequired: return true + case clientMessageContentOptional: + return seqNo%2 != 0 + default: + return false } } diff --git a/internal/mtprotoedge/encrypted_test.go b/internal/mtprotoedge/encrypted_test.go index 889d8ff8..e1af2dfc 100644 --- a/internal/mtprotoedge/encrypted_test.go +++ b/internal/mtprotoedge/encrypted_test.go @@ -69,6 +69,72 @@ func (h *durableDestroyLayerRPC) deletion() ([8]byte, int64) { return h.authKeyID, h.sessionID } +func TestClientMessageContentPolicy(t *testing.T) { + tests := []struct { + name string + typeID uint32 + want clientMessageContentPolicy + }{ + {name: "api_rpc", typeID: tg.HelpGetConfigRequestTypeID, want: clientMessageContentRequired}, + {name: "container", typeID: proto.MessageContainerTypeID, want: clientMessageContentForbidden}, + {name: "msgs_ack", typeID: mt.MsgsAckTypeID, want: clientMessageContentForbidden}, + {name: "msg_copy", typeID: mt.MsgCopyTypeID, want: clientMessageContentForbidden}, + {name: "bad_msg_notification", typeID: mt.BadMsgNotificationTypeID, want: clientMessageContentOptional}, + {name: "bad_server_salt", typeID: mt.BadServerSaltTypeID, want: clientMessageContentOptional}, + {name: "msg_detailed_info", typeID: mt.MsgDetailedInfoTypeID, want: clientMessageContentOptional}, + {name: "msg_new_detailed_info", typeID: mt.MsgNewDetailedInfoTypeID, want: clientMessageContentOptional}, + {name: "ping", typeID: mt.PingRequestTypeID, want: clientMessageContentOptional}, + {name: "ping_delay_disconnect", typeID: mt.PingDelayDisconnectRequestTypeID, want: clientMessageContentOptional}, + {name: "get_future_salts", typeID: mt.GetFutureSaltsRequestTypeID, want: clientMessageContentOptional}, + {name: "msgs_state_req", typeID: mt.MsgsStateReqTypeID, want: clientMessageContentOptional}, + {name: "msg_resend_req", typeID: mt.MsgResendReqTypeID, want: clientMessageContentOptional}, + {name: "msgs_all_info", typeID: mt.MsgsAllInfoTypeID, want: clientMessageContentOptional}, + {name: "msgs_state_info", typeID: mt.MsgsStateInfoTypeID, want: clientMessageContentOptional}, + {name: "destroy_session", typeID: mt.DestroySessionRequestTypeID, want: clientMessageContentOptional}, + {name: "http_wait", typeID: mt.HTTPWaitRequestTypeID, want: clientMessageContentOptional}, + {name: "rpc_drop_answer", typeID: mt.RPCDropAnswerRequestTypeID, want: clientMessageContentOptional}, + {name: "destroy_auth_key", typeID: destroyAuthKeyRequestTypeID, want: clientMessageContentOptional}, + } + + now := time.Now() + msgID := proto.NewMessageIDGen(func() time.Time { return now }).New(proto.MessageFromClient) + for _, test := range tests { + t.Run(test.name, func(t *testing.T) { + if got := clientMessageContentPolicyFor(test.typeID); got != test.want { + t.Fatalf("content policy = %d, want %d", got, test.want) + } + + evenCode := validateClientContainerEnvelope(msgID, 8, test.typeID) + oddCode := validateClientContainerEnvelope(msgID, 9, test.typeID) + directEvenCode := validateClientEnvelope(now, msgID, 8, test.typeID) + directOddCode := validateClientEnvelope(now, msgID, 9, test.typeID) + if directEvenCode != evenCode || directOddCode != oddCode { + t.Fatalf( + "top-level/container parity mismatch = top(%d,%d) container(%d,%d)", + directEvenCode, directOddCode, evenCode, oddCode, + ) + } + switch test.want { + case clientMessageContentRequired: + if evenCode != badMsgSeqNotOdd || oddCode != 0 { + t.Fatalf("required content parity codes = even:%d odd:%d", evenCode, oddCode) + } + case clientMessageContentForbidden: + if evenCode != 0 || oddCode != badMsgSeqNotEven { + t.Fatalf("forbidden content parity codes = even:%d odd:%d", evenCode, oddCode) + } + case clientMessageContentOptional: + if evenCode != 0 || oddCode != 0 { + t.Fatalf("optional content parity codes = even:%d odd:%d", evenCode, oddCode) + } + if clientMessageIsContentRelated(test.typeID, 8) || !clientMessageIsContentRelated(test.typeID, 9) { + t.Fatal("optional service content bit was not derived from seq_no parity") + } + } + }) + } +} + // TestEncryptedPingPong 验证 M2/M4：握手后 client 加密 ping， // server 回 new_session_created + pong + msgs_ack。 func TestEncryptedPingPong(t *testing.T) { @@ -79,7 +145,7 @@ func TestEncryptedPingPong(t *testing.T) { clientMsgID := proto.NewMessageIDGen(time.Now) const pingID int64 = 0x1234beef pingMsgID := clientMsgID.New(proto.MessageFromClient) - sendEncrypted(t, conn, cipher, auth, pingMsgID, &mt.PingRequest{PingID: pingID}) + sendEncryptedWithSeq(t, conn, cipher, auth, pingMsgID, 1, &mt.PingRequest{PingID: pingID}) replies := collectReplies(t, conn, cipher, auth.AuthKey, mt.PongTypeID) mustHave(t, replies, mt.NewSessionCreatedTypeID, "new_session_created") @@ -230,6 +296,55 @@ func TestMsgsStateReq(t *testing.T) { } } +// TestTDLibReconnectRecoveryContainerAcceptsEvenServiceMessages reproduces the +// first container TDLib emits after reopening an authenticated session with +// unknown queries. All service entries and the outer container use the current +// even sequence number. Rejecting msgs_state_req as a content-only constructor +// turns the valid inner message into bad_msg_notification(code=64), after which +// TDLib closes the session and retries the same container forever. +func TestTDLibReconnectRecoveryContainerAcceptsEvenServiceMessages(t *testing.T) { + const dc = 2 + addr, pub, _ := startTestServer(t, Options{DC: dc}) + conn, auth, cipher := dialHandshake(t, addr, dc, pub) + + ids := proto.NewMessageIDGen(time.Now) + pendingMsgID := ids.New(proto.MessageFromClient) + ackMsgID := ids.New(proto.MessageFromClient) + stateMsgID := ids.New(proto.MessageFromClient) + pingMsgID := ids.New(proto.MessageFromClient) + outerMsgID := ids.New(proto.MessageFromClient) + const ( + pendingSeqNo int32 = 9 + serviceSeqNo int32 = 10 + ) + + pendingBody := mustEncodeTL(t, &mt.PingRequest{PingID: 0xc01d}) + ackBody := mustEncodeTL(t, &mt.MsgsAck{MsgIDs: []int64{stateMsgID - 4}}) + stateBody := mustEncodeTL(t, &mt.MsgsStateReq{MsgIDs: []int64{pendingMsgID, stateMsgID - 4}}) + pingBody := mustEncodeTL(t, &mt.PingDelayDisconnectRequest{PingID: 0x5eed, DisconnectDelay: 60}) + container := &proto.MessageContainer{Messages: []proto.Message{ + {ID: pendingMsgID, SeqNo: int(pendingSeqNo), Bytes: len(pendingBody), Body: pendingBody}, + {ID: ackMsgID, SeqNo: int(serviceSeqNo), Bytes: len(ackBody), Body: ackBody}, + {ID: stateMsgID, SeqNo: int(serviceSeqNo), Bytes: len(stateBody), Body: stateBody}, + {ID: pingMsgID, SeqNo: int(serviceSeqNo), Bytes: len(pingBody), Body: pingBody}, + }} + + sendEncryptedWithSeq(t, conn, cipher, auth, outerMsgID, serviceSeqNo, container) + frames := collectReplyFrames(t, conn, cipher, auth.AuthKey, map[uint32]int{ + mt.MsgsStateInfoTypeID: 1, + mt.PongTypeID: 2, + }) + for _, frame := range frames { + if frame.TypeID == mt.BadMsgNotificationTypeID { + var bad mt.BadMsgNotification + if err := bad.Decode(frame.Plain); err != nil { + t.Fatalf("decode bad_msg_notification: %v", err) + } + t.Fatalf("TDLib reconnect recovery container was rejected: %+v", bad) + } + } +} + // TestMsgResendReq 验证 MTProto msg_resend_req 由连接层按状态查询兜底响应， // 不会落入业务 RPC fallback。 func TestMsgResendReq(t *testing.T) { diff --git a/internal/mtprotoedge/exchange_test.go b/internal/mtprotoedge/exchange_test.go index ff2044ea..b40d3793 100644 --- a/internal/mtprotoedge/exchange_test.go +++ b/internal/mtprotoedge/exchange_test.go @@ -1044,7 +1044,7 @@ func TestReconnectFakeReqPQThenEncryptedFrame(t *testing.T) { cancel() msgGen := tgproto.NewMessageIDGen(time.Now) - sendEncrypted(t, conn, cipher, auth, msgGen.New(tgproto.MessageFromClient), &mt.PingRequest{PingID: 7}) + sendEncryptedWithSeq(t, conn, cipher, auth, msgGen.New(tgproto.MessageFromClient), 1, &mt.PingRequest{PingID: 7}) var resPQFrame bin.Buffer ctx, cancel = context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 5*time.Second) diff --git a/internal/mtprotoedge/helpers_test.go b/internal/mtprotoedge/helpers_test.go index e66ba332..09d12d57 100644 --- a/internal/mtprotoedge/helpers_test.go +++ b/internal/mtprotoedge/helpers_test.go @@ -250,7 +250,7 @@ func encodeClientMessageForTest(t *testing.T, msg bin.Encoder) ([]byte, int32) { if container, ok := msg.(*proto.MessageContainer); ok { return raw, clientContainerSeqNoForTest(container) } - if clientMessageNeedsAck(typeID) { + if clientMessageContentPolicyFor(typeID) == clientMessageContentRequired { return raw, 1 } return raw, 0 diff --git a/internal/mtprotoedge/inbound_preflight.go b/internal/mtprotoedge/inbound_preflight.go index 1b8296bc..4755041b 100644 --- a/internal/mtprotoedge/inbound_preflight.go +++ b/internal/mtprotoedge/inbound_preflight.go @@ -454,7 +454,7 @@ func (s *Server) walkInbound( return &dispatchBadMsgError{msgID: msgID, seqNo: seqNo, code: code} } - content := clientMessageNeedsAck(typeID) + content := clientMessageIsContentRelated(typeID, seqNo) if record, seen := overlay.seenRecord(msgID); seen { if record.seqNo != seqNo || record.content != content { return &dispatchBadMsgError{msgID: msgID, seqNo: seqNo, code: badMsgContainer} diff --git a/internal/mtprotoedge/layer_seed_test.go b/internal/mtprotoedge/layer_seed_test.go index 619e3c01..1b54907e 100644 --- a/internal/mtprotoedge/layer_seed_test.go +++ b/internal/mtprotoedge/layer_seed_test.go @@ -28,7 +28,7 @@ func TestRegisterSeedsNegotiatedLayerBeforeFirstRPC(t *testing.T) { conn, auth, cipher := dialHandshake(t, addr, 2, pub) clientMsgID := proto.NewMessageIDGen(time.Now) - sendEncrypted(t, conn, cipher, auth, clientMsgID.New(proto.MessageFromClient), &mt.PingRequest{PingID: 7}) + sendEncryptedWithSeq(t, conn, cipher, auth, clientMsgID.New(proto.MessageFromClient), 1, &mt.PingRequest{PingID: 7}) // 等 pong 回来，确保携带注册动作的那一帧已处理完成。 gotPong := false diff --git a/internal/mtprotoedge/outbound_test.go b/internal/mtprotoedge/outbound_test.go index 9643cbdf..415d6f68 100644 --- a/internal/mtprotoedge/outbound_test.go +++ b/internal/mtprotoedge/outbound_test.go @@ -544,7 +544,7 @@ func TestOutboundActorSerializesConcurrentSends(t *testing.T) { conn, auth, cipher := dialHandshake(t, addr, dc, pub) clientMsgID := proto.NewMessageIDGen(time.Now) - sendEncrypted(t, conn, cipher, auth, clientMsgID.New(proto.MessageFromClient), &mt.PingRequest{PingID: 1}) + sendEncryptedWithSeq(t, conn, cipher, auth, clientMsgID.New(proto.MessageFromClient), 1, &mt.PingRequest{PingID: 1}) collectReplies(t, conn, cipher, auth.AuthKey, mt.MsgsAckTypeID) freezeActiveTestSessionProfile(t, srv.Conns(), auth.AuthKey.ID, auth.SessionID, tlprofile.ProfileCanonical) srv.Conns().SetReceivesUpdates(auth.SessionID, true) @@ -1034,7 +1034,7 @@ func TestOutboundResendAndAckState(t *testing.T) { conn, auth, cipher := dialHandshake(t, addr, dc, pub) clientMsgID := proto.NewMessageIDGen(time.Now) - sendEncrypted(t, conn, cipher, auth, clientMsgID.New(proto.MessageFromClient), &mt.PingRequest{PingID: 1}) + sendEncryptedWithSeq(t, conn, cipher, auth, clientMsgID.New(proto.MessageFromClient), 1, &mt.PingRequest{PingID: 1}) collectReplies(t, conn, cipher, auth.AuthKey, mt.MsgsAckTypeID) freezeActiveTestSessionProfile(t, srv.Conns(), auth.AuthKey.ID, auth.SessionID, tlprofile.ProfileCanonical) srv.Conns().SetReceivesUpdates(auth.SessionID, true) diff --git a/internal/mtprotoedge/session_manager_test.go b/internal/mtprotoedge/session_manager_test.go index 5db9f1ff..dd4b3c0f 100644 --- a/internal/mtprotoedge/session_manager_test.go +++ b/internal/mtprotoedge/session_manager_test.go @@ -1205,9 +1205,9 @@ func TestSessionManagerPush(t *testing.T) { // 各发一个 ping 建立 session，触发注册（并清掉 new_session_created/pong/ack）。 msgGen := proto.NewMessageIDGen(time.Now) - sendEncrypted(t, conn1, cipher1, auth1, msgGen.New(proto.MessageFromClient), &mt.PingRequest{PingID: 1}) + sendEncryptedWithSeq(t, conn1, cipher1, auth1, msgGen.New(proto.MessageFromClient), 1, &mt.PingRequest{PingID: 1}) collectReplies(t, conn1, cipher1, auth1.AuthKey, mt.PongTypeID) - sendEncrypted(t, conn2, cipher2, auth2, msgGen.New(proto.MessageFromClient), &mt.PingRequest{PingID: 2}) + sendEncryptedWithSeq(t, conn2, cipher2, auth2, msgGen.New(proto.MessageFromClient), 1, &mt.PingRequest{PingID: 2}) collectReplies(t, conn2, cipher2, auth2.AuthKey, mt.PongTypeID) if got := srv.Conns().Online(); got != 2 {