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fix: sync scoped connection and outbox exclusion updates

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This commit is contained in:
A 2026-07-12 12:01:53 +08:00
parent aa21bd04e1
commit cbccd6a8d9
58 changed files with 919 additions and 1435 deletions
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24
internal/mtprotoedge/inbound_preflight.go
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@ -68,7 +68,6 @@ type inboundPlan struct {
logicalMin int64
releases []func()
rpcPrepared bool
rpcReservation *inboundRPCBatchReservation
rpcTasks []inboundRPC
rpcOwners []*rpcResultOwnerLease
@ -101,7 +100,7 @@ func (p *inboundPlan) commitRPCBatch() error {
// batch is runnable immediately; using the old deferred scheduler token here
// was not a real barrier on a busy Conn because an existing ready token could
// dequeue newly appended tasks before activateRPCBatch ran.
_, err := p.rpcReservation.commit(p.rpcTasks, false)
err := p.rpcReservation.commit(p.rpcTasks)
if err != nil {
return err
}
@ -619,7 +618,6 @@ func preflightInboundItem(msgID int64, seqNo int32, typeID uint32, content bool,
// into one consistent terminal FLOOD_WAIT result per uncached RPC; no business
// handler from the batch is allowed to start in that case.
func (s *Server) prepareInboundRPCBatch(ctx context.Context, c *Conn, plan *inboundPlan) error {
plan.rpcPrepared = true
// Keep service-only frames (ping/ack/http_wait) allocation-free here. These
// collections are needed only after the first real API RPC acquires ownership.
var indices []int
@ -815,18 +813,22 @@ func (s *Server) executeInboundPlan(ctx context.Context, cs *connState, c *Conn,
s.log.Debug("Received destroy_auth_key", zap.String("auth_key_id", c.authKeyHex))
if err := s.authKeys.Delete(ctx, c.authKeyID); err != nil {
s.log.Warn("Delete auth key failed", zap.String("auth_key_id", c.authKeyHex), zap.Error(err))
return c.SendAsync(ctx, proto.MessageServerResponse, &destroyAuthKeyFail{})
return c.SendRequiredControl(ctx, proto.MessageServerResponse, &destroyAuthKeyFail{})
}
c.keyDestroyed.Store(true)
// Fence every other active/claiming generation before acknowledging the
// deletion. The exact requester remains writable only long enough to put the
// required destroy_auth_key_ok frame on the wire.
s.conns.CloseSessionsForRawAuthKeyExceptConn(c.authKeyID, c)
return c.SendAsync(ctx, proto.MessageServerResponse, &destroyAuthKeyOk{})
case inboundItemRPC:
if plan.rpcPrepared {
continue
}
if err := s.enqueueRPC(ctx, c, item.msgID, item.typeID, &bin.Buffer{Buf: item.body}); err != nil {
if err := c.SendRequiredControl(ctx, proto.MessageServerResponse, &destroyAuthKeyOk{}); err != nil {
return err
}
c.beginTerminalShutdown()
c.closeTransport()
return nil
case inboundItemRPC:
// prepareInboundRPCBatch owns every fresh RPC before synchronous service
// execution begins; commitRPCBatch publishes them after all protocol barriers.
continue
case inboundItemCapacityError:
if err := s.sendResult(ctx, c, item.msgID, &mt.RPCError{
ErrorCode: 420,