feat: add NFT usernames and bot verification (#22)
Implements collectible usernames, official verification workflows, and third-party bot verification after maintainer protocol and migration review. The composite activity/moderation rating remains an admin-only read model; Telegram Stars Rating wire fields stay unset pending a dedicated official-semantics implementation. Reviewed-Head: 2796345775ea0f908fb7734601e5e1dee4b653b9 Original-Head: fa082b892fd5180c9c9bc53c81c21cf5d250a75b Co-authored-by: Egor Egorov <business.egor.sg@gmail.com>
This commit is contained in:
parent
b0fd3976f1
commit
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169 changed files with 55769 additions and 282 deletions
398
internal/domain/account_rating.go
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398
internal/domain/account_rating.go
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package domain
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import (
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"errors"
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"time"
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)
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// Composite account rating.
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//
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// This is a server-local moderation/operations score for the admin panel. It is
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// deliberately not Telegram's Stars Rating: the official field describes Stars
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// transaction volume, whereas this model combines Stars, account activity and
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// moderation penalties. Projecting it into userFull.stars_rating would give
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// official clients a materially false meaning, so the RPC edge keeps those
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// fields unset.
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const (
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// MaxAccountRatingLevel bounds the local admin level.
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MaxAccountRatingLevel = 50
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// accountRatingLevelUnit is the score required for level 1. Thresholds grow
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// quadratically from it: level n needs accountRatingLevelUnit * n^2.
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accountRatingLevelUnit = 100
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// MaxAccountRatingReasonLength matches the event ledger CHECK on reason.
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MaxAccountRatingReasonLength = 512
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// MaxAccountRatingActorLength matches the event ledger CHECK on actor.
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MaxAccountRatingActorLength = 128
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// MaxAccountRatingCommandKeyLength matches the idempotency CHECK.
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MaxAccountRatingCommandKeyLength = 128
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)
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var (
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// ErrAccountRatingNotFound reports a user with no rating row yet.
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ErrAccountRatingNotFound = errors.New("account rating not found")
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// ErrAccountRatingWeightsInvalid rejects a non-sensical weight set.
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ErrAccountRatingWeightsInvalid = errors.New("account rating weights invalid")
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// ErrAccountRatingAdjustmentInvalid rejects a malformed manual adjustment.
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ErrAccountRatingAdjustmentInvalid = errors.New("account rating adjustment invalid")
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)
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// AccountRatingEventKind is the contribution source of a ledger row. Only
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// 'manual' rows survive a full recompute; the rest are audit trail.
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type AccountRatingEventKind string
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const (
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AccountRatingEventStars AccountRatingEventKind = "stars"
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AccountRatingEventActivity AccountRatingEventKind = "activity"
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AccountRatingEventModeration AccountRatingEventKind = "moderation"
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AccountRatingEventManual AccountRatingEventKind = "manual"
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AccountRatingEventRecompute AccountRatingEventKind = "recompute"
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)
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// Valid reports whether the kind is modelled.
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func (k AccountRatingEventKind) Valid() bool {
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switch k {
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case AccountRatingEventStars, AccountRatingEventActivity, AccountRatingEventModeration,
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AccountRatingEventManual, AccountRatingEventRecompute:
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return true
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default:
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return false
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}
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}
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// AccountRating is the stored read model for one user.
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type AccountRating struct {
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UserID int64
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Level int
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Stars int64
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CurrentLevelStars int64
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// NextLevelStars is meaningful only when HasNextLevel is true.
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NextLevelStars int64
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HasNextLevel bool
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// Components are the explainable breakdown. PenaltyComponent is a
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// non-negative magnitude that is subtracted.
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StarsComponent int64
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ActivityComponent int64
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PenaltyComponent int64
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ManualComponent int64
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// PendingStars is a score delta not yet applied to the visible level, with
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// PendingDate reporting when it becomes effective.
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PendingStars int64
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PendingDate time.Time
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ComputedAt time.Time
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UpdatedAt time.Time
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Version int64
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}
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// AccountRatingLevel is the local admin-facing level snapshot.
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type AccountRatingLevel struct {
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Level int
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CurrentLevelStars int64
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Stars int64
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NextLevelStars int64
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HasNextLevelStars bool
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}
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// RatableAccount reports whether an account may carry a composite rating.
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//
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// The rating measures what an account did with Stars -- gifts bought, paid
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// messages sent, activity, moderation history. Two kinds of account have no
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// meaningful answer there and are excluded everywhere the rating is computed,
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// seeded or projected:
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//
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// - Bots. A bot does not buy gifts or send paid messages on its own behalf, so
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// its score would only ever be the flat account-age term.
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// - The built-in service accounts (the platform account, BotFather, @Stickers,
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// @ChatBot, the verification bots). They are infrastructure rather than
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// participants: a leaderboard entry for the platform account is noise, and a
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// level badge on it would claim something about transaction volume that means
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// nothing.
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//
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// Note that the platform account is not flagged is_bot, so the bot check alone
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// does not cover it -- which is exactly how it ended up in the seeding pass.
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func RatableAccount(userID int64, bot bool) bool {
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return userID > 0 && !bot && !IsSystemUserID(userID)
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}
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// LevelSnapshot returns the current local admin-facing level.
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func (r AccountRating) LevelSnapshot() AccountRatingLevel {
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return AccountRatingLevel{
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Level: r.Level,
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CurrentLevelStars: r.CurrentLevelStars,
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Stars: r.Stars,
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NextLevelStars: r.NextLevelStars,
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HasNextLevelStars: r.HasNextLevel,
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}
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}
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// PendingLevel returns the local level after the pending score is applied and
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// reports whether a pending record exists at all.
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func (r AccountRating) PendingLevel() (AccountRatingLevel, bool) {
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if r.PendingStars == 0 || r.PendingDate.IsZero() {
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return AccountRatingLevel{}, false
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}
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total := r.Stars + r.PendingStars
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if total < 0 {
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total = 0
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}
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level, current, next, hasNext := AccountRatingLevelForStars(total)
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return AccountRatingLevel{
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Level: level,
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CurrentLevelStars: current,
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Stars: total,
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NextLevelStars: next,
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HasNextLevelStars: hasNext,
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}, true
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}
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// AccountRatingWeights is the composite formula. All weights are integers so the
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// score is exactly reproducible across a recompute and across store backends.
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type AccountRatingWeights struct {
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// StarsReceivedPermille weighs Stars credited to the account (gifts,
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// reactions, paid messages received), in permille of the raw amount.
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StarsReceivedPermille int64
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// StarsSpentPermille weighs Stars the account spent. Spending is a weaker
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// signal than receiving, so the default is lower.
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StarsSpentPermille int64
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// PerMessageSent rewards sustained use.
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PerMessageSent int64
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// PerAccountAgeDay rewards account longevity.
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PerAccountAgeDay int64
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// PerGiftReceived rewards collectible gifts held.
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PerGiftReceived int64
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// PerModerationCase is the penalty for each upheld moderation case.
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PerModerationCase int64
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// ScamPenalty and FakePenalty are flat penalties for the peer flags.
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ScamPenalty int64
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FakePenalty int64
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// ActivityCap bounds the activity component so activity alone cannot
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// outweigh everything else. Zero means uncapped.
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ActivityCap int64
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}
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// DefaultAccountRatingWeights returns the shipped local policy. Stars dominate,
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// activity contributes a bounded floor, and moderation subtracts.
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func DefaultAccountRatingWeights() AccountRatingWeights {
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return AccountRatingWeights{
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StarsReceivedPermille: 1000,
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StarsSpentPermille: 250,
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PerMessageSent: 1,
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PerAccountAgeDay: 2,
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PerGiftReceived: 25,
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PerModerationCase: 150,
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ScamPenalty: 5000,
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FakePenalty: 5000,
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ActivityCap: 5000,
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}
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}
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// Validate rejects negative weights and an impossible cap.
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func (w AccountRatingWeights) Validate() error {
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values := []int64{
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w.StarsReceivedPermille, w.StarsSpentPermille, w.PerMessageSent,
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w.PerAccountAgeDay, w.PerGiftReceived, w.PerModerationCase,
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w.ScamPenalty, w.FakePenalty, w.ActivityCap,
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}
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for _, v := range values {
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if v < 0 {
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return ErrAccountRatingWeightsInvalid
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}
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}
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return nil
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}
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// AccountRatingSignals is the raw snapshot gathered from the contributing
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// sources for one user. It is deliberately a plain value: the same snapshot must
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// produce the same score in a unit test and in production.
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type AccountRatingSignals struct {
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UserID int64
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StarsReceived int64
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StarsSpent int64
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MessagesSent int64
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AccountAgeDays int64
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GiftsReceived int64
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ModerationCases int64
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Scam bool
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Fake bool
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// Manual is the sum of admin adjustments, carried across recomputes.
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Manual int64
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}
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// ComputeAccountRating turns a signal snapshot into the read model. The score is
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// clamped at zero: penalties can erase this local score but never invert it.
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func ComputeAccountRating(signals AccountRatingSignals, weights AccountRatingWeights, now time.Time) AccountRating {
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if err := weights.Validate(); err != nil {
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weights = DefaultAccountRatingWeights()
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}
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starsComponent := permille(max64(signals.StarsReceived, 0), weights.StarsReceivedPermille) +
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permille(max64(signals.StarsSpent, 0), weights.StarsSpentPermille)
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activityComponent := max64(signals.MessagesSent, 0)*weights.PerMessageSent +
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max64(signals.AccountAgeDays, 0)*weights.PerAccountAgeDay +
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max64(signals.GiftsReceived, 0)*weights.PerGiftReceived
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if weights.ActivityCap > 0 && activityComponent > weights.ActivityCap {
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activityComponent = weights.ActivityCap
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}
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penalty := max64(signals.ModerationCases, 0) * weights.PerModerationCase
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if signals.Scam {
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penalty += weights.ScamPenalty
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}
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if signals.Fake {
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penalty += weights.FakePenalty
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}
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total := starsComponent + activityComponent + signals.Manual - penalty
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if total < 0 {
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total = 0
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}
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level, current, next, hasNext := AccountRatingLevelForStars(total)
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return AccountRating{
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UserID: signals.UserID,
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Level: level,
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Stars: total,
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CurrentLevelStars: current,
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NextLevelStars: next,
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HasNextLevel: hasNext,
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StarsComponent: starsComponent,
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ActivityComponent: activityComponent,
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PenaltyComponent: penalty,
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ManualComponent: signals.Manual,
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ComputedAt: now,
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UpdatedAt: now,
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Version: 1,
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}
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}
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// AccountRatingLevelThreshold returns the score needed to reach the given level.
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// Level 0 needs nothing; growth is quadratic so early levels arrive quickly and
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// later ones stay meaningful.
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func AccountRatingLevelThreshold(level int) int64 {
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if level <= 0 {
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return 0
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}
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if level > MaxAccountRatingLevel {
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level = MaxAccountRatingLevel
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}
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n := int64(level)
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return accountRatingLevelUnit * n * n
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}
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// AccountRatingLevelForStars maps a score onto the level and the surrounding
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// thresholds. hasNext is false at MaxAccountRatingLevel.
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func AccountRatingLevelForStars(stars int64) (level int, currentLevelStars int64, nextLevelStars int64, hasNext bool) {
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if stars < 0 {
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stars = 0
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}
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level = 0
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for candidate := 1; candidate <= MaxAccountRatingLevel; candidate++ {
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if stars < AccountRatingLevelThreshold(candidate) {
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break
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}
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level = candidate
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}
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currentLevelStars = AccountRatingLevelThreshold(level)
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if level >= MaxAccountRatingLevel {
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return level, currentLevelStars, 0, false
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}
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return level, currentLevelStars, AccountRatingLevelThreshold(level + 1), true
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}
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// ResolveAccountRatingPending decides whether a freshly computed score becomes
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// visible immediately or is parked as pending.
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//
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// A score that dropped is applied at once -- a penalty must not sit behind a
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// delay. A score that grew is parked until delay has elapsed; once the parked
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// window has passed the pending delta is folded into the visible admin rating.
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func ResolveAccountRatingPending(prev, computed AccountRating, delay time.Duration, now time.Time) AccountRating {
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out := computed
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out.Version = prev.Version + 1
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if out.Version <= 0 {
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out.Version = 1
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}
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if delay <= 0 || prev.UserID == 0 {
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return out
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}
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if computed.Stars <= prev.Stars {
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return out
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}
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// A previously parked delta whose date has arrived is applied now.
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if prev.PendingStars != 0 && !prev.PendingDate.IsZero() && !now.Before(prev.PendingDate) {
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return out
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}
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pendingSince := prev.PendingDate
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if prev.PendingStars == 0 || pendingSince.IsZero() {
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pendingSince = now.Add(delay)
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}
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visible := prev
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visible.StarsComponent = computed.StarsComponent
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visible.ActivityComponent = computed.ActivityComponent
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visible.PenaltyComponent = computed.PenaltyComponent
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visible.ManualComponent = computed.ManualComponent
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visible.PendingStars = computed.Stars - prev.Stars
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visible.PendingDate = pendingSince
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visible.ComputedAt = now
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visible.UpdatedAt = now
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visible.Version = out.Version
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return visible
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}
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// AccountRatingEvent is one contribution ledger row.
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type AccountRatingEvent struct {
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ID int64
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UserID int64
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Kind AccountRatingEventKind
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Amount int64
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Reason string
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Actor string
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CommandKey string
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CreatedAt time.Time
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}
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// AdjustAccountRatingRequest is an operator adjustment to the manual component.
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type AdjustAccountRatingRequest struct {
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UserID int64
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Amount int64
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Reason string
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Actor string
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CommandKey string
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}
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// Validate rejects a no-op or oversized adjustment.
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func (r AdjustAccountRatingRequest) Validate() error {
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if r.UserID <= 0 || r.Amount == 0 {
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return ErrAccountRatingAdjustmentInvalid
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}
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if len(r.Reason) > MaxAccountRatingReasonLength {
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return ErrAccountRatingAdjustmentInvalid
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}
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if len(r.Actor) > MaxAccountRatingActorLength {
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return ErrAccountRatingAdjustmentInvalid
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}
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if len(r.CommandKey) > MaxAccountRatingCommandKeyLength {
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return ErrAccountRatingAdjustmentInvalid
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}
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return nil
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}
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// AccountRatingFilter bounds an admin listing query.
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type AccountRatingFilter struct {
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MinLevel int
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UserID int64
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BeforeID int64
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Limit int
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}
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func permille(value, weight int64) int64 {
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if value <= 0 || weight <= 0 {
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return 0
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}
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return value * weight / 1000
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}
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func max64(a, b int64) int64 {
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if a > b {
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return a
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}
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return b
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}
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369
internal/domain/bot_verification.go
Normal file
369
internal/domain/bot_verification.go
Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,369 @@
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package domain
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import (
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"errors"
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"fmt"
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"strings"
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"time"
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"unicode/utf8"
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)
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// Third-party bot verification (core.telegram.org/api/bots/verification).
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//
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// A verifier bot marks a peer with its OWN icon and description. Clients render
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// that icon before the name and the description in the profile, which is
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// deliberately different from the official checkmark: only the operator grants the
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// platform flag (see verification.go), and the two mechanisms never read each
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// other's state.
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//
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// Layer 228 shapes this feature projects onto:
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//
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// botVerification#f93cd45c bot_id:long icon:long description:string
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// botVerifierSettings#b0cd6617 flags:# can_modify_custom_description:flags.1?true
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// icon:long company:string custom_description:flags.0?string
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// bots.setCustomVerification#8b89dfbd flags:# enabled:flags.1?true
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// bot:flags.0?InputUser peer:InputPeer custom_description:flags.2?string = Bool
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// user#b1b8cc83 bot_verification_icon:flags2.14?long
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// channel#d49f34c6 bot_verification_icon:flags2.13?long
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// userFull#6cbe645 bot_verification:flags2.12?BotVerification
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// channelFull#a04e8d3a bot_verification:flags2.17?BotVerification
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// chatInvite#5c9d3702 bot_verification:flags.13?BotVerification
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// botInfo#4d8a0299 verifier_settings:flags.9?BotVerifierSettings
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//
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// The icon is a custom emoji document id. Clients resolve it through
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// messages.getCustomEmojiDocuments, so an id that names no fetchable document
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// renders as nothing at all -- which is why the catalogue is validated against
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// real documents rather than accepting arbitrary numbers.
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const (
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// MaxVerifierCompanyLength bounds botVerifierSettings.company.
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MaxVerifierCompanyLength = 128
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// MaxCustomVerificationDescriptionLength is the app-configured limit for text
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// supplied by a verifier (bot_verification_description_length_limit).
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MaxCustomVerificationDescriptionLength = 70
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// MaxBotVerificationDescriptionLength bounds the final wire description. It
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// may exceed the custom-input limit because the server-generated fallback
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// includes the organization name.
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MaxBotVerificationDescriptionLength = 1024
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// MaxVerificationIconNameLength bounds an operator-facing catalogue label.
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MaxVerificationIconNameLength = 128
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// MaxCustomVerificationReasonLength bounds an applicant's stated reason.
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MaxCustomVerificationReasonLength = 4096
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// MaxCustomVerificationNoteLength bounds an operator-only note.
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MaxCustomVerificationNoteLength = 8192
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// MaxVerifierGrantReasonLength bounds the reason a bot was made a verifier.
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MaxVerifierGrantReasonLength = 1024
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// MaxCustomVerificationsPerVerifier bounds how many peers one verifier may
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// mark. Verifier status is granted per deployment, not earned per peer, so an
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// unbounded verifier would be an unbounded badge printer.
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MaxCustomVerificationsPerVerifier = 10000
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)
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var (
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// ErrVerifierNotFound reports a bot without verifier status.
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ErrVerifierNotFound = errors.New("bot verifier settings not found")
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// ErrVerifierForbidden reports a bot that may not verify: no verifier row, or a
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// row the operator disabled. It maps to BOT_VERIFIER_FORBIDDEN.
|
||||
ErrVerifierForbidden = errors.New("bot is not allowed to verify peers")
|
||||
// ErrVerifierSettingsInvalid rejects a malformed verifier configuration.
|
||||
ErrVerifierSettingsInvalid = errors.New("bot verifier settings invalid")
|
||||
// ErrVerifierDescriptionForbidden reports a per-peer description supplied by a
|
||||
// verifier whose can_modify_custom_description is false.
|
||||
ErrVerifierDescriptionForbidden = errors.New("verifier may not set a custom description")
|
||||
// ErrVerificationIconNotFound reports an icon missing from the catalogue.
|
||||
ErrVerificationIconNotFound = errors.New("verification icon not found")
|
||||
// ErrVerificationIconInactive rejects an icon the operator retired.
|
||||
ErrVerificationIconInactive = errors.New("verification icon inactive")
|
||||
// ErrVerificationIconInvalid rejects a malformed icon record.
|
||||
ErrVerificationIconInvalid = errors.New("verification icon invalid")
|
||||
// ErrCustomVerificationNotFound reports a peer this verifier has not marked.
|
||||
ErrCustomVerificationNotFound = errors.New("custom verification not found")
|
||||
// ErrCustomVerificationLimit reports the per-verifier bound.
|
||||
ErrCustomVerificationLimit = errors.New("custom verification limit reached")
|
||||
// ErrCustomVerificationTargetInvalid rejects an unverifiable peer.
|
||||
ErrCustomVerificationTargetInvalid = errors.New("custom verification target invalid")
|
||||
// ErrCustomVerificationRequestNotFound reports a missing application.
|
||||
ErrCustomVerificationRequestNotFound = errors.New("custom verification request not found")
|
||||
// ErrCustomVerificationRequestExists reports a pending application already
|
||||
// occupying the (verifier, peer) pair.
|
||||
ErrCustomVerificationRequestExists = errors.New("custom verification request already pending")
|
||||
// ErrCustomVerificationRequestInvalid rejects a malformed application.
|
||||
ErrCustomVerificationRequestInvalid = errors.New("custom verification request invalid")
|
||||
// ErrCustomVerificationVersionConflict reports a lost optimistic-locking race.
|
||||
ErrCustomVerificationVersionConflict = errors.New("custom verification changed concurrently")
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
// VerificationIcon is one catalogue entry: a custom emoji document usable as a
|
||||
// verifier's mark.
|
||||
type VerificationIcon struct {
|
||||
ID int64
|
||||
DocumentID int64
|
||||
// OwnerBotID is zero for a shared entry and a bot id when the operator
|
||||
// reserved the icon for one verifier.
|
||||
OwnerBotID int64
|
||||
Name string
|
||||
Active bool
|
||||
CreatedAt time.Time
|
||||
UpdatedAt time.Time
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Validate checks the catalogue entry shape.
|
||||
func (i VerificationIcon) Validate() error {
|
||||
if i.DocumentID <= 0 {
|
||||
return ErrVerificationIconInvalid
|
||||
}
|
||||
name := strings.TrimSpace(i.Name)
|
||||
if name == "" || utf8.RuneCountInString(name) > MaxVerificationIconNameLength {
|
||||
return ErrVerificationIconInvalid
|
||||
}
|
||||
if i.OwnerBotID < 0 {
|
||||
return ErrVerificationIconInvalid
|
||||
}
|
||||
return nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// UsableBy reports whether a verifier may mark peers with this icon.
|
||||
func (i VerificationIcon) UsableBy(botID int64) bool {
|
||||
return i.Active && (i.OwnerBotID == 0 || i.OwnerBotID == botID)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// BotVerifierSettings is a bot's verifier status, projected onto
|
||||
// botVerifierSettings#b0cd6617 and consulted by bots.setCustomVerification.
|
||||
type BotVerifierSettings struct {
|
||||
BotID int64
|
||||
IconDocumentID int64
|
||||
CompanyName string
|
||||
DefaultDescription string
|
||||
// CanModifyCustomDescription mirrors flags.1 of the TL constructor: when false
|
||||
// the verifier may only apply DefaultDescription.
|
||||
CanModifyCustomDescription bool
|
||||
// Enabled is the operator's kill switch. A disabled verifier keeps its row and
|
||||
// its granted marks but can no longer mark anything new, and the settings stop
|
||||
// being projected into botInfo.
|
||||
Enabled bool
|
||||
GrantedBy string
|
||||
GrantReason string
|
||||
CreatedAt time.Time
|
||||
UpdatedAt time.Time
|
||||
Version int64
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Validate checks the verifier configuration.
|
||||
func (s BotVerifierSettings) Validate() error {
|
||||
if s.BotID <= 0 || s.IconDocumentID <= 0 {
|
||||
return ErrVerifierSettingsInvalid
|
||||
}
|
||||
company := strings.TrimSpace(s.CompanyName)
|
||||
if company == "" || utf8.RuneCountInString(company) > MaxVerifierCompanyLength {
|
||||
return ErrVerifierSettingsInvalid
|
||||
}
|
||||
if utf8.RuneCountInString(s.DefaultDescription) > MaxCustomVerificationDescriptionLength {
|
||||
return ErrVerifierSettingsInvalid
|
||||
}
|
||||
if len(s.GrantedBy) > 128 || utf8.RuneCountInString(s.GrantReason) > MaxVerifierGrantReasonLength {
|
||||
return ErrVerifierSettingsInvalid
|
||||
}
|
||||
return nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// DescriptionFor resolves the description a mark carries: the verifier-supplied
|
||||
// one when allowed, the configured default, or the protocol-defined generated
|
||||
// fallback.
|
||||
func (s BotVerifierSettings) DescriptionFor(custom string) (string, error) {
|
||||
custom = strings.TrimSpace(custom)
|
||||
if custom == "" {
|
||||
if fallback := strings.TrimSpace(s.DefaultDescription); fallback != "" {
|
||||
return fallback, nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
return fmt.Sprintf(`Was verified by organization "%s"`, strings.TrimSpace(s.CompanyName)), nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
if !s.CanModifyCustomDescription {
|
||||
return "", ErrVerifierDescriptionForbidden
|
||||
}
|
||||
if utf8.RuneCountInString(custom) > MaxCustomVerificationDescriptionLength {
|
||||
return "", ErrCustomVerificationRequestInvalid
|
||||
}
|
||||
return custom, nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// CustomVerification is one granted third-party mark.
|
||||
type CustomVerification struct {
|
||||
ID int64
|
||||
VerifierBotID int64
|
||||
Peer Peer
|
||||
// IconDocumentID is denormalised at grant time so the mark keeps rendering the
|
||||
// icon it was granted with even after the verifier changes its own.
|
||||
IconDocumentID int64
|
||||
Description string
|
||||
GrantedByUserID int64
|
||||
CreatedAt time.Time
|
||||
UpdatedAt time.Time
|
||||
Version int64
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// BotVerification is the TL projection (botVerification#f93cd45c).
|
||||
type BotVerification struct {
|
||||
BotID int64
|
||||
Icon int64
|
||||
Description string
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Projection returns the botVerification payload for full peer objects.
|
||||
func (v CustomVerification) Projection() BotVerification {
|
||||
return BotVerification{
|
||||
BotID: v.VerifierBotID,
|
||||
Icon: v.IconDocumentID,
|
||||
Description: v.Description,
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Validate checks the mark shape.
|
||||
func (v CustomVerification) Validate() error {
|
||||
if v.VerifierBotID <= 0 || v.IconDocumentID <= 0 {
|
||||
return ErrCustomVerificationTargetInvalid
|
||||
}
|
||||
if !validCustomVerificationPeer(v.Peer) {
|
||||
return ErrCustomVerificationTargetInvalid
|
||||
}
|
||||
if utf8.RuneCountInString(v.Description) > MaxBotVerificationDescriptionLength {
|
||||
return ErrCustomVerificationRequestInvalid
|
||||
}
|
||||
return nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func validCustomVerificationPeer(peer Peer) bool {
|
||||
switch peer.Type {
|
||||
case PeerTypeUser, PeerTypeChannel:
|
||||
return peer.ID > 0
|
||||
default:
|
||||
return false
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// CustomVerificationRequestStatus is the application lifecycle in front of a mark.
|
||||
type CustomVerificationRequestStatus string
|
||||
|
||||
const (
|
||||
CustomVerificationPending CustomVerificationRequestStatus = "pending"
|
||||
CustomVerificationApproved CustomVerificationRequestStatus = "approved"
|
||||
CustomVerificationRejected CustomVerificationRequestStatus = "rejected"
|
||||
CustomVerificationRevoked CustomVerificationRequestStatus = "revoked"
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
// Valid reports whether the status is modelled.
|
||||
func (s CustomVerificationRequestStatus) Valid() bool {
|
||||
switch s {
|
||||
case CustomVerificationPending, CustomVerificationApproved,
|
||||
CustomVerificationRejected, CustomVerificationRevoked:
|
||||
return true
|
||||
default:
|
||||
return false
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// CanTransitionCustomVerificationStatus is the status machine. A revoked mark is
|
||||
// reached only from approved, which keeps "revoked" meaning "was verified once".
|
||||
func CanTransitionCustomVerificationStatus(from, to CustomVerificationRequestStatus) bool {
|
||||
if !from.Valid() || !to.Valid() || from == to {
|
||||
return false
|
||||
}
|
||||
switch from {
|
||||
case CustomVerificationPending:
|
||||
return to == CustomVerificationApproved || to == CustomVerificationRejected
|
||||
case CustomVerificationApproved:
|
||||
return to == CustomVerificationRevoked
|
||||
default:
|
||||
return false
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// CustomVerificationRequest is an application filed with a verifier bot.
|
||||
type CustomVerificationRequest struct {
|
||||
ID int64
|
||||
VerifierBotID int64
|
||||
ApplicantUserID int64
|
||||
Peer Peer
|
||||
PeerTitle string
|
||||
PeerUsername string
|
||||
Reason string
|
||||
RequestedDescription string
|
||||
Status CustomVerificationRequestStatus
|
||||
DecidedBy string
|
||||
DecisionReason string
|
||||
InternalNote string
|
||||
CorrelationID string
|
||||
CreatedAt time.Time
|
||||
UpdatedAt time.Time
|
||||
ApprovedAt time.Time
|
||||
RejectedAt time.Time
|
||||
Version int64
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Validate checks the application shape.
|
||||
func (r CustomVerificationRequest) Validate() error {
|
||||
if r.VerifierBotID <= 0 || r.ApplicantUserID <= 0 || !validCustomVerificationPeer(r.Peer) {
|
||||
return ErrCustomVerificationRequestInvalid
|
||||
}
|
||||
if !r.Status.Valid() {
|
||||
return ErrCustomVerificationRequestInvalid
|
||||
}
|
||||
if utf8.RuneCountInString(r.Reason) > MaxCustomVerificationReasonLength ||
|
||||
utf8.RuneCountInString(r.RequestedDescription) > MaxCustomVerificationDescriptionLength ||
|
||||
utf8.RuneCountInString(r.InternalNote) > MaxCustomVerificationNoteLength {
|
||||
return ErrCustomVerificationRequestInvalid
|
||||
}
|
||||
if r.Status == CustomVerificationRejected && strings.TrimSpace(r.DecisionReason) == "" {
|
||||
return ErrVerificationReasonRequired
|
||||
}
|
||||
return nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// SetCustomVerificationRequest is the bots.setCustomVerification payload after the
|
||||
// RPC edge has resolved the caller, the verifier bot and the target peer.
|
||||
type SetCustomVerificationRequest struct {
|
||||
VerifierBotID int64
|
||||
Peer Peer
|
||||
// Enabled false revokes the mark this verifier granted; the request then
|
||||
// carries no description.
|
||||
Enabled bool
|
||||
// CustomDescription is the verifier-supplied per-peer text. It is only honoured
|
||||
// when the verifier's settings allow it.
|
||||
CustomDescription string
|
||||
// CallerUserID is the account that invoked the RPC: the bot itself or its owner.
|
||||
CallerUserID int64
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Validate checks the request shape without consulting stored state.
|
||||
func (r SetCustomVerificationRequest) Validate() error {
|
||||
if r.VerifierBotID <= 0 || !validCustomVerificationPeer(r.Peer) {
|
||||
return ErrCustomVerificationTargetInvalid
|
||||
}
|
||||
if utf8.RuneCountInString(r.CustomDescription) > MaxCustomVerificationDescriptionLength {
|
||||
return ErrCustomVerificationRequestInvalid
|
||||
}
|
||||
if !r.Enabled && strings.TrimSpace(r.CustomDescription) != "" {
|
||||
// Revocation with a description is a caller bug worth reporting rather than
|
||||
// silently ignoring: it usually means enabled was left unset by mistake.
|
||||
return ErrCustomVerificationRequestInvalid
|
||||
}
|
||||
return nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// CustomVerificationFilter bounds an admin listing query.
|
||||
type CustomVerificationFilter struct {
|
||||
VerifierBotID int64
|
||||
PeerType PeerType
|
||||
PeerID int64
|
||||
Query string
|
||||
BeforeID int64
|
||||
Limit int
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// CustomVerificationRequestFilter bounds a review-queue query.
|
||||
type CustomVerificationRequestFilter struct {
|
||||
Statuses []CustomVerificationRequestStatus
|
||||
VerifierBotID int64
|
||||
PeerType PeerType
|
||||
Query string
|
||||
BeforeID int64
|
||||
Limit int
|
||||
}
|
||||
635
internal/domain/collectible_username.go
Normal file
635
internal/domain/collectible_username.go
Normal file
|
|
@ -0,0 +1,635 @@
|
|||
package domain
|
||||
|
||||
import (
|
||||
"errors"
|
||||
"sort"
|
||||
"strings"
|
||||
"time"
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
// Collectible (Fragment-style) usernames.
|
||||
//
|
||||
// A peer holds exactly one editable username -- the slot the client owns through
|
||||
// account.updateUsername / channels.updateUsername -- plus any number of
|
||||
// collectible usernames up to MaxPeerCollectibleUsernames. Both kinds live in
|
||||
// the same global registry, so occupancy checks and username resolution have a
|
||||
// single source of truth.
|
||||
//
|
||||
// The editable slot keeps the service-level 5..32 length rule. Collectible names
|
||||
// are minted by the operator and may be shorter: short names are precisely what
|
||||
// a collectible market distributes. They still have to be syntactically
|
||||
// resolvable by clients, so the character rules are identical.
|
||||
const (
|
||||
MinCollectibleUsernameLength = 4
|
||||
MaxCollectibleUsernameLength = 32
|
||||
// MaxPeerCollectibleUsernames bounds the collectible rows a single peer can
|
||||
// hold. The TL usernames vector is rendered in full by clients, so the bound
|
||||
// keeps both the projection cost and the rendered list finite.
|
||||
MaxPeerCollectibleUsernames = 20
|
||||
// MaxUsernameSortOrder matches the registry CHECK and bounds reorder input.
|
||||
MaxUsernameSortOrder = 1024
|
||||
// MaxCollectibleUsernameURLLength matches the registry CHECK on url.
|
||||
MaxCollectibleUsernameURLLength = 512
|
||||
// MaxCollectibleUsernameReasonLength matches the provenance CHECK on reason.
|
||||
MaxCollectibleUsernameReasonLength = 512
|
||||
// MaxCollectibleUsernameActorLength matches the provenance CHECK on actor.
|
||||
MaxCollectibleUsernameActorLength = 128
|
||||
// MaxCollectibleUsernameCommandKeyLength matches the idempotency CHECK.
|
||||
MaxCollectibleUsernameCommandKeyLength = 128
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
var (
|
||||
// ErrCollectibleUsernameNotFound is returned when no asset backs the name.
|
||||
ErrCollectibleUsernameNotFound = errors.New("collectible username not found")
|
||||
// ErrCollectibleUsernameNotOwned rejects operations that need a live owner.
|
||||
ErrCollectibleUsernameNotOwned = errors.New("collectible username not owned")
|
||||
// ErrCollectibleUsernameBurned rejects any mutation of a burned asset.
|
||||
ErrCollectibleUsernameBurned = errors.New("collectible username burned")
|
||||
// ErrCollectibleUsernameLimit reports the per-peer collectible bound.
|
||||
ErrCollectibleUsernameLimit = errors.New("collectible username limit reached")
|
||||
// ErrCollectibleUsernameStateInvalid rejects an impossible asset shape.
|
||||
ErrCollectibleUsernameStateInvalid = errors.New("collectible username state invalid")
|
||||
// ErrUsernameNotCollectible rejects collectible-only operations on the
|
||||
// editable slot, which the client owns and the operator must not move.
|
||||
ErrUsernameNotCollectible = errors.New("username not collectible")
|
||||
// ErrUsernameNotEditable rejects editable-only operations on a collectible.
|
||||
ErrUsernameNotEditable = errors.New("username not editable")
|
||||
// ErrUsernameOrderInvalid rejects a reorder that is not a permutation of the
|
||||
// peer's current collectible usernames.
|
||||
ErrUsernameOrderInvalid = errors.New("username order invalid")
|
||||
// ErrCollectibleCurrencyInvalid rejects an unsupported purchase currency.
|
||||
ErrCollectibleCurrencyInvalid = errors.New("collectible currency invalid")
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
// Purchase currencies recorded on a collectible asset. XTR is Stars, TON is the
|
||||
// local (non on-chain) TON ledger, USD is a bookkeeping-only fiat record for
|
||||
// assets the operator imported rather than sold.
|
||||
const (
|
||||
CollectibleCurrencyStars = "XTR"
|
||||
CollectibleCurrencyTON = "TON"
|
||||
CollectibleCurrencyUSD = "USD"
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
// CollectibleCryptoCurrencyTON is the only crypto currency the projection
|
||||
// reports, matching the TON ledger the star gift lifecycle already uses.
|
||||
const CollectibleCryptoCurrencyTON = "TON"
|
||||
|
||||
// CollectibleUsernameStatus is the asset lifecycle.
|
||||
//
|
||||
// vault -- minted, held by the operator, attached to no peer.
|
||||
// owned -- attached to a peer and present in that peer's username registry.
|
||||
// burned -- permanently retired; the name is released back to the pool.
|
||||
type CollectibleUsernameStatus string
|
||||
|
||||
const (
|
||||
CollectibleUsernameStatusVault CollectibleUsernameStatus = "vault"
|
||||
CollectibleUsernameStatusOwned CollectibleUsernameStatus = "owned"
|
||||
CollectibleUsernameStatusBurned CollectibleUsernameStatus = "burned"
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
// Valid reports whether the status is one of the three modelled states.
|
||||
func (s CollectibleUsernameStatus) Valid() bool {
|
||||
switch s {
|
||||
case CollectibleUsernameStatusVault, CollectibleUsernameStatusOwned, CollectibleUsernameStatusBurned:
|
||||
return true
|
||||
default:
|
||||
return false
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// CollectibleUsernameTransferKind is the provenance entry kind.
|
||||
type CollectibleUsernameTransferKind string
|
||||
|
||||
const (
|
||||
// CollectibleUsernameKindMint records the asset entering the vault.
|
||||
CollectibleUsernameKindMint CollectibleUsernameTransferKind = "mint"
|
||||
// CollectibleUsernameKindTransfer records an ownership change, including the
|
||||
// first assignment out of the vault.
|
||||
CollectibleUsernameKindTransfer CollectibleUsernameTransferKind = "transfer"
|
||||
// CollectibleUsernameKindRevoke records an owner losing the asset back to the
|
||||
// vault without the name being released.
|
||||
CollectibleUsernameKindRevoke CollectibleUsernameTransferKind = "revoke"
|
||||
// CollectibleUsernameKindBurn records permanent retirement.
|
||||
CollectibleUsernameKindBurn CollectibleUsernameTransferKind = "burn"
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
// Valid reports whether the kind is modelled.
|
||||
func (k CollectibleUsernameTransferKind) Valid() bool {
|
||||
switch k {
|
||||
case CollectibleUsernameKindMint, CollectibleUsernameKindTransfer, CollectibleUsernameKindRevoke, CollectibleUsernameKindBurn:
|
||||
return true
|
||||
default:
|
||||
return false
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Username is one registry row of a peer's username list. It projects directly
|
||||
// onto username#b4073647 (editable/active flags plus the display form).
|
||||
type Username struct {
|
||||
Username string
|
||||
Active bool
|
||||
Editable bool
|
||||
// SortOrder orders collectible rows. The editable row always sorts first
|
||||
// regardless of its stored value, matching client expectations that the
|
||||
// editable username heads the list.
|
||||
SortOrder int
|
||||
// CollectibleID is zero for the editable slot and non-zero for an asset.
|
||||
CollectibleID int64
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Collectible reports whether this row is backed by a collectible asset.
|
||||
func (u Username) Collectible() bool { return u.CollectibleID != 0 }
|
||||
|
||||
// CollectibleUsername is the asset behind a collectible username: who holds it,
|
||||
// what was paid, and where the purchase can be verified.
|
||||
type CollectibleUsername struct {
|
||||
ID int64
|
||||
Username string
|
||||
Status CollectibleUsernameStatus
|
||||
// Owner is the zero Peer unless Status is owned.
|
||||
Owner Peer
|
||||
// PurchaseDate, Currency, Amount, CryptoCurrency, CryptoAmount and URL are
|
||||
// the fragment.collectibleInfo payload.
|
||||
PurchaseDate time.Time
|
||||
Currency string
|
||||
Amount int64
|
||||
CryptoCurrency string
|
||||
CryptoAmount int64
|
||||
URL string
|
||||
// OriginalOwner is the first holder and survives transfers and burns.
|
||||
OriginalOwner Peer
|
||||
TransferCount int
|
||||
Version int64
|
||||
CreatedAt time.Time
|
||||
UpdatedAt time.Time
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// CollectibleInfo is the fragment.collectibleInfo projection. PurchaseDate is a
|
||||
// unix timestamp because the TL field is an int date.
|
||||
type CollectibleInfo struct {
|
||||
PurchaseDate int
|
||||
Currency string
|
||||
Amount int64
|
||||
CryptoCurrency string
|
||||
CryptoAmount int64
|
||||
URL string
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Info returns the TL-shaped purchase record.
|
||||
func (c CollectibleUsername) Info() CollectibleInfo {
|
||||
date := 0
|
||||
if !c.PurchaseDate.IsZero() {
|
||||
date = int(c.PurchaseDate.Unix())
|
||||
}
|
||||
return CollectibleInfo{
|
||||
PurchaseDate: date,
|
||||
Currency: c.Currency,
|
||||
Amount: c.Amount,
|
||||
CryptoCurrency: c.CryptoCurrency,
|
||||
CryptoAmount: c.CryptoAmount,
|
||||
URL: c.URL,
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Owned reports whether the asset is currently attached to a peer.
|
||||
func (c CollectibleUsername) Owned() bool {
|
||||
return c.Status == CollectibleUsernameStatusOwned && c.Owner.Type != "" && c.Owner.ID > 0
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Validate enforces the invariants the registry CHECK constraints encode, so an
|
||||
// in-memory store and PostgreSQL reject the same shapes.
|
||||
func (c CollectibleUsername) Validate() error {
|
||||
if !ValidCollectibleUsername(c.Username) {
|
||||
return ErrUsernameInvalid
|
||||
}
|
||||
if !c.Status.Valid() {
|
||||
return ErrCollectibleUsernameStateInvalid
|
||||
}
|
||||
switch c.Status {
|
||||
case CollectibleUsernameStatusOwned:
|
||||
if !validCollectibleOwner(c.Owner) {
|
||||
return ErrCollectibleUsernameStateInvalid
|
||||
}
|
||||
default:
|
||||
if c.Owner.Type != "" || c.Owner.ID != 0 {
|
||||
return ErrCollectibleUsernameStateInvalid
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
if err := ValidateCollectibleAmounts(c.Currency, c.Amount, c.CryptoCurrency, c.CryptoAmount); err != nil {
|
||||
return err
|
||||
}
|
||||
if len(c.URL) > MaxCollectibleUsernameURLLength {
|
||||
return ErrCollectibleUsernameStateInvalid
|
||||
}
|
||||
if c.TransferCount < 0 {
|
||||
return ErrCollectibleUsernameStateInvalid
|
||||
}
|
||||
if c.OriginalOwner.Type != "" && !validCollectibleOwner(c.OriginalOwner) {
|
||||
return ErrCollectibleUsernameStateInvalid
|
||||
}
|
||||
return nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func validCollectibleOwner(peer Peer) bool {
|
||||
switch peer.Type {
|
||||
case PeerTypeUser, PeerTypeChannel:
|
||||
return peer.ID > 0
|
||||
default:
|
||||
return false
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// ValidateCollectibleAmounts enforces the currency/amount pairing shared by the
|
||||
// registry CHECK constraints: a crypto currency requires a positive amount and
|
||||
// an empty one forbids it.
|
||||
func ValidateCollectibleAmounts(currency string, amount int64, cryptoCurrency string, cryptoAmount int64) error {
|
||||
switch currency {
|
||||
case CollectibleCurrencyStars, CollectibleCurrencyTON, CollectibleCurrencyUSD:
|
||||
default:
|
||||
return ErrCollectibleCurrencyInvalid
|
||||
}
|
||||
if amount < 0 {
|
||||
return ErrCollectibleCurrencyInvalid
|
||||
}
|
||||
switch cryptoCurrency {
|
||||
case "":
|
||||
if cryptoAmount != 0 {
|
||||
return ErrCollectibleCurrencyInvalid
|
||||
}
|
||||
case CollectibleCryptoCurrencyTON:
|
||||
if cryptoAmount <= 0 {
|
||||
return ErrCollectibleCurrencyInvalid
|
||||
}
|
||||
default:
|
||||
return ErrCollectibleCurrencyInvalid
|
||||
}
|
||||
return nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// CollectibleUsernameTransfer is one provenance row.
|
||||
type CollectibleUsernameTransfer struct {
|
||||
ID int64
|
||||
CollectibleID int64
|
||||
Kind CollectibleUsernameTransferKind
|
||||
From Peer
|
||||
To Peer
|
||||
Currency string
|
||||
Amount int64
|
||||
Actor string
|
||||
Reason string
|
||||
CommandKey string
|
||||
CreatedAt time.Time
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// NormalizeUsername trims whitespace and a leading '@'. It is the shared entry
|
||||
// normalisation for every username surface: RPC, admin API and store.
|
||||
func NormalizeUsername(username string) string {
|
||||
username = strings.TrimSpace(username)
|
||||
username = strings.TrimPrefix(username, "@")
|
||||
return strings.TrimSpace(username)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// ValidCollectibleUsername reports whether the name is syntactically usable as a
|
||||
// collectible username. Character rules match the editable slot exactly; only
|
||||
// the minimum length differs.
|
||||
func ValidCollectibleUsername(username string) bool {
|
||||
return validUsernameChars(username, MinCollectibleUsernameLength, MaxCollectibleUsernameLength)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func validUsernameChars(username string, minLen, maxLen int) bool {
|
||||
if len(username) < minLen || len(username) > maxLen {
|
||||
return false
|
||||
}
|
||||
for i := 0; i < len(username); i++ {
|
||||
c := username[i]
|
||||
switch {
|
||||
case c >= 'a' && c <= 'z':
|
||||
case c >= 'A' && c <= 'Z':
|
||||
case c >= '0' && c <= '9':
|
||||
if i == 0 {
|
||||
return false
|
||||
}
|
||||
case c == '_':
|
||||
if i == 0 {
|
||||
return false
|
||||
}
|
||||
default:
|
||||
return false
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
return true
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// SortUsernames returns the projection order clients expect: stored order first,
|
||||
// then the editable slot ahead of a collectible that shares its position, then
|
||||
// the name as a stable tiebreak. The input is not mutated.
|
||||
//
|
||||
// Order beats editability because core.telegram.org/api/fragment makes the first
|
||||
// entry of the vector the peer's primary username, and reorderUsernames is
|
||||
// allowed to move the editable slot out of that position. Editability is only the
|
||||
// tiebreak, which is what keeps a peer that never reordered anything projecting
|
||||
// exactly as before: every such row carries sort_order 0, including the editable
|
||||
// one, so the tiebreak alone decides and the editable slot stays first.
|
||||
func SortUsernames(list []Username) []Username {
|
||||
out := append([]Username(nil), list...)
|
||||
sort.SliceStable(out, func(i, j int) bool {
|
||||
if out[i].SortOrder != out[j].SortOrder {
|
||||
return out[i].SortOrder < out[j].SortOrder
|
||||
}
|
||||
if out[i].Editable != out[j].Editable {
|
||||
return out[i].Editable
|
||||
}
|
||||
return strings.ToLower(out[i].Username) < strings.ToLower(out[j].Username)
|
||||
})
|
||||
return out
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// ActiveUsername returns the name clients treat as the peer's primary username:
|
||||
// the first active entry of the projected vector, which is the active editable
|
||||
// slot until a reorder moves a collectible ahead of it.
|
||||
func ActiveUsername(list []Username) string {
|
||||
for _, item := range SortUsernames(list) {
|
||||
if item.Active && item.Username != "" {
|
||||
return item.Username
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
return ""
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// ValidateUsernameReorder checks that order is a valid new ordering of the peer's
|
||||
// usernames.
|
||||
//
|
||||
// The contract is the one clients implement, not a collectible-only one:
|
||||
// core.telegram.org/api/fragment says "all currently active usernames must be
|
||||
// specified", and the editable slot is an active username. Telegram Desktop
|
||||
// therefore sends the whole visible list -- editable slot included -- and a
|
||||
// server that rejects the editable name answers USERNAME_INVALID to a correct
|
||||
// client, which is what made a channel's username editor unusable.
|
||||
//
|
||||
// So: every name in order must belong to the peer, without duplicates, and every
|
||||
// *active* username of the peer must appear. Inactive names are optional, because
|
||||
// they are not part of what the client is showing; when a client does include
|
||||
// them they are positioned like any other name.
|
||||
func ValidateUsernameReorder(current []Username, order []string) error {
|
||||
// The bound is the collectible bound plus the one editable slot, because the
|
||||
// editable name is a legitimate member of the vector.
|
||||
if len(order) > MaxPeerCollectibleUsernames+1 {
|
||||
return ErrUsernameOrderInvalid
|
||||
}
|
||||
owned := make(map[string]struct{}, len(current))
|
||||
active := make(map[string]struct{}, len(current))
|
||||
for _, item := range current {
|
||||
key := strings.ToLower(item.Username)
|
||||
if key == "" {
|
||||
continue
|
||||
}
|
||||
owned[key] = struct{}{}
|
||||
if item.Active {
|
||||
active[key] = struct{}{}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
seen := make(map[string]struct{}, len(order))
|
||||
for _, name := range order {
|
||||
key := strings.ToLower(NormalizeUsername(name))
|
||||
if key == "" {
|
||||
return ErrUsernameOrderInvalid
|
||||
}
|
||||
if _, ok := owned[key]; !ok {
|
||||
return ErrUsernameOrderInvalid
|
||||
}
|
||||
if _, dup := seen[key]; dup {
|
||||
return ErrUsernameOrderInvalid
|
||||
}
|
||||
seen[key] = struct{}{}
|
||||
}
|
||||
for key := range active {
|
||||
if _, ok := seen[key]; !ok {
|
||||
return ErrUsernameOrderInvalid
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
return nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// SameUsernameOrder reports whether two lists project the same visible sequence
|
||||
// of names. It is what a reorder reports as "changed", rather than whether the
|
||||
// stored sort_order integers moved: legacy rows numbered the editable slot and
|
||||
// the first collectible both 0, so the very first reorder renumbers rows without
|
||||
// moving anything a client can see, and every peer of the peer would be notified
|
||||
// for nothing.
|
||||
func SameUsernameOrder(a, b []Username) bool {
|
||||
left, right := SortUsernames(a), SortUsernames(b)
|
||||
if len(left) != len(right) {
|
||||
return false
|
||||
}
|
||||
for i := range left {
|
||||
if !strings.EqualFold(left[i].Username, right[i].Username) {
|
||||
return false
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
return true
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// ApplyUsernameReorder returns the list with sort orders rewritten to follow
|
||||
// order, the editable slot included: a client is allowed to move its own username
|
||||
// below a collectible one, and the first entry of the vector is what clients show
|
||||
// as the peer's primary username.
|
||||
//
|
||||
// Names absent from order -- only ever inactive ones, since ValidateUsernameReorder
|
||||
// requires every active name -- keep their relative position and are placed after
|
||||
// everything the client ordered, so an inactive name can never displace a visible
|
||||
// one.
|
||||
func ApplyUsernameReorder(current []Username, order []string) ([]Username, error) {
|
||||
if err := ValidateUsernameReorder(current, order); err != nil {
|
||||
return nil, err
|
||||
}
|
||||
position := make(map[string]int, len(order))
|
||||
for i, name := range order {
|
||||
position[strings.ToLower(NormalizeUsername(name))] = i
|
||||
}
|
||||
out := append([]Username(nil), current...)
|
||||
// Unordered rows follow the ordered block in their previous projection order.
|
||||
trailing := len(order)
|
||||
for _, item := range SortUsernames(current) {
|
||||
key := strings.ToLower(item.Username)
|
||||
if key == "" {
|
||||
continue
|
||||
}
|
||||
if _, ok := position[key]; ok {
|
||||
continue
|
||||
}
|
||||
position[key] = trailing
|
||||
trailing++
|
||||
}
|
||||
if trailing > MaxUsernameSortOrder {
|
||||
return nil, ErrUsernameOrderInvalid
|
||||
}
|
||||
for i := range out {
|
||||
key := strings.ToLower(out[i].Username)
|
||||
if key == "" {
|
||||
continue
|
||||
}
|
||||
out[i].SortOrder = position[key]
|
||||
}
|
||||
return SortUsernames(out), nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// ValidateUsernameToggle rejects toggling the editable slot through the
|
||||
// collectible-only method. Every collectible may be inactive at the same time:
|
||||
// ownership and resolvability are separate facts, and inactive assets remain
|
||||
// visible to their owner without resolving publicly.
|
||||
func ValidateUsernameToggle(current []Username, username string, active bool) error {
|
||||
key := strings.ToLower(NormalizeUsername(username))
|
||||
if key == "" {
|
||||
return ErrUsernameInvalid
|
||||
}
|
||||
var target *Username
|
||||
for i := range current {
|
||||
if strings.ToLower(current[i].Username) == key {
|
||||
target = ¤t[i]
|
||||
break
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
if target == nil {
|
||||
return ErrUsernameNotOccupied
|
||||
}
|
||||
if !target.Collectible() {
|
||||
return ErrUsernameNotCollectible
|
||||
}
|
||||
return nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// MintCollectibleUsernameRequest describes an operator minting a new asset,
|
||||
// optionally assigning it to a holder in the same command.
|
||||
type MintCollectibleUsernameRequest struct {
|
||||
Username string
|
||||
// Owner is optional: the zero value mints into the vault.
|
||||
Owner Peer
|
||||
PurchaseDate time.Time
|
||||
Currency string
|
||||
Amount int64
|
||||
CryptoCurrency string
|
||||
CryptoAmount int64
|
||||
URL string
|
||||
Actor string
|
||||
Reason string
|
||||
CommandKey string
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Validate normalises nothing and only checks; callers normalise first.
|
||||
func (r MintCollectibleUsernameRequest) Validate() error {
|
||||
if !ValidCollectibleUsername(r.Username) {
|
||||
return ErrUsernameInvalid
|
||||
}
|
||||
if r.Owner.Type != "" && !validCollectibleOwner(r.Owner) {
|
||||
return ErrCollectibleUsernameStateInvalid
|
||||
}
|
||||
if err := ValidateCollectibleAmounts(r.Currency, r.Amount, r.CryptoCurrency, r.CryptoAmount); err != nil {
|
||||
return err
|
||||
}
|
||||
if len(r.URL) > MaxCollectibleUsernameURLLength {
|
||||
return ErrCollectibleUsernameStateInvalid
|
||||
}
|
||||
if len(r.Reason) > MaxCollectibleUsernameReasonLength {
|
||||
return ErrCollectibleUsernameStateInvalid
|
||||
}
|
||||
if len(r.Actor) > MaxCollectibleUsernameActorLength {
|
||||
return ErrCollectibleUsernameStateInvalid
|
||||
}
|
||||
if len(r.CommandKey) > MaxCollectibleUsernameCommandKeyLength {
|
||||
return ErrCollectibleUsernameStateInvalid
|
||||
}
|
||||
return nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// TransferCollectibleUsernameRequest moves an asset between peers, or out of the
|
||||
// vault when the asset is unowned.
|
||||
type TransferCollectibleUsernameRequest struct {
|
||||
Username string
|
||||
To Peer
|
||||
Actor string
|
||||
Reason string
|
||||
CommandKey string
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Validate checks the request shape.
|
||||
func (r TransferCollectibleUsernameRequest) Validate() error {
|
||||
if !ValidCollectibleUsername(r.Username) {
|
||||
return ErrUsernameInvalid
|
||||
}
|
||||
if !validCollectibleOwner(r.To) {
|
||||
return ErrCollectibleUsernameStateInvalid
|
||||
}
|
||||
if len(r.Reason) > MaxCollectibleUsernameReasonLength {
|
||||
return ErrCollectibleUsernameStateInvalid
|
||||
}
|
||||
if len(r.Actor) > MaxCollectibleUsernameActorLength {
|
||||
return ErrCollectibleUsernameStateInvalid
|
||||
}
|
||||
if len(r.CommandKey) > MaxCollectibleUsernameCommandKeyLength {
|
||||
return ErrCollectibleUsernameStateInvalid
|
||||
}
|
||||
return nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// RevokeCollectibleUsernameRequest returns an asset to the vault, or burns it.
|
||||
type RevokeCollectibleUsernameRequest struct {
|
||||
Username string
|
||||
// Burn retires the asset permanently instead of returning it to the vault.
|
||||
Burn bool
|
||||
Actor string
|
||||
Reason string
|
||||
CommandKey string
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Validate checks the request shape.
|
||||
func (r RevokeCollectibleUsernameRequest) Validate() error {
|
||||
if !ValidCollectibleUsername(r.Username) {
|
||||
return ErrUsernameInvalid
|
||||
}
|
||||
if len(r.Reason) > MaxCollectibleUsernameReasonLength {
|
||||
return ErrCollectibleUsernameStateInvalid
|
||||
}
|
||||
if len(r.Actor) > MaxCollectibleUsernameActorLength {
|
||||
return ErrCollectibleUsernameStateInvalid
|
||||
}
|
||||
if len(r.CommandKey) > MaxCollectibleUsernameCommandKeyLength {
|
||||
return ErrCollectibleUsernameStateInvalid
|
||||
}
|
||||
return nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// DeleteCollectibleUsernameRequest removes an asset outright, releasing its name
|
||||
// and discarding its provenance. Revoke+Burn retires an asset but keeps the
|
||||
// history; this is the escape hatch for a name that was issued by mistake.
|
||||
type DeleteCollectibleUsernameRequest struct {
|
||||
Username string
|
||||
Actor string
|
||||
Reason string
|
||||
CommandKey string
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Validate checks the request shape.
|
||||
func (r DeleteCollectibleUsernameRequest) Validate() error {
|
||||
if !ValidCollectibleUsername(r.Username) {
|
||||
return ErrUsernameInvalid
|
||||
}
|
||||
if len(r.Reason) > MaxCollectibleUsernameReasonLength {
|
||||
return ErrCollectibleUsernameStateInvalid
|
||||
}
|
||||
if len(r.Actor) > MaxCollectibleUsernameActorLength {
|
||||
return ErrCollectibleUsernameStateInvalid
|
||||
}
|
||||
if len(r.CommandKey) > MaxCollectibleUsernameCommandKeyLength {
|
||||
return ErrCollectibleUsernameStateInvalid
|
||||
}
|
||||
return nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// CollectibleUsernameFilter bounds an admin listing query.
|
||||
type CollectibleUsernameFilter struct {
|
||||
Status CollectibleUsernameStatus
|
||||
Owner Peer
|
||||
Query string
|
||||
BeforeID int64
|
||||
Limit int
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
|
@ -21,6 +21,28 @@ const (
|
|||
ChatBotUserID int64 = 1250000007
|
||||
// ChatBotAccessHash 固定不变;与 postgres 种子行双写,必须保持一致。
|
||||
ChatBotAccessHash int64 = 6332902371644871201
|
||||
|
||||
// VerifyBotUserID is the built-in @verifybot: it collects official platform
|
||||
// verification applications and reports decisions back to the applicant. The
|
||||
// id is reserved and stable, so a restart never re-creates the account under a
|
||||
// different identity.
|
||||
VerifyBotUserID int64 = 1250000011
|
||||
// VerifyBotAccessHash is fixed and double-written with the seed row in
|
||||
// migration 0153; the two must never drift.
|
||||
VerifyBotAccessHash int64 = 7802113947355620887
|
||||
|
||||
// VerifierBotUserID is the built-in @verifierbot: the first THIRD-PARTY
|
||||
// verifier of a deployment (core.telegram.org/api/bots/verification). It
|
||||
// collects applications for its own icon+description mark and reports the
|
||||
// operator's decision back to the applicant. The id is reserved and stable, so
|
||||
// a restart never re-creates the account under a different identity.
|
||||
//
|
||||
// It is not a second route to the platform checkmark: that badge is granted by
|
||||
// the operator alone and collected by VerifyBotUserID above.
|
||||
VerifierBotUserID int64 = 1250000013
|
||||
// VerifierBotAccessHash is fixed and double-written with the seed row in
|
||||
// migration 0156; the two must never drift.
|
||||
VerifierBotAccessHash int64 = 6913402578811563729
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
// OfficialSystemUser 返回第一阶段内置的官方系统账号。
|
||||
|
|
@ -75,6 +97,38 @@ func ChatBotUser() User {
|
|||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// VerifyBotUser returns the built-in @verifybot account. It is verified itself,
|
||||
// so the applicant sees the same badge on the account that grants it.
|
||||
func VerifyBotUser() User {
|
||||
return User{
|
||||
ID: VerifyBotUserID,
|
||||
AccessHash: VerifyBotAccessHash,
|
||||
FirstName: "Verify Bot",
|
||||
Username: "verifybot",
|
||||
Verified: true,
|
||||
Bot: true,
|
||||
BotInfoVersion: 1,
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// VerifierBotUser returns the built-in @verifierbot account.
|
||||
//
|
||||
// Verified is false on purpose: the official checkmark is the platform's own
|
||||
// mechanism, and a third-party verifier wearing it would blur exactly the
|
||||
// distinction this bot has to explain to every applicant. What makes the account a
|
||||
// verifier is the operator-granted BotVerifierSettings row, not this seed.
|
||||
func VerifierBotUser() User {
|
||||
return User{
|
||||
ID: VerifierBotUserID,
|
||||
AccessHash: VerifierBotAccessHash,
|
||||
FirstName: "Verifier Bot",
|
||||
Username: "verifierbot",
|
||||
Verified: false,
|
||||
Bot: true,
|
||||
BotInfoVersion: 1,
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// SystemUserByID 返回内置系统账号;非系统账号返回 ok=false。
|
||||
// 所有对 777000 的硬编码注入点统一经此函数,新增内置账号只改这里。
|
||||
func SystemUserByID(id int64) (User, bool) {
|
||||
|
|
@ -87,6 +141,10 @@ func SystemUserByID(id int64) (User, bool) {
|
|||
return StickersBotUser(), true
|
||||
case ChatBotUserID:
|
||||
return ChatBotUser(), true
|
||||
case VerifyBotUserID:
|
||||
return VerifyBotUser(), true
|
||||
case VerifierBotUserID:
|
||||
return VerifierBotUser(), true
|
||||
}
|
||||
return User{}, false
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
|
@ -96,9 +154,25 @@ func IsSystemUserID(id int64) bool {
|
|||
return ok
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// SystemUserIDs returns every built-in account id, in a stable order.
|
||||
//
|
||||
// It is the one list to extend when a service account is added, so a caller that
|
||||
// has to enumerate them -- a SQL predicate excluding infrastructure, say -- cannot
|
||||
// silently miss one the way an inline literal would.
|
||||
func SystemUserIDs() []int64 {
|
||||
return []int64{
|
||||
OfficialSystemUserID,
|
||||
BotFatherUserID,
|
||||
StickersBotUserID,
|
||||
ChatBotUserID,
|
||||
VerifyBotUserID,
|
||||
VerifierBotUserID,
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func SystemUserByPhone(phone string) (User, bool) {
|
||||
phone = NormalizePhone(phone)
|
||||
for _, id := range []int64{OfficialSystemUserID, BotFatherUserID, StickersBotUserID, ChatBotUserID} {
|
||||
for _, id := range SystemUserIDs() {
|
||||
u, ok := SystemUserByID(id)
|
||||
if !ok || u.Phone == "" {
|
||||
continue
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
651
internal/domain/verification.go
Normal file
651
internal/domain/verification.go
Normal file
|
|
@ -0,0 +1,651 @@
|
|||
package domain
|
||||
|
||||
import (
|
||||
"errors"
|
||||
"net"
|
||||
"net/url"
|
||||
"strings"
|
||||
"time"
|
||||
"unicode/utf8"
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
// Official platform verification.
|
||||
//
|
||||
// This is the badge official clients render from user#b1b8cc83 verified:flags.17
|
||||
// and channel#d49f34c6 verified:flags.7 (layer 228). It is deliberately NOT the
|
||||
// third-party mechanism built on botVerification#f93cd45c /
|
||||
// bots.setCustomVerification#8b89dfbd / bot_verification_icon, where an outside
|
||||
// organisation attaches its own icon. The two must never be conflated: an
|
||||
// application reviewed here flips the platform flag on the peer record and
|
||||
// nothing else.
|
||||
//
|
||||
// Applications are filed through the built-in @verifybot and decided in the
|
||||
// admin panel. The application record is the durable audit subject: it is never
|
||||
// deleted, only moved through its status machine.
|
||||
|
||||
// Verification target kinds. A verification subject is always a public presence:
|
||||
// a bot, a public channel or a public supergroup. Ordinary user accounts are
|
||||
// excluded unless the operator opts in via configuration.
|
||||
type VerificationTargetType string
|
||||
|
||||
const (
|
||||
VerificationTargetBot VerificationTargetType = "bot"
|
||||
VerificationTargetChannel VerificationTargetType = "channel"
|
||||
VerificationTargetSupergroup VerificationTargetType = "supergroup"
|
||||
VerificationTargetUser VerificationTargetType = "user"
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
// Valid reports whether the target type is modelled.
|
||||
func (t VerificationTargetType) Valid() bool {
|
||||
switch t {
|
||||
case VerificationTargetBot, VerificationTargetChannel, VerificationTargetSupergroup, VerificationTargetUser:
|
||||
return true
|
||||
default:
|
||||
return false
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// PeerType maps the target kind onto the peer namespace that holds it: bots and
|
||||
// users live in the user namespace, channels and supergroups in the channel one.
|
||||
func (t VerificationTargetType) PeerType() PeerType {
|
||||
switch t {
|
||||
case VerificationTargetChannel, VerificationTargetSupergroup:
|
||||
return PeerTypeChannel
|
||||
default:
|
||||
return PeerTypeUser
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// VerificationStatus is the application lifecycle.
|
||||
//
|
||||
// draft -- being filled in through the bot dialog, not yet visible to review
|
||||
// submitted -- awaiting a reviewer
|
||||
// in_review -- claimed by a reviewer
|
||||
// approved -- decided in favour; the target carries the platform flag
|
||||
// rejected -- decided against, with a mandatory reason
|
||||
// cancelled -- withdrawn by the applicant
|
||||
type VerificationStatus string
|
||||
|
||||
const (
|
||||
VerificationStatusDraft VerificationStatus = "draft"
|
||||
VerificationStatusSubmitted VerificationStatus = "submitted"
|
||||
VerificationStatusInReview VerificationStatus = "in_review"
|
||||
VerificationStatusApproved VerificationStatus = "approved"
|
||||
VerificationStatusRejected VerificationStatus = "rejected"
|
||||
VerificationStatusCancelled VerificationStatus = "cancelled"
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
// Valid reports whether the status is modelled.
|
||||
func (s VerificationStatus) Valid() bool {
|
||||
switch s {
|
||||
case VerificationStatusDraft, VerificationStatusSubmitted, VerificationStatusInReview,
|
||||
VerificationStatusApproved, VerificationStatusRejected, VerificationStatusCancelled:
|
||||
return true
|
||||
default:
|
||||
return false
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Active reports whether the application still occupies its target. Exactly one
|
||||
// active application per target is allowed, which the store enforces with a
|
||||
// partial unique index over these statuses.
|
||||
func (s VerificationStatus) Active() bool {
|
||||
switch s {
|
||||
case VerificationStatusDraft, VerificationStatusSubmitted, VerificationStatusInReview:
|
||||
return true
|
||||
default:
|
||||
return false
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Decided reports whether a reviewer has closed the application.
|
||||
func (s VerificationStatus) Decided() bool {
|
||||
return s == VerificationStatusApproved || s == VerificationStatusRejected
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// CanTransitionVerificationStatus is the single source of truth for the status
|
||||
// machine. Both the bot dialog and the review API validate against it, so an
|
||||
// operator cannot drive an application into a state the applicant path forbids.
|
||||
func CanTransitionVerificationStatus(from, to VerificationStatus) bool {
|
||||
if !from.Valid() || !to.Valid() || from == to {
|
||||
return false
|
||||
}
|
||||
switch from {
|
||||
case VerificationStatusDraft:
|
||||
return to == VerificationStatusSubmitted || to == VerificationStatusCancelled
|
||||
case VerificationStatusSubmitted:
|
||||
return to == VerificationStatusInReview || to == VerificationStatusApproved ||
|
||||
to == VerificationStatusRejected || to == VerificationStatusCancelled
|
||||
case VerificationStatusInReview:
|
||||
return to == VerificationStatusApproved || to == VerificationStatusRejected ||
|
||||
to == VerificationStatusSubmitted || to == VerificationStatusCancelled
|
||||
default:
|
||||
// Decided and cancelled applications are terminal: history is kept, a new
|
||||
// attempt is a new application.
|
||||
return false
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Field bounds. They are enforced in the domain so the bot dialog, the admin API
|
||||
// and both store backends reject the same inputs, and they mirror the CHECK
|
||||
// constraints on verification_applications.
|
||||
const (
|
||||
MaxVerificationCategoryLength = 64
|
||||
MaxVerificationDescriptionLength = 1024
|
||||
MinVerificationDescriptionLength = 40
|
||||
MaxVerificationCommentLength = 1024
|
||||
MaxVerificationURLLength = 512
|
||||
MaxVerificationSocialLinks = 10
|
||||
MaxVerificationPressLinks = 10
|
||||
// MinVerificationPressLinks is the official bar: independent coverage is what
|
||||
// distinguishes a verifiable public presence from a self-declared one.
|
||||
MinVerificationPressLinks = 2
|
||||
MaxVerificationReasonLength = 1024
|
||||
MaxVerificationNoteLength = 2048
|
||||
MaxVerificationTitleLength = 256
|
||||
MaxVerificationReviewerLength = 128
|
||||
MaxVerificationCorrelationLen = 128
|
||||
MaxVerificationEventPayloadSize = 8192
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
// VerificationCategories is the closed set of project categories offered by the
|
||||
// bot. A closed set keeps the review queue groupable and keeps free text out of
|
||||
// a field the panel filters on.
|
||||
var VerificationCategories = []string{
|
||||
"media",
|
||||
"government",
|
||||
"company",
|
||||
"brand",
|
||||
"sport",
|
||||
"culture",
|
||||
"education",
|
||||
"nonprofit",
|
||||
"public_figure",
|
||||
"service",
|
||||
"other",
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// ValidVerificationCategory reports whether the category is offered.
|
||||
func ValidVerificationCategory(category string) bool {
|
||||
for _, item := range VerificationCategories {
|
||||
if item == category {
|
||||
return true
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
return false
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
var (
|
||||
// ErrVerificationApplicationNotFound reports a missing application.
|
||||
ErrVerificationApplicationNotFound = errors.New("verification application not found")
|
||||
// ErrVerificationApplicationExists reports an active application already
|
||||
// occupying the target.
|
||||
ErrVerificationApplicationExists = errors.New("verification application already active for target")
|
||||
// ErrVerificationApplicationInvalid rejects a malformed application.
|
||||
ErrVerificationApplicationInvalid = errors.New("verification application invalid")
|
||||
// ErrVerificationStatusInvalid rejects an impossible status transition.
|
||||
ErrVerificationStatusInvalid = errors.New("verification status transition invalid")
|
||||
// ErrVerificationVersionConflict reports a lost optimistic-locking race, which
|
||||
// is what two reviewers deciding at once must produce for the loser.
|
||||
ErrVerificationVersionConflict = errors.New("verification application changed concurrently")
|
||||
// ErrVerificationTargetInvalid rejects a target that cannot be verified.
|
||||
ErrVerificationTargetInvalid = errors.New("verification target invalid")
|
||||
// ErrVerificationTargetNotPublic rejects a target without a public username.
|
||||
ErrVerificationTargetNotPublic = errors.New("verification target has no public username")
|
||||
// ErrVerificationTargetAlreadyVerified rejects a target that already carries
|
||||
// the platform flag.
|
||||
ErrVerificationTargetAlreadyVerified = errors.New("verification target already verified")
|
||||
// ErrVerificationTargetRestricted rejects a scam/fake/frozen/deleted target.
|
||||
ErrVerificationTargetRestricted = errors.New("verification target restricted")
|
||||
// ErrVerificationTargetSystem rejects a built-in system entity.
|
||||
ErrVerificationTargetSystem = errors.New("verification target is a system entity")
|
||||
// ErrVerificationNotOwner reports that the applicant does not control the
|
||||
// target.
|
||||
ErrVerificationNotOwner = errors.New("applicant does not control verification target")
|
||||
// ErrVerificationReasonRequired reports a rejection or revocation without a
|
||||
// reason, which the audit trail must never contain.
|
||||
ErrVerificationReasonRequired = errors.New("verification decision reason required")
|
||||
// ErrVerificationCooldown reports a re-application filed before the
|
||||
// configured cooldown after a rejection has elapsed.
|
||||
ErrVerificationCooldown = errors.New("verification re-application cooldown active")
|
||||
// ErrVerificationRateLimited reports too many applications in the window.
|
||||
ErrVerificationRateLimited = errors.New("verification rate limit exceeded")
|
||||
// ErrVerificationURLInvalid rejects a link that is not a plain http(s) URL to
|
||||
// a public host.
|
||||
ErrVerificationURLInvalid = errors.New("verification link invalid")
|
||||
// ErrVerificationUserTargetsDisabled reports that plain user accounts are not
|
||||
// accepted by this deployment.
|
||||
ErrVerificationUserTargetsDisabled = errors.New("verification of user accounts is disabled")
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
// VerificationApplication is the persistent application record.
|
||||
//
|
||||
// The target is addressed by its stable peer id; TargetTitle and TargetUsername
|
||||
// are a snapshot for the review UI and audit trail, because a username can move
|
||||
// between peers and a title can change after submission.
|
||||
type VerificationApplication struct {
|
||||
ID int64
|
||||
ApplicantUserID int64
|
||||
TargetType VerificationTargetType
|
||||
TargetID int64
|
||||
TargetTitle string
|
||||
TargetUsername string
|
||||
TargetAccessHash int64
|
||||
Category string
|
||||
Description string
|
||||
OfficialWebsite string
|
||||
SocialLinks []string
|
||||
PressLinks []string
|
||||
AdditionalNote string
|
||||
Status VerificationStatus
|
||||
CreatedAt time.Time
|
||||
UpdatedAt time.Time
|
||||
SubmittedAt time.Time
|
||||
ReviewedAt time.Time
|
||||
ReviewerAdminID string
|
||||
DecisionReason string
|
||||
InternalNote string
|
||||
CorrelationID string
|
||||
// Version is the optimistic-locking token. Every mutation submits the version
|
||||
// it read and the store refuses a stale one, which is how two reviewers
|
||||
// deciding the same application at the same time produce exactly one decision.
|
||||
Version int64
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Target returns the peer the application is about.
|
||||
func (a VerificationApplication) Target() Peer {
|
||||
return Peer{Type: a.TargetType.PeerType(), ID: a.TargetID}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Editable reports whether the applicant may still change the payload.
|
||||
func (a VerificationApplication) Editable() bool {
|
||||
return a.Status == VerificationStatusDraft
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// VerificationApplicationEventKind is one entry of the immutable per-application
|
||||
// history rendered in the panel.
|
||||
type VerificationApplicationEventKind string
|
||||
|
||||
const (
|
||||
VerificationEventCreated VerificationApplicationEventKind = "created"
|
||||
VerificationEventUpdated VerificationApplicationEventKind = "updated"
|
||||
VerificationEventSubmitted VerificationApplicationEventKind = "submitted"
|
||||
VerificationEventClaimed VerificationApplicationEventKind = "claimed"
|
||||
VerificationEventApproved VerificationApplicationEventKind = "approved"
|
||||
VerificationEventRejected VerificationApplicationEventKind = "rejected"
|
||||
VerificationEventCancelled VerificationApplicationEventKind = "cancelled"
|
||||
VerificationEventRevoked VerificationApplicationEventKind = "revoked"
|
||||
VerificationEventNotified VerificationApplicationEventKind = "notified"
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
// Valid reports whether the event kind is modelled.
|
||||
func (k VerificationApplicationEventKind) Valid() bool {
|
||||
switch k {
|
||||
case VerificationEventCreated, VerificationEventUpdated, VerificationEventSubmitted,
|
||||
VerificationEventClaimed, VerificationEventApproved, VerificationEventRejected,
|
||||
VerificationEventCancelled, VerificationEventRevoked, VerificationEventNotified:
|
||||
return true
|
||||
default:
|
||||
return false
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// VerificationApplicationEvent is an append-only history row. Actor is the admin
|
||||
// identity for review actions and empty for applicant-driven ones, which are
|
||||
// attributed by ApplicantUserID on the application itself.
|
||||
type VerificationApplicationEvent struct {
|
||||
ID int64
|
||||
ApplicationID int64
|
||||
Kind VerificationApplicationEventKind
|
||||
FromStatus VerificationStatus
|
||||
ToStatus VerificationStatus
|
||||
Actor string
|
||||
Reason string
|
||||
Note string
|
||||
CorrelationID string
|
||||
CreatedAt time.Time
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// VerificationTarget is a candidate the applicant controls, as offered by the
|
||||
// bot's target picker.
|
||||
type VerificationTarget struct {
|
||||
Type VerificationTargetType
|
||||
ID int64
|
||||
Title string
|
||||
Username string
|
||||
AccessHash int64
|
||||
Verified bool
|
||||
// Eligible is false when the target cannot be filed right now; Reason carries
|
||||
// the domain error for the bot to explain why.
|
||||
Eligible bool
|
||||
Reason string
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// VerificationDraftInput is the applicant-supplied payload collected by the bot.
|
||||
type VerificationDraftInput struct {
|
||||
Category string
|
||||
Description string
|
||||
OfficialWebsite string
|
||||
SocialLinks []string
|
||||
PressLinks []string
|
||||
AdditionalNote string
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Normalize trims the payload and drops empty links. It is applied before
|
||||
// validation so a trailing newline from a chat message is not an error.
|
||||
func (in VerificationDraftInput) Normalize() VerificationDraftInput {
|
||||
out := VerificationDraftInput{
|
||||
Category: strings.TrimSpace(in.Category),
|
||||
Description: strings.TrimSpace(in.Description),
|
||||
OfficialWebsite: strings.TrimSpace(in.OfficialWebsite),
|
||||
AdditionalNote: strings.TrimSpace(in.AdditionalNote),
|
||||
}
|
||||
out.SocialLinks = normalizeVerificationLinks(in.SocialLinks)
|
||||
out.PressLinks = normalizeVerificationLinks(in.PressLinks)
|
||||
return out
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func normalizeVerificationLinks(links []string) []string {
|
||||
out := make([]string, 0, len(links))
|
||||
seen := make(map[string]struct{}, len(links))
|
||||
for _, link := range links {
|
||||
link = strings.TrimSpace(link)
|
||||
if link == "" {
|
||||
continue
|
||||
}
|
||||
key := strings.ToLower(link)
|
||||
if _, dup := seen[key]; dup {
|
||||
continue
|
||||
}
|
||||
seen[key] = struct{}{}
|
||||
out = append(out, link)
|
||||
}
|
||||
return out
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// ValidateDraft checks a partially filled draft: every present field must be
|
||||
// well formed, but nothing is required yet. The bot uses it per step.
|
||||
func (in VerificationDraftInput) ValidateDraft() error {
|
||||
in = in.Normalize()
|
||||
if in.Category != "" && !ValidVerificationCategory(in.Category) {
|
||||
return ErrVerificationApplicationInvalid
|
||||
}
|
||||
if utf8.RuneCountInString(in.Description) > MaxVerificationDescriptionLength {
|
||||
return ErrVerificationApplicationInvalid
|
||||
}
|
||||
if utf8.RuneCountInString(in.AdditionalNote) > MaxVerificationCommentLength {
|
||||
return ErrVerificationApplicationInvalid
|
||||
}
|
||||
if in.OfficialWebsite != "" {
|
||||
if err := ValidateVerificationURL(in.OfficialWebsite); err != nil {
|
||||
return err
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
if len(in.SocialLinks) > MaxVerificationSocialLinks || len(in.PressLinks) > MaxVerificationPressLinks {
|
||||
return ErrVerificationApplicationInvalid
|
||||
}
|
||||
for _, link := range append(append([]string(nil), in.SocialLinks...), in.PressLinks...) {
|
||||
if err := ValidateVerificationURL(link); err != nil {
|
||||
return err
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
return nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// ValidateForSubmission checks a complete application. Everything the official
|
||||
// process requires must be present: category, a real description, a website, and
|
||||
// at least MinVerificationPressLinks independent press links.
|
||||
func (in VerificationDraftInput) ValidateForSubmission() error {
|
||||
in = in.Normalize()
|
||||
if err := in.ValidateDraft(); err != nil {
|
||||
return err
|
||||
}
|
||||
if !ValidVerificationCategory(in.Category) {
|
||||
return ErrVerificationApplicationInvalid
|
||||
}
|
||||
if utf8.RuneCountInString(in.Description) < MinVerificationDescriptionLength {
|
||||
return ErrVerificationApplicationInvalid
|
||||
}
|
||||
if in.OfficialWebsite == "" {
|
||||
return ErrVerificationApplicationInvalid
|
||||
}
|
||||
if len(in.PressLinks) < MinVerificationPressLinks {
|
||||
return ErrVerificationApplicationInvalid
|
||||
}
|
||||
return nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// ValidateVerificationURL accepts only a plain http(s) URL naming a public host.
|
||||
//
|
||||
// The server never fetches these links, and this check is what keeps that
|
||||
// decision safe to revisit: credentials, non-web schemes, loopback, link-local,
|
||||
// private and other reserved address space are all refused, so a link can never
|
||||
// become an SSRF probe against the deployment's own network, and the admin panel
|
||||
// only ever renders an absolute external URL.
|
||||
func ValidateVerificationURL(raw string) error {
|
||||
raw = strings.TrimSpace(raw)
|
||||
if raw == "" || len(raw) > MaxVerificationURLLength {
|
||||
return ErrVerificationURLInvalid
|
||||
}
|
||||
if strings.ContainsAny(raw, " \t\r\n<>\"'\\") {
|
||||
return ErrVerificationURLInvalid
|
||||
}
|
||||
parsed, err := url.Parse(raw)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
return ErrVerificationURLInvalid
|
||||
}
|
||||
switch strings.ToLower(parsed.Scheme) {
|
||||
case "http", "https":
|
||||
default:
|
||||
return ErrVerificationURLInvalid
|
||||
}
|
||||
if parsed.User != nil {
|
||||
// user:password@host would be rendered as a credential-bearing link.
|
||||
return ErrVerificationURLInvalid
|
||||
}
|
||||
host := parsed.Hostname()
|
||||
if host == "" {
|
||||
return ErrVerificationURLInvalid
|
||||
}
|
||||
if err := validateVerificationHost(host); err != nil {
|
||||
return err
|
||||
}
|
||||
if port := parsed.Port(); port != "" {
|
||||
switch port {
|
||||
case "80", "443":
|
||||
default:
|
||||
// A non-standard port on a "public site" link is a smell and would be
|
||||
// the first thing an SSRF attempt reaches for.
|
||||
return ErrVerificationURLInvalid
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
return nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func validateVerificationHost(host string) error {
|
||||
lower := strings.ToLower(host)
|
||||
if lower == "localhost" || strings.HasSuffix(lower, ".localhost") ||
|
||||
strings.HasSuffix(lower, ".local") || strings.HasSuffix(lower, ".internal") ||
|
||||
strings.HasSuffix(lower, ".onion") {
|
||||
return ErrVerificationURLInvalid
|
||||
}
|
||||
if ip := net.ParseIP(host); ip != nil {
|
||||
if !publicVerificationIP(ip) {
|
||||
return ErrVerificationURLInvalid
|
||||
}
|
||||
return nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
// A registered name must look like a real domain: at least one dot, no
|
||||
// underscores, no trailing dot-only labels.
|
||||
if !strings.Contains(lower, ".") {
|
||||
return ErrVerificationURLInvalid
|
||||
}
|
||||
for _, label := range strings.Split(strings.TrimSuffix(lower, "."), ".") {
|
||||
if label == "" || len(label) > 63 {
|
||||
return ErrVerificationURLInvalid
|
||||
}
|
||||
for i := 0; i < len(label); i++ {
|
||||
c := label[i]
|
||||
switch {
|
||||
case c >= 'a' && c <= 'z':
|
||||
case c >= '0' && c <= '9':
|
||||
case c == '-' && i != 0 && i != len(label)-1:
|
||||
default:
|
||||
return ErrVerificationURLInvalid
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
return nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// publicVerificationIP reports whether an IP literal is globally routable.
|
||||
func publicVerificationIP(ip net.IP) bool {
|
||||
if ip.IsLoopback() || ip.IsUnspecified() || ip.IsLinkLocalUnicast() ||
|
||||
ip.IsLinkLocalMulticast() || ip.IsInterfaceLocalMulticast() ||
|
||||
ip.IsMulticast() || ip.IsPrivate() {
|
||||
return false
|
||||
}
|
||||
if v4 := ip.To4(); v4 != nil {
|
||||
switch {
|
||||
case v4[0] == 100 && v4[1]&0xc0 == 64: // 100.64.0.0/10 CGNAT
|
||||
return false
|
||||
case v4[0] == 192 && v4[1] == 0 && v4[2] == 0: // 192.0.0.0/24
|
||||
return false
|
||||
case v4[0] == 192 && v4[1] == 0 && v4[2] == 2: // TEST-NET-1
|
||||
return false
|
||||
case v4[0] == 198 && v4[1] == 51 && v4[2] == 100: // TEST-NET-2
|
||||
return false
|
||||
case v4[0] == 203 && v4[1] == 0 && v4[2] == 113: // TEST-NET-3
|
||||
return false
|
||||
case v4[0] == 198 && v4[1]&0xfe == 18: // 198.18.0.0/15 benchmarking
|
||||
return false
|
||||
case v4[0] >= 240: // 240.0.0.0/4 reserved, 255.255.255.255 broadcast
|
||||
return false
|
||||
}
|
||||
return true
|
||||
}
|
||||
// IPv6: refuse unique-local, documentation, and v4-mapped forms that would
|
||||
// smuggle a private v4 address past the checks above.
|
||||
if len(ip) == net.IPv6len {
|
||||
if ip[0]&0xfe == 0xfc { // fc00::/7
|
||||
return false
|
||||
}
|
||||
if ip[0] == 0x20 && ip[1] == 0x01 && ip[2] == 0x0d && ip[3] == 0xb8 { // 2001:db8::/32
|
||||
return false
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
return true
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// SubmitVerificationApplicationRequest is the applicant-side submission.
|
||||
type SubmitVerificationApplicationRequest struct {
|
||||
ApplicantUserID int64
|
||||
TargetType VerificationTargetType
|
||||
TargetID int64
|
||||
TargetTitle string
|
||||
TargetUsername string
|
||||
Draft VerificationDraftInput
|
||||
CorrelationID string
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Validate checks the request shape without touching the target state, which is
|
||||
// the service's job.
|
||||
func (r SubmitVerificationApplicationRequest) Validate() error {
|
||||
if r.ApplicantUserID <= 0 || r.TargetID <= 0 || !r.TargetType.Valid() {
|
||||
return ErrVerificationApplicationInvalid
|
||||
}
|
||||
if utf8.RuneCountInString(r.TargetTitle) > MaxVerificationTitleLength {
|
||||
return ErrVerificationApplicationInvalid
|
||||
}
|
||||
if len(r.CorrelationID) > MaxVerificationCorrelationLen {
|
||||
return ErrVerificationApplicationInvalid
|
||||
}
|
||||
return r.Draft.ValidateForSubmission()
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// VerificationDecision is a reviewer's action on one application.
|
||||
type VerificationDecision struct {
|
||||
ApplicationID int64
|
||||
// Version is the value the reviewer read; a mismatch is a concurrent decision.
|
||||
Version int64
|
||||
Reviewer string
|
||||
Reason string
|
||||
InternalNote string
|
||||
CorrelationID string
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Validate checks a decision that does not require a reason.
|
||||
func (d VerificationDecision) Validate() error {
|
||||
if d.ApplicationID <= 0 || d.Version <= 0 {
|
||||
return ErrVerificationApplicationInvalid
|
||||
}
|
||||
if strings.TrimSpace(d.Reviewer) == "" || len(d.Reviewer) > MaxVerificationReviewerLength {
|
||||
return ErrVerificationApplicationInvalid
|
||||
}
|
||||
if utf8.RuneCountInString(d.Reason) > MaxVerificationReasonLength ||
|
||||
utf8.RuneCountInString(d.InternalNote) > MaxVerificationNoteLength {
|
||||
return ErrVerificationApplicationInvalid
|
||||
}
|
||||
if len(d.CorrelationID) > MaxVerificationCorrelationLen {
|
||||
return ErrVerificationApplicationInvalid
|
||||
}
|
||||
return nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// ValidateWithReason checks a decision that must carry one: rejection and
|
||||
// revocation are never recorded without a stated reason.
|
||||
func (d VerificationDecision) ValidateWithReason() error {
|
||||
if err := d.Validate(); err != nil {
|
||||
return err
|
||||
}
|
||||
if strings.TrimSpace(d.Reason) == "" {
|
||||
return ErrVerificationReasonRequired
|
||||
}
|
||||
return nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// VerificationApplicationFilter bounds a review-queue query.
|
||||
type VerificationApplicationFilter struct {
|
||||
Statuses []VerificationStatus
|
||||
TargetType VerificationTargetType
|
||||
Reviewer string
|
||||
// Query matches an application id, a peer id or a username.
|
||||
Query string
|
||||
CreatedAt time.Time
|
||||
Until time.Time
|
||||
BeforeID int64
|
||||
Limit int
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// VerificationStatusCounts is the queue summary shown above the list.
|
||||
type VerificationStatusCounts map[VerificationStatus]int64
|
||||
|
||||
// VerificationRevocation removes the platform flag from a previously approved
|
||||
// target. It is modelled separately from a rejection: the application stays
|
||||
// approved as history, and the revocation is its own audit event.
|
||||
type VerificationRevocation struct {
|
||||
TargetType VerificationTargetType
|
||||
TargetID int64
|
||||
Reviewer string
|
||||
Reason string
|
||||
InternalNote string
|
||||
CorrelationID string
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Validate checks the revocation shape; a reason is mandatory.
|
||||
func (r VerificationRevocation) Validate() error {
|
||||
if r.TargetID <= 0 || !r.TargetType.Valid() {
|
||||
return ErrVerificationTargetInvalid
|
||||
}
|
||||
if strings.TrimSpace(r.Reviewer) == "" || len(r.Reviewer) > MaxVerificationReviewerLength {
|
||||
return ErrVerificationApplicationInvalid
|
||||
}
|
||||
if strings.TrimSpace(r.Reason) == "" {
|
||||
return ErrVerificationReasonRequired
|
||||
}
|
||||
if utf8.RuneCountInString(r.Reason) > MaxVerificationReasonLength ||
|
||||
utf8.RuneCountInString(r.InternalNote) > MaxVerificationNoteLength {
|
||||
return ErrVerificationApplicationInvalid
|
||||
}
|
||||
return nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
Loading…
Add table
Add a link
Reference in a new issue