904 lines
34 KiB
Go
904 lines
34 KiB
Go
package mtprotoedge
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import (
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"context"
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"errors"
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"sync"
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"testing"
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"time"
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"github.com/iamxvbaba/td/bin"
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"github.com/iamxvbaba/td/crypto"
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"github.com/iamxvbaba/td/mt"
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"github.com/iamxvbaba/td/proto"
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"github.com/iamxvbaba/td/tg"
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"github.com/iamxvbaba/td/transport"
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"telesrv/internal/store/memory"
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)
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type durableDestroyLayerRPC struct {
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*admissionOnlyLayerRPC
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mu sync.Mutex
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deleted bool
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err error
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authKeyID [8]byte
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sessionID int64
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}
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type deleteFailAuthKeyStore struct {
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*memory.AuthKeyStore
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err error
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}
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type trailingDestroyAuthKeyRequest struct{}
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func (*trailingDestroyAuthKeyRequest) Encode(b *bin.Buffer) error {
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b.PutID(destroyAuthKeyRequestTypeID)
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b.PutID(0xdeadbeef)
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return nil
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}
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func (*trailingDestroyAuthKeyRequest) Decode(b *bin.Buffer) error {
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if err := b.ConsumeID(destroyAuthKeyRequestTypeID); err != nil {
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return err
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}
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_, err := b.ID()
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return err
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}
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func (s *deleteFailAuthKeyStore) Delete(context.Context, [8]byte) error {
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return s.err
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}
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func (h *durableDestroyLayerRPC) DeleteNegotiatedSessionLayerEvidence(
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_ context.Context,
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authKeyID [8]byte,
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sessionID int64,
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) (bool, error) {
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h.mu.Lock()
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defer h.mu.Unlock()
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h.authKeyID = authKeyID
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h.sessionID = sessionID
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return h.deleted, h.err
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}
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func (h *durableDestroyLayerRPC) deletion() ([8]byte, int64) {
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h.mu.Lock()
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defer h.mu.Unlock()
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return h.authKeyID, h.sessionID
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}
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// TestEncryptedPingPong 验证 M2/M4：握手后 client 加密 ping，
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// server 回 new_session_created + pong + msgs_ack。
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func TestEncryptedPingPong(t *testing.T) {
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const dc = 2
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addr, pub, _ := startTestServer(t, Options{DC: dc})
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conn, auth, cipher := dialHandshake(t, addr, dc, pub)
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clientMsgID := proto.NewMessageIDGen(time.Now)
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const pingID int64 = 0x1234beef
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pingMsgID := clientMsgID.New(proto.MessageFromClient)
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sendEncrypted(t, conn, cipher, auth, pingMsgID, &mt.PingRequest{PingID: pingID})
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replies := collectReplies(t, conn, cipher, auth.AuthKey, mt.PongTypeID)
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mustHave(t, replies, mt.NewSessionCreatedTypeID, "new_session_created")
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pongBuf := mustHave(t, replies, mt.PongTypeID, "pong")
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var pong mt.Pong
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if err := pong.Decode(pongBuf); err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("decode pong: %v", err)
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}
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if pong.PingID != pingID {
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t.Fatalf("pong.PingID = %#x, want %#x", pong.PingID, pingID)
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}
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if pong.MsgID != pingMsgID {
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t.Fatalf("pong.MsgID = %d, want %d (req msg id)", pong.MsgID, pingMsgID)
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}
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}
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// TestDuplicateMsgIDIdempotent 验证相同物理连接上的重复 content 请求只重新 ACK，
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// 原 owner 仍是唯一 rpc_result 发送者。若每次重复都重放完整结果，Android 的
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// bad_server_salt 全量重试会把一个启动批次放大成 N 轮孤儿结果并饿死新 request id。
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func TestDuplicateMsgIDIdempotent(t *testing.T) {
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const dc = 2
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handler := &admissionCountingRPC{}
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addr, pub, _ := startTestServer(t, Options{DC: dc, legacyRPC: handler})
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conn, auth, cipher := dialHandshake(t, addr, dc, pub)
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clientMsgID := proto.NewMessageIDGen(time.Now)
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msgID := clientMsgID.New(proto.MessageFromClient)
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sendEncrypted(t, conn, cipher, auth, msgID, &tg.HelpGetConfigRequest{})
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collectReplyFrames(t, conn, cipher, auth.AuthKey, map[uint32]int{
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proto.ResultTypeID: 1,
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mt.MsgsAckTypeID: 1,
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})
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waitForAtomicCalls(t, &handler.calls, 1)
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// 用一个小型重试风暴覆盖完成后的 duplicate 路径。TCP 仍存活时原结果已在同一
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// 可靠字节流上；每个 duplicate 只需 ACK，不应产生第二个 rpc_result。
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const duplicateCount = 16
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for i := 0; i < duplicateCount; i++ {
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sendEncrypted(t, conn, cipher, auth, msgID, &tg.HelpGetConfigRequest{})
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}
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frames := collectReplyFrames(t, conn, cipher, auth.AuthKey, map[uint32]int{
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mt.MsgsAckTypeID: duplicateCount,
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})
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for _, frame := range frames {
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if frame.TypeID == proto.ResultTypeID {
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t.Fatalf("same-connection duplicate emitted an extra rpc_result")
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}
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}
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if got := handler.calls.Load(); got != 1 {
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t.Fatalf("same-connection duplicate business calls = %d, want 1", got)
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}
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}
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func TestServiceDuplicateCannotReplaceOriginallyAdmittedPayload(t *testing.T) {
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const dc = 2
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addr, pub, _ := startTestServer(t, Options{DC: dc})
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conn, auth, cipher := dialHandshake(t, addr, dc, pub)
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ids := proto.NewMessageIDGen(time.Now)
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msgID := ids.New(proto.MessageFromClient)
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sendEncryptedWithSeq(t, conn, cipher, auth, msgID, 1, &mt.PingRequest{PingID: 11})
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collectReplyFrames(t, conn, cipher, auth.AuthKey, map[uint32]int{
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mt.PongTypeID: 1,
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mt.MsgsAckTypeID: 1,
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})
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// Same id/seq/content parity but a destructive replacement body. Duplicate
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// handling must use the original committed request class and never execute it.
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sendEncryptedWithSeq(t, conn, cipher, auth, msgID, 1, &destroyAuthKeyRequest{})
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collectReplyFrames(t, conn, cipher, auth.AuthKey, map[uint32]int{mt.MsgsAckTypeID: 1})
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freshID := ids.New(proto.MessageFromClient)
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sendEncryptedWithSeq(t, conn, cipher, auth, freshID, 3, &mt.PingRequest{PingID: 22})
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replies := collectReplies(t, conn, cipher, auth.AuthKey, mt.PongTypeID)
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var pong mt.Pong
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if err := pong.Decode(mustHave(t, replies, mt.PongTypeID, "pong after replacement attempt")); err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("decode pong: %v", err)
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}
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if pong.MsgID != freshID || pong.PingID != 22 {
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t.Fatalf("pong after replacement = %+v, want msg=%d ping=22", pong, freshID)
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}
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}
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// TestGetFutureSalts 验证 MTProto service message get_future_salts 由连接层直接响应，
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// 不再落到业务 RPC fallback。
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func TestGetFutureSalts(t *testing.T) {
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const dc = 2
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addr, pub, _ := startTestServer(t, Options{DC: dc})
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conn, auth, cipher := dialHandshake(t, addr, dc, pub)
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clientMsgID := proto.NewMessageIDGen(time.Now)
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reqMsgID := clientMsgID.New(proto.MessageFromClient)
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sendEncrypted(t, conn, cipher, auth, reqMsgID, &mt.GetFutureSaltsRequest{Num: 32})
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replies := collectReplies(t, conn, cipher, auth.AuthKey, mt.FutureSaltsTypeID)
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buf := mustHave(t, replies, mt.FutureSaltsTypeID, "future_salts")
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var salts mt.FutureSalts
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if err := salts.Decode(buf); err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("decode future_salts: %v", err)
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}
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if salts.ReqMsgID != reqMsgID {
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t.Fatalf("future_salts.req_msg_id = %d, want %d", salts.ReqMsgID, reqMsgID)
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}
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if len(salts.Salts) != 1 {
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t.Fatalf("future_salts len = %d, want 1", len(salts.Salts))
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}
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if got := salts.Salts[0].Salt; got != auth.ServerSalt {
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t.Fatalf("future salt = %#x, want server salt %#x", got, auth.ServerSalt)
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}
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if salts.Salts[0].ValidSince > salts.Now || salts.Salts[0].ValidUntil <= salts.Now {
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t.Fatalf("future salt validity = [%d,%d], now %d", salts.Salts[0].ValidSince, salts.Salts[0].ValidUntil, salts.Now)
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}
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}
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// TestMsgsStateReq 验证 MTProto service message msgs_state_req 由连接层直接响应，
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// 不再落到业务 RPC fallback。
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func TestMsgsStateReq(t *testing.T) {
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const dc = 2
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addr, pub, _ := startTestServer(t, Options{DC: dc})
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conn, auth, cipher := dialHandshake(t, addr, dc, pub)
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clientMsgID := proto.NewMessageIDGen(time.Now)
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reqMsgID := clientMsgID.New(proto.MessageFromClient)
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asked := []int64{reqMsgID, reqMsgID - 4, reqMsgID + 4}
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sendEncrypted(t, conn, cipher, auth, reqMsgID, &mt.MsgsStateReq{MsgIDs: asked})
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replies := collectReplies(t, conn, cipher, auth.AuthKey, mt.MsgsStateInfoTypeID)
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buf := mustHave(t, replies, mt.MsgsStateInfoTypeID, "msgs_state_info")
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var info mt.MsgsStateInfo
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if err := info.Decode(buf); err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("decode msgs_state_info: %v", err)
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}
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if info.ReqMsgID != reqMsgID {
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t.Fatalf("msgs_state_info.req_msg_id = %d, want %d", info.ReqMsgID, reqMsgID)
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}
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if len(info.Info) != len(asked) {
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t.Fatalf("msgs_state_info len = %d, want %d", len(info.Info), len(asked))
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}
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want := []byte{4, 1, 3}
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for i, b := range info.Info {
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if b != want[i] {
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t.Fatalf("msgs_state_info[%d] = %d, want %d", i, b, want[i])
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}
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}
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}
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// TestMsgResendReq 验证 MTProto msg_resend_req 由连接层按状态查询兜底响应，
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// 不会落入业务 RPC fallback。
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func TestMsgResendReq(t *testing.T) {
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const dc = 2
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addr, pub, _ := startTestServer(t, Options{DC: dc})
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conn, auth, cipher := dialHandshake(t, addr, dc, pub)
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clientMsgID := proto.NewMessageIDGen(time.Now)
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reqMsgID := clientMsgID.New(proto.MessageFromClient)
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asked := []int64{reqMsgID, reqMsgID - 4, reqMsgID + 4}
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sendEncrypted(t, conn, cipher, auth, reqMsgID, &mt.MsgResendReq{MsgIDs: asked})
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replies := collectReplies(t, conn, cipher, auth.AuthKey, mt.MsgsStateInfoTypeID)
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buf := mustHave(t, replies, mt.MsgsStateInfoTypeID, "msgs_state_info")
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var info mt.MsgsStateInfo
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if err := info.Decode(buf); err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("decode msgs_state_info: %v", err)
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}
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if info.ReqMsgID != reqMsgID {
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t.Fatalf("msgs_state_info.req_msg_id = %d, want %d", info.ReqMsgID, reqMsgID)
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}
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if len(info.Info) != len(asked) {
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t.Fatalf("msgs_state_info len = %d, want %d", len(info.Info), len(asked))
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}
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want := []byte{4, 1, 3}
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for i, b := range info.Info {
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if b != want[i] {
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t.Fatalf("msgs_state_info[%d] = %d, want %d", i, b, want[i])
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}
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}
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}
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// TestDestroySession 验证 destroy_session 返回 raw DestroySessionRes，
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// 避免客户端清理旧 session 时掉到 RPC fallback。
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func TestDestroySession(t *testing.T) {
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const dc = 2
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addr, pub, _ := startTestServer(t, Options{DC: dc})
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conn, auth, cipher := dialHandshake(t, addr, dc, pub)
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clientMsgID := proto.NewMessageIDGen(time.Now)
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reqMsgID := clientMsgID.New(proto.MessageFromClient)
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targetSessionID := auth.SessionID + 4
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sendEncrypted(t, conn, cipher, auth, reqMsgID, &mt.DestroySessionRequest{SessionID: targetSessionID})
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replies := collectReplies(t, conn, cipher, auth.AuthKey, mt.DestroySessionNoneTypeID)
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buf := mustHave(t, replies, mt.DestroySessionNoneTypeID, "destroy_session_none")
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var res mt.DestroySessionNone
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if err := res.Decode(buf); err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("decode destroy_session_none: %v", err)
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}
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if res.SessionID != targetSessionID {
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t.Fatalf("destroy_session_none.session_id = %d, want %d", res.SessionID, targetSessionID)
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}
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}
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func TestDestroySessionAcknowledgesOfflineDurableEvidenceDeletion(t *testing.T) {
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const dc = 2
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handler := &durableDestroyLayerRPC{
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admissionOnlyLayerRPC: newAdmissionOnlyLayerRPC(),
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deleted: true,
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}
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addr, pub, _ := startTestServer(t, Options{DC: dc, LayerRPC: handler})
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conn, auth, cipher := dialHandshake(t, addr, dc, pub)
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clientMsgID := proto.NewMessageIDGen(time.Now)
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reqMsgID := clientMsgID.New(proto.MessageFromClient)
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targetSessionID := auth.SessionID + 4
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sendEncrypted(t, conn, cipher, auth, reqMsgID, &mt.DestroySessionRequest{SessionID: targetSessionID})
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replies := collectReplies(t, conn, cipher, auth.AuthKey, mt.DestroySessionOkTypeID)
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buf := mustHave(t, replies, mt.DestroySessionOkTypeID, "destroy_session_ok")
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var res mt.DestroySessionOk
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if err := res.Decode(buf); err != nil {
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t.Fatal(err)
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}
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if res.SessionID != targetSessionID {
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t.Fatalf("destroy_session_ok.session_id = %d, want %d", res.SessionID, targetSessionID)
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}
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authKeyID, deletedSessionID := handler.deletion()
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if authKeyID == ([8]byte{}) || deletedSessionID != targetSessionID {
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t.Fatalf("durable deletion = auth:%x session:%d", authKeyID, deletedSessionID)
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}
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}
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func TestDestroySessionDurabilityFailureDoesNotAcknowledgeOrRetireLiveSession(t *testing.T) {
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boom := errors.New("database unavailable")
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handler := &durableDestroyLayerRPC{
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admissionOnlyLayerRPC: newAdmissionOnlyLayerRPC(),
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err: boom,
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}
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manager := NewSessionManager(nil)
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authKeyID := [8]byte{0xd3, 0x57}
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target := &Conn{authKeyID: authKeyID, sessionID: 2, metrics: NopMetrics{}}
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if err := manager.Register(target); err != nil {
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t.Fatal(err)
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}
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defer manager.Unregister(target)
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s := New(Options{DC: 2, LayerRPC: handler, ActiveSessions: manager})
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current := &Conn{authKeyID: authKeyID, sessionID: 1, metrics: NopMetrics{}}
|
||
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err := s.sendDestroySession(context.Background(), current, target.sessionID)
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if !errors.Is(err, boom) {
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t.Fatalf("destroy durability error = %v, want %v", err, boom)
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}
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manager.mu.RLock()
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stillCurrent := manager.bySession[connSessionKey(target)] == target
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manager.mu.RUnlock()
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if !stillCurrent {
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t.Fatal("durability failure retired the live target session")
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}
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}
|
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|
||
// TestRPCDropAnswer 验证 rpc_drop_answer 以 rpc_result 包装 RpcDropAnswer 返回，
|
||
// 与 iamxvbaba/td 和 TDesktop 的请求/响应模型对齐。
|
||
func TestRPCDropAnswer(t *testing.T) {
|
||
const dc = 2
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||
addr, pub, _ := startTestServer(t, Options{DC: dc})
|
||
conn, auth, cipher := dialHandshake(t, addr, dc, pub)
|
||
|
||
clientMsgID := proto.NewMessageIDGen(time.Now)
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||
reqMsgID := clientMsgID.New(proto.MessageFromClient)
|
||
droppedReqID := reqMsgID - 4
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sendEncrypted(t, conn, cipher, auth, reqMsgID, &mt.RPCDropAnswerRequest{ReqMsgID: droppedReqID})
|
||
|
||
replies := collectReplies(t, conn, cipher, auth.AuthKey, proto.ResultTypeID)
|
||
buf := mustHave(t, replies, proto.ResultTypeID, "rpc_result")
|
||
|
||
var result proto.Result
|
||
if err := result.Decode(buf); err != nil {
|
||
t.Fatalf("decode rpc_result: %v", err)
|
||
}
|
||
if result.RequestMessageID != reqMsgID {
|
||
t.Fatalf("rpc_result.req_msg_id = %d, want %d", result.RequestMessageID, reqMsgID)
|
||
}
|
||
answer, err := mt.DecodeRPCDropAnswer(&bin.Buffer{Buf: result.Result})
|
||
if err != nil {
|
||
t.Fatalf("decode RpcDropAnswer: %v", err)
|
||
}
|
||
if _, ok := answer.(*mt.RPCAnswerUnknown); !ok {
|
||
t.Fatalf("RpcDropAnswer = %T, want *mt.RPCAnswerUnknown", answer)
|
||
}
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
// TestHTTPWaitInContainerDoesNotNeedAck 验证 http_wait 在 container 中被协议层吞掉，
|
||
// 但同 container 内的 ping 仍按 content-related service request 回 ack。
|
||
func TestHTTPWaitInContainerDoesNotNeedAck(t *testing.T) {
|
||
const dc = 2
|
||
addr, pub, _ := startTestServer(t, Options{DC: dc})
|
||
conn, auth, cipher := dialHandshake(t, addr, dc, pub)
|
||
|
||
clientMsgID := proto.NewMessageIDGen(time.Now)
|
||
waitMsgID := clientMsgID.New(proto.MessageFromClient)
|
||
pingMsgID := clientMsgID.New(proto.MessageFromClient)
|
||
containerMsgID := clientMsgID.New(proto.MessageFromClient)
|
||
waitBody := mustEncodeTL(t, &mt.HTTPWaitRequest{MaxDelay: 0, WaitAfter: 0, MaxWait: 25_000})
|
||
pingBody := mustEncodeTL(t, &mt.PingRequest{PingID: 7})
|
||
sendEncrypted(t, conn, cipher, auth, containerMsgID, &proto.MessageContainer{
|
||
Messages: []proto.Message{
|
||
{ID: waitMsgID, SeqNo: 0, Bytes: len(waitBody), Body: waitBody},
|
||
{ID: pingMsgID, SeqNo: 1, Bytes: len(pingBody), Body: pingBody},
|
||
},
|
||
})
|
||
|
||
replies := collectReplies(t, conn, cipher, auth.AuthKey, mt.MsgsAckTypeID)
|
||
mustHave(t, replies, mt.PongTypeID, "pong")
|
||
ackBuf := mustHave(t, replies, mt.MsgsAckTypeID, "msgs_ack")
|
||
var ack mt.MsgsAck
|
||
if err := ack.Decode(ackBuf); err != nil {
|
||
t.Fatalf("decode msgs_ack: %v", err)
|
||
}
|
||
if len(ack.MsgIDs) != 1 || ack.MsgIDs[0] != pingMsgID {
|
||
t.Fatalf("msgs_ack = %+v, want only ping msg_id %d", ack.MsgIDs, pingMsgID)
|
||
}
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
// TestOldMessageInFreshContainerAccepted verifies TDesktop's bad_msg recovery
|
||
// path: an old request can be resent inside a fresh container msg_id.
|
||
func TestOldMessageInFreshContainerAccepted(t *testing.T) {
|
||
const dc = 2
|
||
addr, pub, _ := startTestServer(t, Options{DC: dc})
|
||
conn, auth, cipher := dialHandshake(t, addr, dc, pub)
|
||
|
||
oldMsgIDGen := proto.NewMessageIDGen(func() time.Time {
|
||
return time.Now().Add(-10 * time.Minute)
|
||
})
|
||
freshMsgIDGen := proto.NewMessageIDGen(time.Now)
|
||
oldPingMsgID := oldMsgIDGen.New(proto.MessageFromClient)
|
||
containerMsgID := freshMsgIDGen.New(proto.MessageFromClient)
|
||
pingBody := mustEncodeTL(t, &mt.PingRequest{PingID: 42})
|
||
|
||
sendEncrypted(t, conn, cipher, auth, containerMsgID, &proto.MessageContainer{
|
||
Messages: []proto.Message{
|
||
{ID: oldPingMsgID, SeqNo: 1, Bytes: len(pingBody), Body: pingBody},
|
||
},
|
||
})
|
||
|
||
replies := collectReplies(t, conn, cipher, auth.AuthKey, mt.PongTypeID)
|
||
createdBuf := mustHave(t, replies, mt.NewSessionCreatedTypeID, "new_session_created")
|
||
var created mt.NewSessionCreated
|
||
if err := created.Decode(createdBuf); err != nil {
|
||
t.Fatalf("decode new_session_created: %v", err)
|
||
}
|
||
if created.FirstMsgID != oldPingMsgID {
|
||
t.Fatalf("new_session_created.first_msg_id = %d, want accepted inner msg_id %d", created.FirstMsgID, oldPingMsgID)
|
||
}
|
||
buf := mustHave(t, replies, mt.PongTypeID, "pong")
|
||
var pong mt.Pong
|
||
if err := pong.Decode(buf); err != nil {
|
||
t.Fatalf("decode pong: %v", err)
|
||
}
|
||
if pong.MsgID != oldPingMsgID || pong.PingID != 42 {
|
||
t.Fatalf("pong = %+v, want msg_id=%d ping_id=42", pong, oldPingMsgID)
|
||
}
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
func TestPingDelayDisconnectEvenSeqAccepted(t *testing.T) {
|
||
const dc = 2
|
||
addr, pub, _ := startTestServer(t, Options{DC: dc})
|
||
conn, auth, cipher := dialHandshake(t, addr, dc, pub)
|
||
|
||
clientMsgID := proto.NewMessageIDGen(time.Now)
|
||
reqMsgID := clientMsgID.New(proto.MessageFromClient)
|
||
sendEncryptedWithSeq(t, conn, cipher, auth, reqMsgID, 0, &mt.PingDelayDisconnectRequest{
|
||
PingID: 9,
|
||
DisconnectDelay: 60,
|
||
})
|
||
|
||
replies := collectReplies(t, conn, cipher, auth.AuthKey, mt.PongTypeID)
|
||
buf := mustHave(t, replies, mt.PongTypeID, "pong")
|
||
var pong mt.Pong
|
||
if err := pong.Decode(buf); err != nil {
|
||
t.Fatalf("decode pong: %v", err)
|
||
}
|
||
if pong.MsgID != reqMsgID || pong.PingID != 9 {
|
||
t.Fatalf("pong = %+v, want msg_id=%d ping_id=9", pong, reqMsgID)
|
||
}
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
func TestPingDelayDisconnectPongUsesEvenSeqNo(t *testing.T) {
|
||
const dc = 2
|
||
addr, pub, _ := startTestServer(t, Options{DC: dc})
|
||
conn, auth, cipher := dialHandshake(t, addr, dc, pub)
|
||
|
||
clientMsgID := proto.NewMessageIDGen(time.Now)
|
||
reqMsgID := clientMsgID.New(proto.MessageFromClient)
|
||
sendEncryptedWithSeq(t, conn, cipher, auth, reqMsgID, 0, &mt.PingDelayDisconnectRequest{
|
||
PingID: 11,
|
||
DisconnectDelay: 10,
|
||
})
|
||
|
||
for i := 0; i < 4; i++ {
|
||
data, id, _ := readServerMessage(t, conn, cipher, auth.AuthKey)
|
||
if id == mt.BadMsgNotificationTypeID {
|
||
t.Fatal("ping_delay_disconnect produced bad_msg_notification")
|
||
}
|
||
if id != mt.PongTypeID {
|
||
continue
|
||
}
|
||
if data.SeqNo%2 != 0 {
|
||
t.Fatalf("pong seq_no = %d, want even non-content-related seq_no", data.SeqNo)
|
||
}
|
||
return
|
||
}
|
||
t.Fatal("pong was not returned")
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
func TestPingDelayDisconnectOddSeqAccepted(t *testing.T) {
|
||
const dc = 2
|
||
addr, pub, _ := startTestServer(t, Options{DC: dc})
|
||
conn, auth, cipher := dialHandshake(t, addr, dc, pub)
|
||
|
||
clientMsgID := proto.NewMessageIDGen(time.Now)
|
||
reqMsgID := clientMsgID.New(proto.MessageFromClient)
|
||
sendEncryptedWithSeq(t, conn, cipher, auth, reqMsgID, 1, &mt.PingDelayDisconnectRequest{
|
||
PingID: 10,
|
||
DisconnectDelay: 60,
|
||
})
|
||
|
||
replies := collectReplies(t, conn, cipher, auth.AuthKey, mt.PongTypeID)
|
||
if _, ok := replies[mt.BadMsgNotificationTypeID]; ok {
|
||
t.Fatalf("odd ping_delay_disconnect seq_no produced bad_msg_notification")
|
||
}
|
||
buf := mustHave(t, replies, mt.PongTypeID, "pong")
|
||
var pong mt.Pong
|
||
if err := pong.Decode(buf); err != nil {
|
||
t.Fatalf("decode pong: %v", err)
|
||
}
|
||
if pong.MsgID != reqMsgID || pong.PingID != 10 {
|
||
t.Fatalf("pong = %+v, want msg_id=%d ping_id=10", pong, reqMsgID)
|
||
}
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
// TestDestroyAuthKey 验证 MTProto service message destroy_auth_key 无论裸发，
|
||
// 还是沿官方客户端的 invokeWithLayer/initConnection 路径发送，都由连接层
|
||
// 直接处理，并以绑定原请求的 rpc_result 回复。
|
||
func TestDestroyAuthKey(t *testing.T) {
|
||
tests := []struct {
|
||
name string
|
||
layer int
|
||
wrapped bool
|
||
}{
|
||
{name: "bare"},
|
||
{name: "layer225_wrapped", layer: 225, wrapped: true},
|
||
{name: "layer226_wrapped", layer: 226, wrapped: true},
|
||
{name: "layer227_wrapped", layer: 227, wrapped: true},
|
||
{name: "layer228_wrapped", layer: 228, wrapped: true},
|
||
}
|
||
for _, test := range tests {
|
||
t.Run(test.name, func(t *testing.T) {
|
||
const dc = 2
|
||
addr, pub, srv := startTestServer(t, Options{DC: dc, LayerRPC: newAdmissionOnlyLayerRPC()})
|
||
conn, auth, cipher := dialHandshake(t, addr, dc, pub)
|
||
|
||
var request bin.Encoder = &destroyAuthKeyRequest{}
|
||
if test.wrapped {
|
||
request = &tg.InvokeWithLayerRequest{
|
||
Layer: test.layer,
|
||
Query: &tg.InitConnectionRequest{
|
||
APIID: 1,
|
||
DeviceModel: "destroy-key-test",
|
||
SystemVersion: "test",
|
||
AppVersion: "test",
|
||
SystemLangCode: "en",
|
||
LangCode: "en",
|
||
Query: &destroyAuthKeyRequest{},
|
||
},
|
||
}
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
clientMsgID := proto.NewMessageIDGen(time.Now)
|
||
reqMsgID := clientMsgID.New(proto.MessageFromClient)
|
||
sendEncrypted(t, conn, cipher, auth, reqMsgID, request)
|
||
|
||
replies := collectReplies(t, conn, cipher, auth.AuthKey, proto.ResultTypeID)
|
||
assertDestroyAuthKeyRPCResult(t, mustHave(t, replies, proto.ResultTypeID, "destroy_auth_key rpc_result"), reqMsgID, destroyAuthKeyOkTypeID)
|
||
if _, found, err := srv.authKeys.Get(context.Background(), auth.AuthKey.ID); err != nil || found {
|
||
t.Fatalf("auth key after destroy: found=%v err=%v", found, err)
|
||
}
|
||
ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), time.Second)
|
||
defer cancel()
|
||
var frame bin.Buffer
|
||
if err := conn.Recv(ctx, &frame); err == nil {
|
||
t.Fatal("destroy_auth_key requester remained readable after required rpc_result(ok)")
|
||
}
|
||
})
|
||
}
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
func assertDestroyAuthKeyRPCResult(t *testing.T, b *bin.Buffer, reqMsgID int64, wantInner uint32) {
|
||
t.Helper()
|
||
var result proto.Result
|
||
if err := result.Decode(b); err != nil {
|
||
t.Fatalf("decode destroy_auth_key rpc_result: %v", err)
|
||
}
|
||
if result.RequestMessageID != reqMsgID {
|
||
t.Fatalf("destroy_auth_key rpc_result.req_msg_id = %d, want %d", result.RequestMessageID, reqMsgID)
|
||
}
|
||
inner := &bin.Buffer{Buf: result.Result}
|
||
innerID, err := inner.PeekID()
|
||
if err != nil {
|
||
t.Fatalf("peek destroy_auth_key rpc_result inner: %v", err)
|
||
}
|
||
if innerID != wantInner || inner.Len() != bin.Word {
|
||
t.Fatalf("destroy_auth_key rpc_result inner = %#x/%d bytes, want %#x/%d", innerID, inner.Len(), wantInner, bin.Word)
|
||
}
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
func TestDestroyAuthKeyDeleteFailureReturnsCorrelatedFailAndKeepsConnection(t *testing.T) {
|
||
const dc = 2
|
||
deleteErr := errors.New("delete auth key failed")
|
||
keys := &deleteFailAuthKeyStore{AuthKeyStore: memory.NewAuthKeyStore(), err: deleteErr}
|
||
addr, pub, srv := startTestServer(t, Options{DC: dc, AuthKeys: keys, LayerRPC: newAdmissionOnlyLayerRPC()})
|
||
conn, auth, cipher := dialHandshake(t, addr, dc, pub)
|
||
|
||
ids := proto.NewMessageIDGen(time.Now)
|
||
destroyReqMsgID := ids.New(proto.MessageFromClient)
|
||
sendEncrypted(t, conn, cipher, auth, destroyReqMsgID, &destroyAuthKeyRequest{})
|
||
replies := collectReplies(t, conn, cipher, auth.AuthKey, proto.ResultTypeID)
|
||
assertDestroyAuthKeyRPCResult(t, mustHave(t, replies, proto.ResultTypeID, "destroy_auth_key fail rpc_result"), destroyReqMsgID, destroyAuthKeyFailTypeID)
|
||
|
||
if _, found, err := srv.authKeys.Get(context.Background(), auth.AuthKey.ID); err != nil || !found {
|
||
t.Fatalf("auth key after failed delete: found=%v err=%v", found, err)
|
||
}
|
||
pingReqMsgID := ids.New(proto.MessageFromClient)
|
||
sendEncryptedWithSeq(t, conn, cipher, auth, pingReqMsgID, 3, &mt.PingRequest{PingID: 99})
|
||
pongReplies := collectReplies(t, conn, cipher, auth.AuthKey, mt.PongTypeID)
|
||
var pong mt.Pong
|
||
if err := pong.Decode(mustHave(t, pongReplies, mt.PongTypeID, "pong after failed destroy_auth_key")); err != nil {
|
||
t.Fatalf("decode pong after failed destroy_auth_key: %v", err)
|
||
}
|
||
if pong.MsgID != pingReqMsgID || pong.PingID != 99 {
|
||
t.Fatalf("pong after failed destroy_auth_key = %+v", pong)
|
||
}
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
func TestWrappedDestroyAuthKeyTrailingBytesDoNotDelete(t *testing.T) {
|
||
const dc = 2
|
||
addr, pub, srv := startTestServer(t, Options{DC: dc, LayerRPC: newAdmissionOnlyLayerRPC()})
|
||
conn, auth, cipher := dialHandshake(t, addr, dc, pub)
|
||
ids := proto.NewMessageIDGen(time.Now)
|
||
reqMsgID := ids.New(proto.MessageFromClient)
|
||
request := &tg.InvokeWithLayerRequest{
|
||
Layer: 228,
|
||
Query: &tg.InitConnectionRequest{
|
||
APIID: 1, DeviceModel: "malformed-destroy-key-test", SystemVersion: "test",
|
||
AppVersion: "test", SystemLangCode: "en", LangCode: "en",
|
||
Query: &trailingDestroyAuthKeyRequest{},
|
||
},
|
||
}
|
||
sendEncrypted(t, conn, cipher, auth, reqMsgID, request)
|
||
|
||
replies := collectReplies(t, conn, cipher, auth.AuthKey, proto.ResultTypeID)
|
||
var result proto.Result
|
||
if err := result.Decode(mustHave(t, replies, proto.ResultTypeID, "malformed destroy_auth_key rpc_result")); err != nil {
|
||
t.Fatalf("decode malformed destroy_auth_key rpc_result: %v", err)
|
||
}
|
||
if result.RequestMessageID != reqMsgID {
|
||
t.Fatalf("malformed destroy_auth_key req_msg_id = %d, want %d", result.RequestMessageID, reqMsgID)
|
||
}
|
||
var rpcErr mt.RPCError
|
||
if err := rpcErr.Decode(&bin.Buffer{Buf: result.Result}); err != nil {
|
||
t.Fatalf("decode malformed destroy_auth_key RPC error: %v", err)
|
||
}
|
||
if rpcErr.ErrorCode != 400 || rpcErr.ErrorMessage != "INPUT_REQUEST_INVALID" {
|
||
t.Fatalf("malformed destroy_auth_key RPC error = %+v", rpcErr)
|
||
}
|
||
if _, found, err := srv.authKeys.Get(context.Background(), auth.AuthKey.ID); err != nil || !found {
|
||
t.Fatalf("auth key after malformed wrapped destroy: found=%v err=%v", found, err)
|
||
}
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
func TestWrappedDestroyAuthKeySemanticWrapperDoesNotDelete(t *testing.T) {
|
||
const dc = 2
|
||
addr, pub, srv := startTestServer(t, Options{DC: dc, LayerRPC: newAdmissionOnlyLayerRPC()})
|
||
conn, auth, cipher := dialHandshake(t, addr, dc, pub)
|
||
ids := proto.NewMessageIDGen(time.Now)
|
||
reqMsgID := ids.New(proto.MessageFromClient)
|
||
request := &tg.InvokeWithLayerRequest{
|
||
Layer: 228,
|
||
Query: &tg.InitConnectionRequest{
|
||
APIID: 1, DeviceModel: "semantic-wrapper-destroy-key-test", SystemVersion: "test",
|
||
AppVersion: "test", SystemLangCode: "en", LangCode: "en",
|
||
Query: &tg.InvokeAfterMsgRequest{
|
||
MsgID: 1,
|
||
Query: &destroyAuthKeyRequest{},
|
||
},
|
||
},
|
||
}
|
||
sendEncrypted(t, conn, cipher, auth, reqMsgID, request)
|
||
|
||
replies := collectReplies(t, conn, cipher, auth.AuthKey, proto.ResultTypeID)
|
||
var result proto.Result
|
||
if err := result.Decode(mustHave(t, replies, proto.ResultTypeID, "semantic-wrapper destroy_auth_key rpc_result")); err != nil {
|
||
t.Fatalf("decode semantic-wrapper destroy_auth_key rpc_result: %v", err)
|
||
}
|
||
if result.RequestMessageID != reqMsgID {
|
||
t.Fatalf("semantic-wrapper destroy_auth_key req_msg_id = %d, want %d", result.RequestMessageID, reqMsgID)
|
||
}
|
||
var rpcErr mt.RPCError
|
||
if err := rpcErr.Decode(&bin.Buffer{Buf: result.Result}); err != nil {
|
||
t.Fatalf("decode semantic-wrapper destroy_auth_key RPC error: %v", err)
|
||
}
|
||
if rpcErr.ErrorCode != 400 || rpcErr.ErrorMessage != "INPUT_REQUEST_INVALID" {
|
||
t.Fatalf("semantic-wrapper destroy_auth_key RPC error = %+v", rpcErr)
|
||
}
|
||
if _, found, err := srv.authKeys.Get(context.Background(), auth.AuthKey.ID); err != nil || !found {
|
||
t.Fatalf("auth key after semantic-wrapper destroy_auth_key: found=%v err=%v", found, err)
|
||
}
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
func TestWrappedDestroyAuthKeyMixedContainerIsRejectedAtomically(t *testing.T) {
|
||
const dc = 2
|
||
addr, pub, srv := startTestServer(t, Options{DC: dc, LayerRPC: newAdmissionOnlyLayerRPC()})
|
||
conn, auth, cipher := dialHandshake(t, addr, dc, pub)
|
||
ids := proto.NewMessageIDGen(time.Now)
|
||
|
||
destroyBody := encodeClientMessageBodyForTest(t, &tg.InvokeWithLayerRequest{
|
||
Layer: 228,
|
||
Query: &tg.InitConnectionRequest{
|
||
APIID: 1, DeviceModel: "mixed-destroy-key-test", SystemVersion: "test",
|
||
AppVersion: "test", SystemLangCode: "en", LangCode: "en",
|
||
Query: &destroyAuthKeyRequest{},
|
||
},
|
||
})
|
||
pingBody := encodeClientMessageBodyForTest(t, &mt.PingRequest{PingID: 7})
|
||
destroyMsgID := ids.New(proto.MessageFromClient)
|
||
pingMsgID := ids.New(proto.MessageFromClient)
|
||
outerMsgID := ids.New(proto.MessageFromClient)
|
||
container := &proto.MessageContainer{Messages: []proto.Message{
|
||
{ID: destroyMsgID, SeqNo: 1, Bytes: len(destroyBody), Body: destroyBody},
|
||
{ID: pingMsgID, SeqNo: 3, Bytes: len(pingBody), Body: pingBody},
|
||
}}
|
||
sendEncrypted(t, conn, cipher, auth, outerMsgID, container)
|
||
|
||
replies := collectReplies(t, conn, cipher, auth.AuthKey, mt.BadMsgNotificationTypeID)
|
||
var bad mt.BadMsgNotification
|
||
if err := bad.Decode(mustHave(t, replies, mt.BadMsgNotificationTypeID, "bad_msg for mixed destroy_auth_key container")); err != nil {
|
||
t.Fatalf("decode mixed destroy_auth_key bad_msg: %v", err)
|
||
}
|
||
if bad.BadMsgID != outerMsgID || bad.ErrorCode != badMsgContainer {
|
||
t.Fatalf("mixed destroy_auth_key bad_msg = %+v, want msg_id=%d code=%d", bad, outerMsgID, badMsgContainer)
|
||
}
|
||
if _, found, err := srv.authKeys.Get(context.Background(), auth.AuthKey.ID); err != nil || !found {
|
||
t.Fatalf("auth key after mixed destroy_auth_key container: found=%v err=%v", found, err)
|
||
}
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
// TestBadServerSalt 验证客户端带错 server_salt 时 server 返回 bad_server_salt，
|
||
// 并携带当前 auth key 的权威 salt。
|
||
func TestBadServerSalt(t *testing.T) {
|
||
const dc = 2
|
||
addr, pub, _ := startTestServer(t, Options{DC: dc})
|
||
conn, auth, cipher := dialHandshake(t, addr, dc, pub)
|
||
|
||
clientMsgID := proto.NewMessageIDGen(time.Now)
|
||
reqMsgID := clientMsgID.New(proto.MessageFromClient)
|
||
wrongSalt := auth.ServerSalt + 1
|
||
sendEncryptedWithSalt(t, conn, cipher, auth, wrongSalt, reqMsgID, &mt.PingRequest{PingID: 1})
|
||
|
||
envelope, typeID, buf := readServerMessage(t, conn, cipher, auth.AuthKey)
|
||
if typeID != mt.BadServerSaltTypeID {
|
||
t.Fatalf("bad salt reply type = %#x, want %#x", typeID, mt.BadServerSaltTypeID)
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
var bad mt.BadServerSalt
|
||
if err := bad.Decode(buf); err != nil {
|
||
t.Fatalf("decode bad_server_salt: %v", err)
|
||
}
|
||
if bad.BadMsgID != reqMsgID {
|
||
t.Fatalf("bad_server_salt.bad_msg_id = %d, want %d", bad.BadMsgID, reqMsgID)
|
||
}
|
||
if bad.ErrorCode != 48 {
|
||
t.Fatalf("bad_server_salt.error_code = %d, want 48", bad.ErrorCode)
|
||
}
|
||
if bad.NewServerSalt != auth.ServerSalt {
|
||
t.Fatalf("bad_server_salt.new_server_salt = %#x, want %#x", bad.NewServerSalt, auth.ServerSalt)
|
||
}
|
||
// DrKLO stores the salt from the encrypted envelope, not only the TL payload.
|
||
// A mismatch makes every correction ineffective and re-enters the resend storm.
|
||
if envelope.Salt != bad.NewServerSalt {
|
||
t.Fatalf("bad_server_salt envelope salt = %#x, payload = %#x", envelope.Salt, bad.NewServerSalt)
|
||
}
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
func TestBadMsgSeqOddExpected(t *testing.T) {
|
||
const dc = 2
|
||
addr, pub, _ := startTestServer(t, Options{DC: dc})
|
||
conn, auth, cipher := dialHandshake(t, addr, dc, pub)
|
||
|
||
clientMsgID := proto.NewMessageIDGen(time.Now)
|
||
reqMsgID := clientMsgID.New(proto.MessageFromClient)
|
||
sendEncryptedWithSeq(t, conn, cipher, auth, reqMsgID, 0, &tg.HelpGetConfigRequest{})
|
||
|
||
bad := readBadMsgNotification(t, conn, cipher, auth.AuthKey)
|
||
if bad.BadMsgID != reqMsgID || bad.BadMsgSeqno != 0 || bad.ErrorCode != badMsgSeqNotOdd {
|
||
t.Fatalf("bad_msg = %+v, want msg_id=%d seq=0 code=%d", bad, reqMsgID, badMsgSeqNotOdd)
|
||
}
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
func TestBadMsgSeqEvenExpected(t *testing.T) {
|
||
const dc = 2
|
||
addr, pub, _ := startTestServer(t, Options{DC: dc})
|
||
conn, auth, cipher := dialHandshake(t, addr, dc, pub)
|
||
|
||
clientMsgID := proto.NewMessageIDGen(time.Now)
|
||
reqMsgID := clientMsgID.New(proto.MessageFromClient)
|
||
sendEncryptedWithSeq(t, conn, cipher, auth, reqMsgID, 1, &mt.MsgsAck{MsgIDs: []int64{reqMsgID}})
|
||
|
||
bad := readBadMsgNotification(t, conn, cipher, auth.AuthKey)
|
||
if bad.BadMsgID != reqMsgID || bad.BadMsgSeqno != 1 || bad.ErrorCode != badMsgSeqNotEven {
|
||
t.Fatalf("bad_msg = %+v, want msg_id=%d seq=1 code=%d", bad, reqMsgID, badMsgSeqNotEven)
|
||
}
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
func TestBadMsgSeqTooLow(t *testing.T) {
|
||
const dc = 2
|
||
addr, pub, _ := startTestServer(t, Options{DC: dc})
|
||
conn, auth, cipher := dialHandshake(t, addr, dc, pub)
|
||
|
||
clientMsgID := proto.NewMessageIDGen(time.Now)
|
||
firstMsgID := clientMsgID.New(proto.MessageFromClient)
|
||
sendEncryptedWithSeq(t, conn, cipher, auth, firstMsgID, 3, &tg.HelpGetConfigRequest{})
|
||
collectReplies(t, conn, cipher, auth.AuthKey, mt.MsgsAckTypeID)
|
||
|
||
secondMsgID := clientMsgID.New(proto.MessageFromClient)
|
||
sendEncryptedWithSeq(t, conn, cipher, auth, secondMsgID, 1, &tg.HelpGetConfigRequest{})
|
||
|
||
bad := readBadMsgNotification(t, conn, cipher, auth.AuthKey)
|
||
if bad.BadMsgID != secondMsgID || bad.BadMsgSeqno != 1 || bad.ErrorCode != badMsgSeqTooLow {
|
||
t.Fatalf("bad_msg = %+v, want msg_id=%d seq=1 code=%d", bad, secondMsgID, badMsgSeqTooLow)
|
||
}
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
func TestBadMsgSeqTooHigh(t *testing.T) {
|
||
const dc = 2
|
||
addr, pub, _ := startTestServer(t, Options{DC: dc})
|
||
conn, auth, cipher := dialHandshake(t, addr, dc, pub)
|
||
|
||
clientMsgID := proto.NewMessageIDGen(time.Now)
|
||
lowMsgID := clientMsgID.New(proto.MessageFromClient)
|
||
highMsgID := clientMsgID.New(proto.MessageFromClient)
|
||
sendEncryptedWithSeq(t, conn, cipher, auth, highMsgID, 1, &tg.HelpGetConfigRequest{})
|
||
collectReplies(t, conn, cipher, auth.AuthKey, mt.MsgsAckTypeID)
|
||
|
||
sendEncryptedWithSeq(t, conn, cipher, auth, lowMsgID, 3, &tg.HelpGetConfigRequest{})
|
||
|
||
bad := readBadMsgNotification(t, conn, cipher, auth.AuthKey)
|
||
if bad.BadMsgID != lowMsgID || bad.BadMsgSeqno != 3 || bad.ErrorCode != badMsgSeqTooHigh {
|
||
t.Fatalf("bad_msg = %+v, want msg_id=%d seq=3 code=%d", bad, lowMsgID, badMsgSeqTooHigh)
|
||
}
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
func TestSessionChangeResetsClientSeqState(t *testing.T) {
|
||
const dc = 2
|
||
addr, pub, srv := startTestServer(t, Options{DC: dc})
|
||
conn, auth, cipher := dialHandshake(t, addr, dc, pub)
|
||
|
||
clientMsgID := proto.NewMessageIDGen(time.Now)
|
||
firstMsgID := clientMsgID.New(proto.MessageFromClient)
|
||
sendEncryptedWithSeq(t, conn, cipher, auth, firstMsgID, 1, &tg.HelpGetConfigRequest{})
|
||
collectReplies(t, conn, cipher, auth.AuthKey, mt.MsgsAckTypeID)
|
||
|
||
nextSessionID := auth.SessionID + 1
|
||
if nextSessionID == 0 {
|
||
nextSessionID++
|
||
}
|
||
secondMsgID := clientMsgID.New(proto.MessageFromClient)
|
||
body := encodeClientMessageBodyForTest(t, &tg.HelpGetConfigRequest{})
|
||
sendEncryptedWithSessionSaltAndSeq(t, conn, cipher, auth, nextSessionID, auth.ServerSalt, secondMsgID, 1, body)
|
||
|
||
replies := collectReplies(t, conn, cipher, auth.AuthKey, mt.MsgsAckTypeID)
|
||
if _, ok := replies[mt.BadMsgNotificationTypeID]; ok {
|
||
t.Fatalf("session change with fresh seq_no produced bad_msg_notification")
|
||
}
|
||
mustHave(t, replies, mt.NewSessionCreatedTypeID, "new_session_created after session change")
|
||
mustHave(t, replies, mt.MsgsAckTypeID, "msgs_ack after session change")
|
||
|
||
oldKey := sessionKey{authKeyID: auth.AuthKey.ID, sessionID: auth.SessionID}
|
||
newKey := sessionKey{authKeyID: auth.AuthKey.ID, sessionID: nextSessionID}
|
||
srv.conns.mu.RLock()
|
||
_, oldVisible := srv.conns.bySession[oldKey]
|
||
newConn := srv.conns.bySession[newKey]
|
||
claims := len(srv.conns.claims)
|
||
online := len(srv.conns.bySession)
|
||
srv.conns.mu.RUnlock()
|
||
if oldVisible || newConn == nil || !newConn.isActive() || claims != 0 || online != 1 {
|
||
t.Fatalf("same-transport switch state: old=%v new=%p active=%v claims=%d online=%d",
|
||
oldVisible, newConn, newConn != nil && newConn.isActive(), claims, online)
|
||
}
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
func readBadMsgNotification(t *testing.T, conn transport.Conn, cipher crypto.Cipher, key crypto.AuthKey) mt.BadMsgNotification {
|
||
t.Helper()
|
||
replies := collectReplies(t, conn, cipher, key, mt.BadMsgNotificationTypeID)
|
||
buf := mustHave(t, replies, mt.BadMsgNotificationTypeID, "bad_msg_notification")
|
||
var bad mt.BadMsgNotification
|
||
if err := bad.Decode(buf); err != nil {
|
||
t.Fatalf("decode bad_msg_notification: %v", err)
|
||
}
|
||
return bad
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
func mustEncodeTL(t *testing.T, msg bin.Encoder) []byte {
|
||
t.Helper()
|
||
var b bin.Buffer
|
||
if err := msg.Encode(&b); err != nil {
|
||
t.Fatalf("encode TL: %v", err)
|
||
}
|
||
return b.Copy()
|
||
}
|