Astra
206bde18e0
updateChannelParticipant carries the account's qts per the MTProto spec, but the server always sent Qts: 0, so real clients silently discarded it as a stale duplicate -- the banned/kicked user's channel never vanished locally and no correct "removed by admin" message showed, even though the update was delivered successfully at the transport layer. Add a durable per-device qts queue (channel_participant_event_queue) sharing its qts number space with the existing secret-chat queue (one qts sequence per device, per spec), and use it to stamp a correct, monotonically increasing qts on the update for every device of the affected user -- for channel bans/kicks, admin promotion/demotion, and ownership transfer. A device offline when it happened can now recover the event via updates.getDifference instead of missing it permanently.
479 lines
17 KiB
Go
479 lines
17 KiB
Go
package rpc
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import (
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"context"
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"crypto/sha1"
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"encoding/binary"
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"math/big"
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"testing"
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"github.com/iamxvbaba/td/bin"
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"github.com/iamxvbaba/td/clock"
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"github.com/iamxvbaba/td/tg"
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"github.com/iamxvbaba/td/tlprofile"
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"go.uber.org/zap/zaptest"
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appphone "telesrv/internal/app/phone"
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appsecret "telesrv/internal/app/secretchat"
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appupdates "telesrv/internal/app/updates"
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appusers "telesrv/internal/app/users"
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"telesrv/internal/domain"
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"telesrv/internal/store/memory"
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)
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func dhParam(lead byte) []byte {
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b := make([]byte, 256)
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for i := range b {
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b[i] = 0x42
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}
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b[0] = lead
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return b
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}
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type encryptedFixture struct {
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ctx context.Context
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router *Router
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sessions *phoneCaptureSessions
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store *memory.SecretChatStore
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queue *memory.EncryptedQueueStore
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admin domain.User
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participant domain.User
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}
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const (
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encAdminSession = int64(301)
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encPartSession = int64(302)
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encPartOtherSession = int64(303)
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)
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var (
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encAdminAuthKey = [8]byte{1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0}
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encPartAuthKey = [8]byte{2, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0}
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encPartOtherAuthKey = [8]byte{3, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0}
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)
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func newEncryptedFixture(t *testing.T) *encryptedFixture {
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t.Helper()
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ctx := context.Background()
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userStore := memory.NewUserStore()
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sessions := &phoneCaptureSessions{}
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secretStore := memory.NewSecretChatStore()
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queueStore := memory.NewEncryptedQueueStore()
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router := New(Config{}, Deps{
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Users: appusers.NewService(userStore),
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SecretChats: appsecret.NewService(secretStore, queueStore, queueStore),
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Updates: appupdates.NewService(memory.NewUpdateStateStore(), memory.NewUpdateEventStore()),
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Files: &fakeFiles{},
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Sessions: sessions,
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}, zaptest.NewLogger(t), clock.System)
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f := &encryptedFixture{ctx: ctx, router: router, sessions: sessions, store: secretStore, queue: queueStore}
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mk := func(hash int64, phone, name string) domain.User {
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u, err := userStore.Create(ctx, domain.User{AccessHash: hash, Phone: phone, FirstName: name})
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if err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("create user %s: %v", name, err)
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}
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return u
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}
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f.admin = mk(5001, "13800000011", "Admin")
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f.participant = mk(5002, "13800000012", "Participant")
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return f
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}
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func (f *encryptedFixture) adminCtx() context.Context {
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return WithAuthKeyID(WithSessionID(WithUserID(f.ctx, f.admin.ID), encAdminSession), encAdminAuthKey)
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}
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func (f *encryptedFixture) participantCtx() context.Context {
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return WithAuthKeyID(WithSessionID(WithUserID(f.ctx, f.participant.ID), encPartSession), encPartAuthKey)
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}
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func (f *encryptedFixture) participantOtherCtx() context.Context {
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return WithAuthKeyID(WithSessionID(WithUserID(f.ctx, f.participant.ID), encPartOtherSession), encPartOtherAuthKey)
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}
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// encChatPayload 从捕获的推送里取出 updateEncryption 载荷。
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func encChatPayload(t *testing.T, rec phonePushRecord) tg.EncryptedChatClass {
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t.Helper()
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updates, ok := rec.msg.(*tg.Updates)
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if !ok || len(updates.Updates) != 1 {
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t.Fatalf("pushed msg = %T, want single-update tg.Updates", rec.msg)
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}
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upd, ok := updates.Updates[0].(*tg.UpdateEncryption)
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if !ok {
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t.Fatalf("pushed update = %T, want UpdateEncryption", updates.Updates[0])
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}
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return upd.Chat
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}
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func secretChatDHFixture(t *testing.T, wantNegativeFingerprint bool) (ga, gb []byte, fingerprint int64) {
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t.Helper()
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prime := new(big.Int).SetBytes(appphone.DHPrime())
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generator := big.NewInt(int64(appphone.DHG))
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privateA := new(big.Int).SetBytes(make([]byte, 256))
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privateA.SetBit(privateA, 2046, 1)
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privateA.Add(privateA, big.NewInt(0x12345))
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gaInt := new(big.Int).Exp(generator, privateA, prime)
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ga = gaInt.Bytes()
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for n := int64(1); n < 128; n++ {
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privateB := new(big.Int).SetBit(new(big.Int), 2045, 1)
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privateB.Add(privateB, big.NewInt(0x54321+n))
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gbInt := new(big.Int).Exp(generator, privateB, prime)
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sharedA := new(big.Int).Exp(gbInt, privateA, prime)
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sharedB := new(big.Int).Exp(gaInt, privateB, prime)
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if sharedA.Cmp(sharedB) != 0 {
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t.Fatal("DH fixture derived different shared keys")
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}
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key := make([]byte, 256)
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sharedBytes := sharedA.Bytes()
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copy(key[len(key)-len(sharedBytes):], sharedBytes)
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digest := sha1.Sum(key)
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fingerprint = int64(binary.LittleEndian.Uint64(digest[12:20]))
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if (fingerprint < 0) == wantNegativeFingerprint {
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return ga, gbInt.Bytes(), fingerprint
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}
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}
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t.Fatalf("could not generate DH fixture with negative=%v fingerprint", wantNegativeFingerprint)
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return nil, nil, 0
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}
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func TestEncryptedChatRealDHHandshakeAcrossExactLayers(t *testing.T) {
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for _, negative := range []bool{false, true} {
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name := "positive_fingerprint"
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if negative {
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name = "negative_fingerprint"
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}
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t.Run(name, func(t *testing.T) {
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f := newEncryptedFixture(t)
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ga, gb, fingerprint := secretChatDHFixture(t, negative)
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waitingClass, err := f.router.onMessagesRequestEncryption(f.adminCtx(), &tg.MessagesRequestEncryptionRequest{
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UserID: &tg.InputUser{UserID: f.participant.ID, AccessHash: f.participant.AccessHash},
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RandomID: 909,
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GA: ga,
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})
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if err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("requestEncryption: %v", err)
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}
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waiting := waitingClass.(*tg.EncryptedChatWaiting)
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if waiting.ID != 909 {
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t.Fatalf("waiting id = %d, want request random_id 909", waiting.ID)
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}
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chat, ok, err := f.store.GetSecretChat(f.ctx, waiting.ID)
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if err != nil || !ok {
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t.Fatalf("stored requested chat: ok=%v err=%v", ok, err)
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}
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f.sessions.reset()
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if _, err := f.router.onMessagesAcceptEncryption(f.participantCtx(), &tg.MessagesAcceptEncryptionRequest{
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Peer: tg.InputEncryptedChat{ChatID: chat.ID, AccessHash: chat.ParticipantAccessHash},
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GB: gb,
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KeyFingerprint: fingerprint,
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}); err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("acceptEncryption: %v", err)
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}
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var adminUpdates *tg.Updates
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for _, rec := range f.sessions.records() {
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if rec.userID == f.admin.ID {
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adminUpdates = rec.msg.(*tg.Updates)
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break
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}
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}
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if adminUpdates == nil {
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t.Fatal("missing accepted update for the initiating device")
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}
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for _, profile := range []tlprofile.Profile{
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tlprofile.Profile225,
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tlprofile.Profile226,
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tlprofile.Profile227,
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tlprofile.Profile228,
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} {
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var body bin.Buffer
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if err := tlprofile.EncodeObject(profile, adminUpdates, &body); err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("encode accepted update for profile %d: %v", profile, err)
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}
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decoded, err := tlprofile.DecodeObject(profile, &bin.Buffer{Buf: body.Buf}, tlprofile.Limits{})
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if err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("decode accepted update for profile %d: %v", profile, err)
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}
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updates, ok := decoded.(*tg.Updates)
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if !ok || len(updates.Updates) != 1 {
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t.Fatalf("profile %d decoded update = %T", profile, decoded)
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}
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encUpdate, ok := updates.Updates[0].(*tg.UpdateEncryption)
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if !ok {
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t.Fatalf("profile %d nested update = %T", profile, updates.Updates[0])
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}
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accepted, ok := encUpdate.Chat.(*tg.EncryptedChat)
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if !ok {
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t.Fatalf("profile %d chat = %T", profile, encUpdate.Chat)
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}
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if new(big.Int).SetBytes(accepted.GAOrB).Cmp(new(big.Int).SetBytes(gb)) != 0 {
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t.Fatalf("profile %d changed g_b", profile)
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}
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if accepted.KeyFingerprint != fingerprint {
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t.Fatalf("profile %d fingerprint = %d, want %d", profile, accepted.KeyFingerprint, fingerprint)
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}
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}
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})
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}
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}
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func TestEncryptedChatRPCHappyPath(t *testing.T) {
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f := newEncryptedFixture(t)
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ga := dhParam(0x55)
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gb := dhParam(0x66)
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// --- requestEncryption（发起方） ---
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res, err := f.router.onMessagesRequestEncryption(f.adminCtx(), &tg.MessagesRequestEncryptionRequest{
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UserID: &tg.InputUser{UserID: f.participant.ID, AccessHash: f.participant.AccessHash},
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RandomID: 777,
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GA: ga,
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})
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if err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("requestEncryption: %v", err)
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}
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waiting, ok := res.(*tg.EncryptedChatWaiting)
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if !ok {
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t.Fatalf("request response = %T, want *tg.EncryptedChatWaiting", res)
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}
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if waiting.ID != 777 {
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t.Fatalf("waiting id = %d, want request random_id 777", waiting.ID)
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}
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// 推送给接受方的 encryptedChatRequested（携 g_a）。
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recs := f.sessions.records()
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if len(recs) != 1 || recs[0].userID != f.participant.ID {
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t.Fatalf("request push = %+v, want single push to participant %d", recs, f.participant.ID)
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}
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requested, ok := encChatPayload(t, recs[0]).(*tg.EncryptedChatRequested)
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if !ok {
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t.Fatalf("participant payload = %T, want EncryptedChatRequested", encChatPayload(t, recs[0]))
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}
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if requested.ID != 777 {
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t.Fatalf("participant requested id = %d, want request random_id 777", requested.ID)
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}
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if string(requested.GA) != string(ga) {
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t.Fatal("requested g_a not relayed verbatim")
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}
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chat, found, _ := f.store.GetSecretChat(f.ctx, waiting.ID)
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if !found {
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t.Fatal("chat not persisted")
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}
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// --- acceptEncryption（接受方） ---
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f.sessions.reset()
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const fp = int64(0x0123456789abcdef)
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accRes, err := f.router.onMessagesAcceptEncryption(f.participantCtx(), &tg.MessagesAcceptEncryptionRequest{
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Peer: tg.InputEncryptedChat{ChatID: chat.ID, AccessHash: chat.ParticipantAccessHash},
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GB: gb,
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KeyFingerprint: fp,
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})
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if err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("acceptEncryption: %v", err)
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}
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// 接受方同步响应：encryptedChat，GAOrB = g_a。
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partView, ok := accRes.(*tg.EncryptedChat)
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if !ok {
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t.Fatalf("accept response = %T, want *tg.EncryptedChat", accRes)
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}
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if string(partView.GAOrB) != string(ga) {
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t.Fatal("participant view GAOrB must be g_a")
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}
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if partView.KeyFingerprint != fp {
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t.Fatalf("key fingerprint = %x, want %x", partView.KeyFingerprint, fp)
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}
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// 定向推送给发起设备 encryptedChat，并让 participant 其它设备收敛为 discarded。
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recs = f.sessions.records()
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if len(recs) != 2 {
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t.Fatalf("accept pushes = %+v, want admin accepted + participant loser discarded", recs)
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}
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var adminRec, loserRec *phonePushRecord
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for i := range recs {
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switch recs[i].userID {
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case f.admin.ID:
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adminRec = &recs[i]
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case f.participant.ID:
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loserRec = &recs[i]
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}
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}
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if adminRec == nil || adminRec.rawAuthKeyID != encAdminAuthKey {
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t.Fatalf("admin accept push = %+v, want target auth key %x", adminRec, encAdminAuthKey)
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}
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if loserRec == nil || loserRec.rawAuthKeyID != encPartAuthKey {
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t.Fatalf("loser discard push = %+v, want exclusion auth key %x", loserRec, encPartAuthKey)
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}
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adminView, ok := encChatPayload(t, *adminRec).(*tg.EncryptedChat)
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if !ok {
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t.Fatalf("admin payload = %T, want EncryptedChat", encChatPayload(t, *adminRec))
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}
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if string(adminView.GAOrB) != string(gb) {
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t.Fatal("admin view GAOrB must be g_b")
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}
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if adminView.KeyFingerprint != fp {
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t.Fatal("admin view key fingerprint not relayed byte-for-byte")
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}
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if discarded, ok := encChatPayload(t, *loserRec).(*tg.EncryptedChatDiscarded); !ok || !discarded.HistoryDeleted {
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t.Fatalf("loser payload = %+v, want history-deleting EncryptedChatDiscarded", encChatPayload(t, *loserRec))
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}
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// --- discardEncryption（发起方） ---
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f.sessions.reset()
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okRes, err := f.router.onMessagesDiscardEncryption(f.adminCtx(), &tg.MessagesDiscardEncryptionRequest{
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ChatID: chat.ID,
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DeleteHistory: true,
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})
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if err != nil || !okRes {
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t.Fatalf("discardEncryption: ok=%v err=%v", okRes, err)
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}
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recs = f.sessions.records()
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if len(recs) != 1 || recs[0].userID != f.participant.ID {
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t.Fatalf("discard push = %+v, want single push to participant", recs)
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}
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discarded, ok := encChatPayload(t, recs[0]).(*tg.EncryptedChatDiscarded)
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if !ok || !discarded.HistoryDeleted {
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t.Fatalf("discard payload = %+v, want EncryptedChatDiscarded{HistoryDeleted:true}", encChatPayload(t, recs[0]))
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}
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}
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// TestDiscardSecretChatsForAuthKeyOnLogout 回归 P1：设备登出/授权撤销销毁其 perm auth_key 后，
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// 必须级联 discard 该设备绑定的活跃密聊并向对端推送 encryptedChatDiscarded。修复前 onAuthLogOut
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// 不处理密聊，对端继续往死 auth_key 投递成静默死链（消息 acked=f / qts 永久积压）。
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func TestDiscardSecretChatsForAuthKeyOnLogout(t *testing.T) {
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f := newEncryptedFixture(t)
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ga := dhParam(0x55)
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gb := dhParam(0x66)
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// 建链到 normal：admin 发起 + participant 接受。
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res, err := f.router.onMessagesRequestEncryption(f.adminCtx(), &tg.MessagesRequestEncryptionRequest{
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UserID: &tg.InputUser{UserID: f.participant.ID, AccessHash: f.participant.AccessHash},
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RandomID: 11,
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GA: ga,
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})
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if err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("request: %v", err)
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}
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chatID := res.(*tg.EncryptedChatWaiting).ID
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chat, _, _ := f.store.GetSecretChat(f.ctx, chatID)
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if _, err := f.router.onMessagesAcceptEncryption(f.participantCtx(), &tg.MessagesAcceptEncryptionRequest{
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Peer: tg.InputEncryptedChat{ChatID: chat.ID, AccessHash: chat.ParticipantAccessHash},
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GB: gb,
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KeyFingerprint: 0x1234,
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}); err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("accept: %v", err)
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}
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if chat, _, _ := f.store.GetSecretChat(f.ctx, chatID); chat.State != domain.SecretChatStateNormal {
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t.Fatalf("pre-logout state=%s, want normal", chat.State)
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}
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// 模拟 participant 设备登出：级联 discard 其 perm auth_key 绑定的密聊。
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f.sessions.reset()
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bobAuthKey := businessAuthKeyInt64(encPartAuthKey)
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f.router.discardSecretChatsForAuthKey(f.ctx, bobAuthKey, f.participant.ID)
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// [1] 密聊已迁移到 discarded（不再是 normal 死链）。
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if chat, _, _ := f.store.GetSecretChat(f.ctx, chatID); chat.State != domain.SecretChatStateDiscarded {
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t.Fatalf("post-logout state=%s, want discarded", chat.State)
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}
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// [2] 对端 admin 收到单条 encryptedChatDiscarded 在线推送。
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recs := f.sessions.records()
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if len(recs) != 1 || recs[0].userID != f.admin.ID {
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t.Fatalf("discard push = %+v, want single push to admin %d", recs, f.admin.ID)
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}
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if _, ok := encChatPayload(t, recs[0]).(*tg.EncryptedChatDiscarded); !ok {
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t.Fatalf("peer payload = %T, want EncryptedChatDiscarded", encChatPayload(t, recs[0]))
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}
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// [3] durable 离线补偿事件写给对端设备（getDifference 兜底）。
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if events, err := f.queue.ListUndeliveredStateEvents(f.ctx, f.admin.ID, businessAuthKeyInt64(encAdminAuthKey), 10); err != nil || len(events) == 0 {
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t.Fatalf("durable discard event for admin = %d (err=%v), want >=1", len(events), err)
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}
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// [4] 幂等：再次对同 auth_key 登出不再 discard、不再推送（已是终态）。
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f.sessions.reset()
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f.router.discardSecretChatsForAuthKey(f.ctx, bobAuthKey, f.participant.ID)
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if recs := f.sessions.records(); len(recs) != 0 {
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t.Fatalf("idempotent re-logout pushed %d updates, want 0", len(recs))
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}
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}
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func TestRequestEncryptionSelf(t *testing.T) {
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f := newEncryptedFixture(t)
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_, err := f.router.onMessagesRequestEncryption(f.adminCtx(), &tg.MessagesRequestEncryptionRequest{
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UserID: &tg.InputUser{UserID: f.admin.ID, AccessHash: f.admin.AccessHash},
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RandomID: 1,
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GA: dhParam(0x55),
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})
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assertPhoneRPCErr(t, err, "USER_ID_INVALID")
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}
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|
||
func TestRequestEncryptionRandomIDContractRPC(t *testing.T) {
|
||
f := newEncryptedFixture(t)
|
||
request := func(randomID int) (tg.EncryptedChatClass, error) {
|
||
return f.router.onMessagesRequestEncryption(f.adminCtx(), &tg.MessagesRequestEncryptionRequest{
|
||
UserID: &tg.InputUser{UserID: f.participant.ID, AccessHash: f.participant.AccessHash},
|
||
RandomID: randomID,
|
||
GA: dhParam(0x55),
|
||
})
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
negative, err := request(-808)
|
||
if err != nil {
|
||
t.Fatalf("negative random_id: %v", err)
|
||
}
|
||
if got := negative.(*tg.EncryptedChatWaiting).ID; got != -808 {
|
||
t.Fatalf("negative waiting id = %d, want -808", got)
|
||
}
|
||
negativeChat, found, err := f.store.GetSecretChat(f.ctx, -808)
|
||
if err != nil || !found {
|
||
t.Fatalf("stored negative chat: found=%v err=%v", found, err)
|
||
}
|
||
accepted, err := f.router.onMessagesAcceptEncryption(f.participantCtx(), &tg.MessagesAcceptEncryptionRequest{
|
||
Peer: tg.InputEncryptedChat{ChatID: -808, AccessHash: negativeChat.ParticipantAccessHash},
|
||
GB: dhParam(0x66),
|
||
KeyFingerprint: 0x1234,
|
||
})
|
||
if err != nil {
|
||
t.Fatalf("accept negative chat id: %v", err)
|
||
}
|
||
if got := accepted.(*tg.EncryptedChat).ID; got != -808 {
|
||
t.Fatalf("accepted id = %d, want -808", got)
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
if _, err := request(0); err == nil {
|
||
t.Fatal("zero random_id succeeded, want RANDOM_ID_DUPLICATE")
|
||
} else {
|
||
assertPhoneRPCErr(t, err, "RANDOM_ID_DUPLICATE")
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
// 同一全局 chat_id 改变握手意图不能被幂等吞掉。
|
||
changed := &tg.MessagesRequestEncryptionRequest{
|
||
UserID: &tg.InputUser{UserID: f.participant.ID, AccessHash: f.participant.AccessHash},
|
||
RandomID: -808,
|
||
GA: dhParam(0x66),
|
||
}
|
||
if _, err := f.router.onMessagesRequestEncryption(f.adminCtx(), changed); err == nil {
|
||
t.Fatal("changed intent succeeded, want RANDOM_ID_DUPLICATE")
|
||
} else {
|
||
assertPhoneRPCErr(t, err, "RANDOM_ID_DUPLICATE")
|
||
}
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
func TestAcceptEncryptionWrongAccessHashRPC(t *testing.T) {
|
||
f := newEncryptedFixture(t)
|
||
res, err := f.router.onMessagesRequestEncryption(f.adminCtx(), &tg.MessagesRequestEncryptionRequest{
|
||
UserID: &tg.InputUser{UserID: f.participant.ID, AccessHash: f.participant.AccessHash},
|
||
RandomID: 9,
|
||
GA: dhParam(0x55),
|
||
})
|
||
if err != nil {
|
||
t.Fatalf("request: %v", err)
|
||
}
|
||
chatID := res.(*tg.EncryptedChatWaiting).ID
|
||
_, err = f.router.onMessagesAcceptEncryption(f.participantCtx(), &tg.MessagesAcceptEncryptionRequest{
|
||
Peer: tg.InputEncryptedChat{ChatID: chatID, AccessHash: 999999},
|
||
GB: dhParam(0x66),
|
||
KeyFingerprint: 1,
|
||
})
|
||
assertPhoneRPCErr(t, err, "CHAT_ID_INVALID")
|
||
}
|