1754 lines
64 KiB
Go
1754 lines
64 KiB
Go
package rpc
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import (
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"context"
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"encoding/hex"
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"errors"
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"fmt"
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"sync"
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"time"
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"go.uber.org/zap"
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"golang.org/x/sync/singleflight"
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"github.com/iamxvbaba/td/bin"
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"github.com/iamxvbaba/td/clock"
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"github.com/iamxvbaba/td/proto"
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"github.com/iamxvbaba/td/tg"
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compatandroid "telesrv/internal/compat/android"
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"telesrv/internal/domain"
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"telesrv/internal/observability/dbtrace"
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)
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// maxWrapperDepth 限制 invokeWithLayer/initConnection/invokeAfter 等 wrapper 的嵌套深度，防御恶意构造。
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// 合法客户端的最深包装来自 gotd 数据连接模式的握手初始化：
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// invokeWithLayer → invokeWithoutUpdates → initConnection → invokeWithoutUpdates → query（深度 5），
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// 官方服务器同样接受。取 8 留余量，仍是小常量、不削弱对无界嵌套的防御。
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const maxWrapperDepth = 8
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const maxInvokeAfterMsgIDs = 128
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// tempResolveResult 是 effectiveAuthKeyID 里 temp→perm 解析经 singleflight 共享的结果。
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type tempResolveResult struct {
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perm [8]byte
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ok bool
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}
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const (
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authKeyResolveSingleflightPrefix = "resolve:"
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authClientInfoSingleflightPrefix = "authinfo:"
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authKeyClientInfoSingleflightPrefix = "authkeyinfo:"
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)
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var (
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tlTypeNamesOnce sync.Once
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tlTypeNames map[uint32]string
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)
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// Config 是 Router 所需的服务端信息。
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type Config struct {
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DC int
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IP string // 对外公布的 DC IP（写入 DCOptions）
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Port int // 对外公布的 DC 端口
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InstanceID string // 进程内唯一标识，用于跨实例 ephemeral push 去重。
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OutboundPushTimeout time.Duration
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SendRateLimit int
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SendRateWindow time.Duration
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// AuthCode*RateLimit protects the unauthenticated sendCode/resendCode write path.
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// The phone budget is keyed by SHA-256(normalized phone), never by the plaintext phone;
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// the second budget is keyed by the physical connection's raw auth_key_id.
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AuthCodePhoneRateLimit int
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AuthCodeAuthKeyRateLimit int
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AuthCodeRateWindow time.Duration
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// CatchupRateLimit/CatchupRateWindow 限制 difference 类 catch-up RPC（getChannelDifference /
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// getPeerDialogs）的每用户频率（设计 Phase 2 / §10.3）：nudge 被消费后客户端会触发这两类
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// catch-up，放开大群 nudge 全速前需 FLOOD_WAIT 兜底防风暴打爆 PG。两类各自独立计数、共用同一
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// 阈值。<=0 关闭（默认行为不变）。
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CatchupRateLimit int
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CatchupRateWindow time.Duration
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// ChannelNudgeMaxTargets 是一次 fan-out 的 >cap nudge 目标上限（设计 Phase 0b 限速兜底）；
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// <=0 用内置默认 defaultChannelNudgeMaxTargets。
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ChannelNudgeMaxTargets int
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// CallSignalingMaxBytes 是 phone.sendSignalingData 单条载荷上限；<=0 不限制。
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CallSignalingMaxBytes int
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// CallForceRelay 强制私聊通话 p2p_allowed=false（调试 TURN 中继路径）。
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CallForceRelay bool
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// GroupCallMaxParticipants 是群通话单房间参与者上限；<=0 不限制。
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GroupCallMaxParticipants int
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// RtmpIngestURL 是 getGroupCallStreamRtmpUrl 返回给推流端（OBS）的服务器地址，
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// 形如 "rtmp://<host>:<port>/live"。为空时回落 "rtmp://<AdvertiseIP>:2400/live"。
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RtmpIngestURL string
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// PublicBaseURL 是所有客户端可见 telesrv 链接的公开根 URL。
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PublicBaseURL string
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// TempKeyResolveCacheTTL 是 PFS temp→perm auth key 解析的进程内缓存有效期。>0 时同一 temp key
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// 在 TTL 内复用上次解析、跳过每帧 ResolveAuthKey 的 PG 查询；0（默认/测试）关闭=每帧重校验。
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// 显式撤销会删除协议 auth key、清缓存并断开活跃连接；TTL 只影响自然过期或异常路径下的
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// 下一次重新解析。re-bind 由 onAuthBindTempAuthKey 显式失效，避免跨账号串号。
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TempKeyResolveCacheTTL time.Duration
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// TempKeyResolveCacheMaxEntries 是 temp→perm 解析缓存容量；<=0 用内置默认。
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TempKeyResolveCacheMaxEntries int
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}
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// Router 把解密后的 RPC 请求按 TypeID 路由到 typed handler（tg.ServerDispatcher）。
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//
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// handler 输入输出均为 iamxvbaba/td/tg 类型，各业务域的 handler
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// 与注册见 help.go / auth.go / users.go / updates.go。Router 本身只负责协议外壳：
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// 剥离 invokeWithLayer / initConnection / invokeWithoutUpdates / invokeAfter*，并兜底未注册 RPC。
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type Router struct {
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cfg Config
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log *zap.Logger
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clock clock.Clock
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deps Deps
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dispatcher *tg.ServerDispatcher
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clientInfoMu sync.RWMutex
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clientInfo map[clientInfoSessionKey]clientSessionInfo
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authInfo map[[8]byte]clientSessionInfo
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authLayerEvidence map[[8]byte]authLayerDefaultEvidence
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authLayerCommit [authLayerCommitStripes]sync.Mutex
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// authLayerSafeEvictionFloor is the monotonic lower bound supplied by the
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// edge-owned exact admission tracker. Evidence below this sequence has no
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// live owner that can still enter publication and is therefore capacity-
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// evictable. clientInfoMu protects it together with authLayerEvidence.
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authLayerSafeEvictionFloor uint64
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exactProfileMu sync.RWMutex
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exactProfiles map[clientInfoSessionKey]exactSessionProfileEntry
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// exactProfileEarliestExpiry is a conservative lower bound. Refresh/deletes
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// may leave it earlier than the true minimum (safe); a capacity scan
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// recomputes it exactly. This makes the normal all-live full-capacity reject
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// O(1) without a heap on every refresh.
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exactProfileEarliestExpiry time.Time
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authUserMu sync.RWMutex
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authUsers map[[8]byte]authUserCacheEntry
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authUserSF singleflight.Group
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mediaCountSF singleflight.Group
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dialogsPinnedSF singleflight.Group
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channelFullBotSF singleflight.Group
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presence *presenceTracker
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callbacks *callbackRegistry
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inlines *inlineRegistry
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webviews *webViewRegistry
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loginTokens *loginTokenRegistry
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botAPIUpdates *botAPIUpdateNotifier
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instanceID string
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channelFanout *channelFanoutDispatcher
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// botAPIEnqueueQueue 把 user→bot 私聊消息的 bot_api_updates 写入移出发送者 RPC 同步
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// 路径（性能审计 H2）；队列满同步回退，绝不丢（队列行是 Bot API 投递真值）。
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botAPIEnqueueQueue *botAPIEnqueueDispatcher
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// presenceCandidateCache 缓存 presence fan-out 的候选 peer 集合（联系人 ∪ 私聊对端，
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// online 过滤前），按 userID 短 TTL；零值 sync.Map 即可用，无需构造器初始化。候选集变动
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// 很慢（加好友/开新私聊），短 TTL 内复用避免 updateStatus 每次重跑 ~25-30 条 hydration 查询。
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presenceCandidateCache sync.Map // userID(int64) -> *presenceCandidateEntry
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// botStatus 永久缓存 userID->是否 bot。bot 标志按账号不可变（BotFather 注册即定，普通用户永不变 bot），
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// 故可无 TTL 缓存。userIsBot 在 PFS 连接上被 announceSessionOnline 每 RPC 调用，不缓存则每次一发
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// Users.ByID 重投影——开群洪峰 ~50 并发时退化成 ~300ms herd（既拖尾延迟也飙 PG CPU）。零值即可用。
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botStatus sync.Map // userID(int64) -> bool
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// lastSeenPersist 记录每个 user 最近一次 last_seen 落库时刻（unix），用于写去抖：
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// updateStatus 高频续期时数秒内只落一次 DB。
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lastSeenPersist sync.Map // userID(int64) -> int64(unix)
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// tempKeyResolveCache 缓存 rawTempKeyID -> resolved perm（带过期），容量有界。
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tempKeyResolveCache *tempKeyResolveCache
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storyProjectionCache *storyProjectionCache
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storyPinnedCache *storyPinnedAvailableCache
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storyPinnedListCache *storyPinnedStoriesCache
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channelFullBotCache *channelFullBotInfoCache
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userFullProjectionCache *userFullProjectionCache
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peerSettingsProjectionCache *peerSettingsProjectionCache
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channelFullProjectionCache *channelFullProjectionCache
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availableReactionDocuments availableReactionDocumentMapCache
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emojiStickers *emojiStickerIndex
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notifySettings *notifySettingsCache
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stickerCatalog *stickerCatalogCache
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transientPrivateBigReactions transientPrivateBigReactionCache
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accountSettings *accountSettingsCache
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// webPageResolveSem 是链接预览异步解析的并发信号量（有界）：发送后把 pending 占位
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// 解析为卡片并就地替换。满则丢弃任务（消息留 pending）。nil=未启用（测试可直接调
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// resolvePendingWebPage 同步验证）。
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webPageResolveSem chan struct{}
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// selfPhotoEchoPushDelay 是头像变更后向当前 session 回显 updateUser 的延迟
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// （见 photos.go pushSelfPhotoUpdateToCurrentSession）；<=0 时同步推送（测试用）。
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selfPhotoEchoPushDelay time.Duration
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}
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type clientInfoSessionKey struct {
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rawAuthKeyID [8]byte
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sessionID int64
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}
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type clientSessionInfo struct {
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layer int
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// layerObservationID is the durable cross-restart ordering token from
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// auth_keys. It is independent from process-local admission sequence.
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layerObservationID int64
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// layerAdmissionSeq is the server-assigned admission order of explicit
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// invokeWithLayer evidence. It is retained on auth-key defaults and on the
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// exact raw-session metadata shadow written by admission publication. Client
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// msg_id is deliberately not used because its ordering is session-local.
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layerAdmissionSeq uint64
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wrapperMsgID int64
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clientInfoAdmissionSeq uint64
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clientInfo ClientInfo
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hasClientInfo bool
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authKeyInfoChecked bool
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authorizationChecked bool
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layerBlocked bool
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layerBlockedByAuthKey bool
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}
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type exactSessionProfileEntry struct {
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layer int
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msgID int64
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observationID int64
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expiresAt time.Time
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}
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// ExactSessionProfileCapacityError reports that the bounded replay/profile
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// registry contains only still-live logical sessions. Callers must fail closed
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// for shared profile mutation; no unexpired msg_id watermark was evicted.
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// The marker method lets mtprotoedge recognize the condition without importing
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// the higher-level rpc package.
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type ExactSessionProfileCapacityError struct {
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Limit int
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}
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func (e *ExactSessionProfileCapacityError) Error() string {
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return fmt.Sprintf("exact session profile capacity exhausted (limit %d)", e.Limit)
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}
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func (*ExactSessionProfileCapacityError) ExactSessionProfileCapacity() {}
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type authLayerDefaultEvidence struct {
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layer int
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sequence uint64
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durable bool
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}
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type authUserCacheEntry struct {
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userID int64
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found bool
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}
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// New 创建 Router，由各业务域自行注册其 RPC handler（registerHelp/Auth/Users/Updates）。
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func New(cfg Config, deps Deps, log *zap.Logger, clk clock.Clock) *Router {
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instanceID := cfg.InstanceID
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if instanceID == "" {
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instanceID = fmt.Sprintf("%016x", randomNonZeroInt64())
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}
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r := &Router{cfg: cfg, log: log, clock: clk, deps: deps, exactProfiles: make(map[clientInfoSessionKey]exactSessionProfileEntry), authLayerEvidence: make(map[[8]byte]authLayerDefaultEvidence), presence: newPresenceTracker(), callbacks: newCallbackRegistry(), inlines: newInlineRegistry(botInlineQueryTTL, deps.Inline), webviews: newWebViewRegistry(webViewSessionTTL, deps.Inline), loginTokens: newLoginTokenRegistry(), botAPIUpdates: newBotAPIUpdateNotifier(), tempKeyResolveCache: newTempKeyResolveCache(cfg.TempKeyResolveCacheMaxEntries), storyProjectionCache: newStoryProjectionCache(clk.Now), storyPinnedCache: newStoryPinnedAvailableCache(clk.Now), storyPinnedListCache: newStoryPinnedStoriesCache(clk.Now), channelFullBotCache: newChannelFullBotInfoCache(clk.Now), userFullProjectionCache: newUserFullProjectionCache(clk.Now), peerSettingsProjectionCache: newPeerSettingsProjectionCache(clk.Now), channelFullProjectionCache: newChannelFullProjectionCache(clk.Now), emojiStickers: newEmojiStickerIndex(clk.Now), notifySettings: newNotifySettingsCache(clk.Now), stickerCatalog: newStickerCatalogCache(clk.Now), accountSettings: newAccountSettingsCache(clk.Now), instanceID: instanceID}
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r.channelFanout = newChannelFanoutDispatcher(r, defaultChannelFanoutShards, defaultChannelFanoutBuffer)
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r.botAPIEnqueueQueue = newBotAPIEnqueueDispatcher(log, defaultBotAPIEnqueueBuffer)
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r.webPageResolveSem = make(chan struct{}, webPageResolveConcurrency)
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r.selfPhotoEchoPushDelay = defaultSelfPhotoEchoPushDelay
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if cfg.DC > 0 {
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groupCallStreamDCID = cfg.DC
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}
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d := tg.NewServerDispatcher(r.fallback)
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if err := registerLayerRPCAdmissionFieldPreflights(d); err != nil {
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panic(fmt.Sprintf("register exact layer RPC admission policy: %v", err))
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}
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r.registerAndroidLayerRPCAdapter(d)
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d.OnLayerRPCWrappers(r.consumeLayerRPCWrappers)
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r.registerHelp(d)
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r.registerAuth(d)
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r.registerUsers(d)
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r.registerUpdates(d)
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r.registerAccount(d)
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r.registerMessages(d)
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r.registerStickers(d)
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r.registerChannels(d)
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r.registerUpload(d)
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r.registerPhotos(d)
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r.registerFolders(d)
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r.registerChatlists(d)
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r.registerContacts(d)
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r.registerLangpack(d)
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r.registerStories(d)
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r.registerPhone(d)
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r.registerEncrypted(d)
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r.registerPayments(d)
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r.registerStats(d)
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r.registerPremium(d)
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r.registerAiCompose(d)
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r.registerBots(d)
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r.dispatcher = d
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return r
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}
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// Dispatch routes one RPC and preserves the historical two-value API used by
|
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// domain/RPC tests. The MTProto edge uses DispatchWithMethod so outbound
|
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// scheduling sees the exact innermost method rather than an invoke wrapper.
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func (r *Router) Dispatch(ctx context.Context, authKeyID [8]byte, sessionID int64, b *bin.Buffer) (bin.Encoder, error) {
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enc, _, err := r.DispatchWithMethod(ctx, authKeyID, sessionID, b)
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return enc, err
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}
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// DispatchWithMethod 路由一条 RPC 请求：先剥离 invokeWithLayer / initConnection /
|
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// invokeWithoutUpdates / invokeAfter* 等 wrapper（注入 layer / 客户端信息到 ctx），
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// 再按 TypeID 路由到 typed handler，并返回 exact innermost method。
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func (r *Router) DispatchWithMethod(ctx context.Context, authKeyID [8]byte, sessionID int64, b *bin.Buffer) (bin.Encoder, string, error) {
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if b == nil {
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return nil, "", inputRequestInvalidErr()
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}
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method := "unknown"
|
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if id, peekErr := b.PeekID(); peekErr == nil {
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method = tlTypeName(id)
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}
|
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ctx, updatesDelivery, err := r.prepareRPCDispatchContext(ctx, authKeyID, sessionID, b.Len(), method)
|
||
if err != nil {
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return nil, "", err
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||
}
|
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meta := rpcDispatchMetadata{}
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enc, err := r.dispatch(ctx, b, 0, &meta)
|
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if err == nil && enc != nil {
|
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r.registerUpdatesDeliveryPlan(ctx, updatesDelivery)
|
||
}
|
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return enc, meta.method, err
|
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}
|
||
|
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func (r *Router) effectiveAuthKeyID(ctx context.Context, rawAuthKeyID [8]byte, sessionID int64) ([8]byte, error) {
|
||
var (
|
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cached [8]byte
|
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hasCached bool
|
||
)
|
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if r.deps.Sessions != nil {
|
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if id, ok := r.deps.Sessions.AuthKeyIDForSession(rawAuthKeyID, sessionID); ok {
|
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cached = id
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hasCached = true
|
||
}
|
||
}
|
||
if hasCached {
|
||
if r.deps.Auth == nil {
|
||
return cached, nil
|
||
}
|
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if cached == rawAuthKeyID {
|
||
// raw==business is a permanent-key fast path only when the edge confirms
|
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// the raw key has no protocol expiry. A temporary session may have cached
|
||
// raw before another concurrent session completes auth.bindTempAuthKey;
|
||
// it must keep resolving until the durable binding becomes visible.
|
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metadata, ok := r.deps.Sessions.(RawAuthKeyMetadataProvider)
|
||
if ok {
|
||
expiresAt, found := metadata.AuthKeyExpiresAtForSession(rawAuthKeyID, sessionID)
|
||
if found && expiresAt == 0 {
|
||
return cached, nil
|
||
}
|
||
}
|
||
// Missing metadata and a session lookup miss both fail closed to the
|
||
// durable resolver. Treating either as proof of permanence recreates the
|
||
// raw-temp identity split when an alternate SessionBinder is installed.
|
||
}
|
||
// temp→perm 解析缓存：PFS 连接每帧都要解析一次 temp key（ResolveAuthKey 打 PG）。TTL 内复用
|
||
// 上次解析、跳过 DB。仅当缓存的 perm 仍等于 session binder 当前 perm 才用（rebind 会改 binder
|
||
// 且 onAuthBindTempAuthKey / 授权撤销都会显式 Delete 缓存，双保险防跨账号串号和被踢滞后）。
|
||
ttl := r.cfg.TempKeyResolveCacheTTL
|
||
if ttl > 0 {
|
||
if perm, ok := r.tempKeyResolveCache.Get(rawAuthKeyID, cached, r.clock.Now()); ok {
|
||
return perm, nil
|
||
}
|
||
}
|
||
// cold burst 下并发 temp-key 解析用 singleflight 合并：同一 temp key 的 N 个并发 RPC 只打
|
||
// 1 次 PG ResolveAuthKey（其余共享），避免开群/重连首帧 ~50 并发 herd（曾让 auth_resolve 飙到
|
||
// ~1s）。解析结果 + 缓存写入在 SF 内（幂等共享）；session 绑定仍每 caller 各自做（按 session）。
|
||
// 顺序调用不合并（SF 仅合并真并发），「每帧重校验」语义与固化测试 resolveCount 不变。
|
||
v, sfErr, _ := r.authUserSF.Do(authKeyResolveSingleflightPrefix+string(rawAuthKeyID[:]), func() (any, error) {
|
||
if ttl > 0 {
|
||
if perm, ok := r.tempKeyResolveCache.Get(rawAuthKeyID, cached, r.clock.Now()); ok {
|
||
return tempResolveResult{perm: perm, ok: true}, nil
|
||
}
|
||
}
|
||
resolved, ok, err := r.deps.Auth.ResolveAuthKey(ctx, rawAuthKeyID)
|
||
if err != nil {
|
||
return tempResolveResult{}, err
|
||
}
|
||
if ok && ttl > 0 {
|
||
r.tempKeyResolveCache.Store(rawAuthKeyID, resolved, r.clock.Now().Add(ttl), r.clock.Now())
|
||
}
|
||
return tempResolveResult{perm: resolved, ok: ok}, nil
|
||
})
|
||
if sfErr != nil {
|
||
return [8]byte{}, sfErr
|
||
}
|
||
out := v.(tempResolveResult)
|
||
if out.ok {
|
||
if out.perm != cached {
|
||
r.bindEffectiveAuthKey(rawAuthKeyID, sessionID, out.perm)
|
||
}
|
||
return out.perm, nil
|
||
}
|
||
r.tempKeyResolveCache.Delete(rawAuthKeyID)
|
||
r.invalidateAuthUserCache(cached)
|
||
r.bindEffectiveAuthKey(rawAuthKeyID, sessionID, rawAuthKeyID)
|
||
return rawAuthKeyID, nil
|
||
}
|
||
effective := rawAuthKeyID
|
||
if r.deps.Auth != nil {
|
||
resolved, ok, err := r.deps.Auth.ResolveAuthKey(ctx, rawAuthKeyID)
|
||
if err != nil {
|
||
return [8]byte{}, err
|
||
}
|
||
if ok {
|
||
effective = resolved
|
||
}
|
||
}
|
||
r.bindEffectiveAuthKey(rawAuthKeyID, sessionID, effective)
|
||
return effective, nil
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
func (r *Router) bindEffectiveAuthKey(rawAuthKeyID [8]byte, sessionID int64, effective [8]byte) {
|
||
if r.deps.Sessions != nil {
|
||
r.deps.Sessions.BindAuthKeyForSession(rawAuthKeyID, sessionID, effective)
|
||
}
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
func (r *Router) effectiveUserID(ctx context.Context, rawAuthKeyID, authKeyID [8]byte, sessionID int64) (int64, bool, error) {
|
||
if userID, ok := UserIDFrom(ctx); ok {
|
||
if r.deps.Sessions != nil {
|
||
r.deps.Sessions.BindUserForAuthKey(rawAuthKeyID, sessionID, userID)
|
||
}
|
||
return userID, true, nil
|
||
}
|
||
if r.deps.Sessions != nil {
|
||
if userID, resolved := r.deps.Sessions.UserIDResolvedForAuthKey(rawAuthKeyID, sessionID); resolved {
|
||
if userID == 0 {
|
||
if cachedUserID, ok := r.positiveCachedAuthUser(authKeyID); ok {
|
||
r.deps.Sessions.BindUserForAuthKey(rawAuthKeyID, sessionID, cachedUserID)
|
||
r.announceSessionOnline(ctx, cachedUserID)
|
||
return cachedUserID, true, nil
|
||
}
|
||
}
|
||
return userID, userID != 0, nil
|
||
}
|
||
}
|
||
if r.deps.Auth == nil {
|
||
return 0, false, nil
|
||
}
|
||
var (
|
||
userID int64
|
||
found bool
|
||
err error
|
||
)
|
||
userID, found, err = r.lookupAuthUser(ctx, authKeyID)
|
||
if err != nil {
|
||
return 0, false, err
|
||
}
|
||
if r.deps.Sessions != nil {
|
||
if cachedUserID, resolved := r.deps.Sessions.UserIDResolvedForAuthKey(rawAuthKeyID, sessionID); resolved {
|
||
if cachedUserID != 0 || !found {
|
||
return cachedUserID, cachedUserID != 0, nil
|
||
}
|
||
}
|
||
if found {
|
||
r.deps.Sessions.BindUserForAuthKey(rawAuthKeyID, sessionID, userID)
|
||
r.announceSessionOnline(ctx, userID)
|
||
} else {
|
||
r.deps.Sessions.BindUserForAuthKey(rawAuthKeyID, sessionID, 0)
|
||
}
|
||
}
|
||
return userID, found, nil
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
func (r *Router) lookupAuthUser(ctx context.Context, authKeyID [8]byte) (int64, bool, error) {
|
||
if userID, found, ok := r.cachedAuthUser(authKeyID); ok {
|
||
return userID, found, nil
|
||
}
|
||
key := string(authKeyID[:])
|
||
v, err, _ := r.authUserSF.Do(key, func() (any, error) {
|
||
if userID, found, ok := r.cachedAuthUser(authKeyID); ok {
|
||
return authUserCacheEntry{userID: userID, found: found}, nil
|
||
}
|
||
userID, found, err := r.deps.Auth.UserID(ctx, authKeyID)
|
||
if err != nil {
|
||
return authUserCacheEntry{}, err
|
||
}
|
||
r.setAuthUserCache(authKeyID, userID, found)
|
||
return authUserCacheEntry{userID: userID, found: found}, nil
|
||
})
|
||
if err != nil {
|
||
return 0, false, err
|
||
}
|
||
entry := v.(authUserCacheEntry)
|
||
return entry.userID, entry.found, nil
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
func (r *Router) cachedAuthUser(authKeyID [8]byte) (int64, bool, bool) {
|
||
r.authUserMu.RLock()
|
||
defer r.authUserMu.RUnlock()
|
||
entry, ok := r.authUsers[authKeyID]
|
||
if !ok {
|
||
return 0, false, false
|
||
}
|
||
return entry.userID, entry.found, true
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
func (r *Router) positiveCachedAuthUser(authKeyID [8]byte) (int64, bool) {
|
||
userID, found, ok := r.cachedAuthUser(authKeyID)
|
||
if !ok || !found || userID == 0 {
|
||
return 0, false
|
||
}
|
||
return userID, true
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
func (r *Router) setAuthUserCache(authKeyID [8]byte, userID int64, found bool) {
|
||
r.authUserMu.Lock()
|
||
defer r.authUserMu.Unlock()
|
||
if r.authUsers == nil {
|
||
r.authUsers = make(map[[8]byte]authUserCacheEntry)
|
||
}
|
||
if _, exists := r.authUsers[authKeyID]; !exists {
|
||
evictMapEntryIfFullLocked(r.authUsers, maxAuthUsersCached)
|
||
}
|
||
r.authUsers[authKeyID] = authUserCacheEntry{userID: userID, found: found}
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
func (r *Router) invalidateAuthUserCache(authKeyID [8]byte) {
|
||
r.authUserMu.Lock()
|
||
delete(r.authUsers, authKeyID)
|
||
r.authUserMu.Unlock()
|
||
r.clientInfoMu.Lock()
|
||
if info, ok := r.authInfo[authKeyID]; ok {
|
||
// Authorization membership can change independently of protocol
|
||
// metadata. Preserve the Layer/default ordering watermark so an older
|
||
// in-flight publisher cannot roll durable state back after login/logout.
|
||
info.authorizationChecked = false
|
||
if !info.layerBlockedByAuthKey {
|
||
info.layerBlocked = false
|
||
}
|
||
r.authInfo[authKeyID] = info
|
||
}
|
||
r.clientInfoMu.Unlock()
|
||
key := string(authKeyID[:])
|
||
r.authUserSF.Forget(key)
|
||
r.authUserSF.Forget(authKeyResolveSingleflightPrefix + key)
|
||
r.authUserSF.Forget(authClientInfoSingleflightPrefix + key)
|
||
r.authUserSF.Forget(authKeyClientInfoSingleflightPrefix + key)
|
||
r.authUserSF.Forget(inheritedAuthKeyLayerSingleflightPrefix + key)
|
||
r.authUserSF.Forget(durableInheritedAuthKeyLayerSingleflightPrefix + key)
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
type rpcDispatchMetadata struct {
|
||
method string
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
func (r *Router) dispatch(ctx context.Context, b *bin.Buffer, depth int, meta *rpcDispatchMetadata) (bin.Encoder, error) {
|
||
if depth > maxWrapperDepth {
|
||
return nil, wrapperTooDeepErr()
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
id, err := b.PeekID()
|
||
if err != nil {
|
||
return nil, err
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
switch id {
|
||
case tg.InvokeWithLayerRequestTypeID:
|
||
if err := b.ConsumeID(id); err != nil {
|
||
return nil, err
|
||
}
|
||
layer, err := b.Int()
|
||
if err != nil {
|
||
return nil, fmt.Errorf("decode invokeWithLayer layer: %w", err)
|
||
}
|
||
// query 紧跟 layer，buffer 剩余即内层请求。
|
||
ctx = WithLayer(ctx, layer)
|
||
r.rememberClientLayer(ctx, layer)
|
||
return r.dispatch(ctx, b, depth+1, meta)
|
||
|
||
case tg.InvokeWithoutUpdatesRequestTypeID:
|
||
if err := b.ConsumeID(id); err != nil {
|
||
return nil, err
|
||
}
|
||
return r.dispatch(withInvokeWithoutUpdates(ctx), b, depth+1, meta)
|
||
|
||
case tg.InvokeAfterMsgRequestTypeID:
|
||
if err := b.ConsumeID(id); err != nil {
|
||
return nil, err
|
||
}
|
||
if _, err := b.Long(); err != nil {
|
||
return nil, fmt.Errorf("decode invokeAfterMsg msg_id: %w", err)
|
||
}
|
||
return r.dispatch(ctx, b, depth+1, meta)
|
||
|
||
case tg.InvokeAfterMsgsRequestTypeID:
|
||
if err := b.ConsumeID(id); err != nil {
|
||
return nil, err
|
||
}
|
||
msgIDs, err := b.VectorHeader()
|
||
if err != nil {
|
||
return nil, fmt.Errorf("decode invokeAfterMsgs msg_ids: %w", err)
|
||
}
|
||
if msgIDs < 0 || msgIDs > maxInvokeAfterMsgIDs {
|
||
return nil, fmt.Errorf("decode invokeAfterMsgs msg_ids: invalid count %d", msgIDs)
|
||
}
|
||
for i := 0; i < msgIDs; i++ {
|
||
if _, err := b.Long(); err != nil {
|
||
return nil, fmt.Errorf("decode invokeAfterMsgs msg_ids[%d]: %w", i, err)
|
||
}
|
||
}
|
||
return r.dispatch(ctx, b, depth+1, meta)
|
||
|
||
case tg.InitConnectionRequestTypeID:
|
||
req := &tg.InitConnectionRequest{Query: &rawObject{}}
|
||
if err := req.Decode(b); err != nil {
|
||
return nil, fmt.Errorf("decode initConnection: %w", err)
|
||
}
|
||
info := ClientInfo{
|
||
APIID: req.APIID,
|
||
DeviceModel: req.DeviceModel,
|
||
SystemVersion: req.SystemVersion,
|
||
AppVersion: req.AppVersion,
|
||
SystemLangCode: req.SystemLangCode,
|
||
LangPack: req.LangPack,
|
||
LangCode: req.LangCode,
|
||
}
|
||
ctx = WithClientInfo(ctx, info)
|
||
r.rememberClientInfo(ctx, info)
|
||
r.log.Debug("initConnection",
|
||
zap.Int("api_id", req.APIID),
|
||
zap.String("device", req.DeviceModel),
|
||
zap.String("app_version", req.AppVersion),
|
||
zap.Int("layer", LayerFrom(ctx)),
|
||
zap.String("client_type", string(ClientTypeFrom(ctx))),
|
||
)
|
||
inner, ok := req.Query.(*rawObject)
|
||
if !ok {
|
||
return nil, fmt.Errorf("initConnection query: unexpected type %T", req.Query)
|
||
}
|
||
return r.dispatch(ctx, &bin.Buffer{Buf: inner.data}, depth+1, meta)
|
||
|
||
default:
|
||
// Router.Dispatch is a legacy test seam. Production uses generated exact
|
||
// Layer admission, whose unknown-method view invokes the same static DrKLO
|
||
// overlay while sharing the outer request budget.
|
||
if id != 0 {
|
||
profile := tg.LayerProfileCanonical
|
||
if selected, ok := tg.ResolveLayerProfile(LayerFrom(ctx)); ok {
|
||
profile = selected
|
||
}
|
||
_, official := tg.LayerSemanticForWireID(profile, id)
|
||
if !official {
|
||
if up, ok, err := compatandroid.UpgradePrivateLayerRPC(profile, b, tg.LayerDecodeLimits{}); ok {
|
||
if err != nil {
|
||
return nil, inputRequestInvalidErr()
|
||
}
|
||
b = up
|
||
newID, err := b.PeekID()
|
||
if err != nil {
|
||
return nil, err
|
||
}
|
||
id = newID
|
||
// A private constructor identifies the DrKLO compatibility seam but
|
||
// never selects or changes the connection's Layer profile.
|
||
ctx = r.withClientDriftMetadata(ctx, ClientTypeAndroid)
|
||
}
|
||
}
|
||
}
|
||
if meta != nil {
|
||
meta.method = tlTypeName(id)
|
||
}
|
||
semantic, knownRequest := tg.LayerSemanticForWireID(tg.LayerProfileCanonical, id)
|
||
if knownRequest {
|
||
category, _, named := tg.LayerSemanticName(semantic)
|
||
knownRequest = named && category == "function"
|
||
}
|
||
if !knownRequest {
|
||
// Unknown methods remain opaque and go to the compatibility trace.
|
||
return r.fallback(ctx, b)
|
||
}
|
||
if r.deps.Auth != nil {
|
||
if _, ok := UserIDFrom(ctx); !ok && !rpcAllowedWithoutAuthorization(id) {
|
||
fields := append([]zap.Field{
|
||
zap.String("method", tlTypeName(id)),
|
||
zap.String("type_id", fmt.Sprintf("%#x", id)),
|
||
}, r.contextLogFields(ctx)...)
|
||
r.log.Info("RPC rejected before authorization", fields...)
|
||
return nil, authKeyUnregisteredErr()
|
||
}
|
||
}
|
||
if err := preflightRPCRequest(id, b); err != nil {
|
||
return nil, err
|
||
}
|
||
if err := r.checkFrozenRPC(ctx, tlTypeName(id)); err != nil {
|
||
return nil, err
|
||
}
|
||
// 任何未包 invokeWithoutUpdates 的已登录 RPC 都把当前 session 视为 updates
|
||
// 接收者。仅靠 updates.getState/getDifference 置位会漏掉 DrKLO 热恢复：
|
||
// 它重连后不重建同步基线（pts 在进程内存里），只发普通业务请求，置位
|
||
// 永不发生时主动推送会一直暂存直至超时丢弃，表现为另一端消息不再实时同步。
|
||
r.maybeMarkSessionReceivesUpdates(ctx)
|
||
dbBefore := dbtrace.SnapshotFromContext(ctx)
|
||
start := time.Now()
|
||
enc, err := r.dispatcher.Handle(ctx, b)
|
||
dur := time.Since(start)
|
||
dbDelta := dbtrace.SnapshotFromContext(ctx).Sub(dbBefore)
|
||
fields := append([]zap.Field{
|
||
zap.String("method", tlTypeName(id)),
|
||
zap.String("type_id", fmt.Sprintf("%#x", id)),
|
||
zap.Duration("dur", dur),
|
||
}, r.contextLogFields(ctx)...)
|
||
fields = dbtrace.AppendZapFields(fields, "handler_", dbDelta)
|
||
if err != nil || dur > 100*time.Millisecond {
|
||
if err != nil {
|
||
fields = append(fields, zap.Error(err))
|
||
}
|
||
r.log.Info("RPC inner handled", fields...)
|
||
} else {
|
||
r.log.Debug("RPC inner handled", fields...)
|
||
}
|
||
return enc, err
|
||
}
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
func tlTypeName(id uint32) string {
|
||
tlTypeNamesOnce.Do(func() {
|
||
names := tg.NamesMap()
|
||
tlTypeNames = make(map[uint32]string, len(names))
|
||
for name, typeID := range names {
|
||
tlTypeNames[typeID] = name
|
||
}
|
||
})
|
||
if name, ok := tlTypeNames[id]; ok {
|
||
return name
|
||
}
|
||
return fmt.Sprintf("%#x", id)
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
// maxClientInfoEntries / maxAuthInfoEntries 是客户端元数据缓存的容量上限兜底。
|
||
// 条目含客户端可控字符串且 session_id 由客户端任意生成，无上限时恶意客户端
|
||
// 在单连接上反复换 session_id / 轮换 temp auth key 可线速膨胀直至 OOM。
|
||
// 达到上限后驱逐任意旧条目：受害条目只损失进程内默认/客户端描述缓存，
|
||
// 下一次 auth-key resolver、initConnection 或 authorization 回填即可恢复。
|
||
// exact profile 由下方独立的 same-session registry 管理，永远优先于默认。
|
||
const (
|
||
maxClientInfoEntries = 1 << 16
|
||
maxAuthInfoEntries = 1 << 16
|
||
// exactSessionProfileLegacyTTL covers the normal 300-second client msg_id
|
||
// window plus the allowed 30-second future skew and a one-second equality
|
||
// margin. Ordered evidence uses its own msg_id timestamp instead of blindly
|
||
// refreshing this TTL on duplicate replay.
|
||
exactSessionProfileLegacyTTL = 331 * time.Second
|
||
// exactSessionProfileTTL remains the maximum/legacy force-path retention
|
||
// used by focused registry tests. Real ordered evidence uses the expiry
|
||
// derived above from its msg_id.
|
||
exactSessionProfileTTL = exactSessionProfileLegacyTTL
|
||
maxExactSessionProfileEntries = 1 << 16
|
||
// maxAuthUsersCached 给 authUsers 授权缓存设容量上界，与 clientInfo/authInfo 一致。
|
||
// 原本无任何上限：设备轮换 temp 键而不显式登出时每个新 authKeyID 永久累积一条，
|
||
// 只靠 logout/reset 的显式 invalidate 清理。达上限驱逐任意旧条目，下次按需回查回填。
|
||
maxAuthUsersCached = 1 << 16
|
||
)
|
||
|
||
func (r *Router) rememberClientInfo(ctx context.Context, info ClientInfo) {
|
||
r.rememberClientInfoAt(ctx, info, 0)
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
func (r *Router) rememberClientInfoAt(ctx context.Context, info ClientInfo, admissionSeq uint64) {
|
||
info = normalizeClientInfo(info)
|
||
rawAuthKeyID, hasRawAuthKeyID := RawAuthKeyIDFrom(ctx)
|
||
sessionID, hasSessionID := SessionIDFrom(ctx)
|
||
if !hasRawAuthKeyID || !hasSessionID {
|
||
return
|
||
}
|
||
authKeyID, hasAuthKeyID := AuthKeyIDFrom(ctx)
|
||
if !hasAuthKeyID {
|
||
authKeyID = rawAuthKeyID
|
||
}
|
||
unlockCommit := r.lockAuthLayerCommit(rawAuthKeyID, authKeyID)
|
||
defer unlockCommit()
|
||
|
||
r.clientInfoMu.Lock()
|
||
if r.clientInfo == nil {
|
||
r.clientInfo = make(map[clientInfoSessionKey]clientSessionInfo)
|
||
}
|
||
key := clientInfoSessionKey{rawAuthKeyID: rawAuthKeyID, sessionID: sessionID}
|
||
sessionInfo, exists := r.clientInfo[key]
|
||
if !exists {
|
||
evictMapEntryIfFullLocked(r.clientInfo, maxClientInfoEntries)
|
||
}
|
||
sessionInfo.clientInfo = info
|
||
sessionInfo.hasClientInfo = true
|
||
if admissionSeq > 0 {
|
||
sessionInfo.clientInfoAdmissionSeq = admissionSeq
|
||
}
|
||
r.clientInfo[key] = sessionInfo
|
||
|
||
publishAuthMetadata := true
|
||
for _, id := range [][8]byte{rawAuthKeyID, authKeyID} {
|
||
current := r.authInfo[id]
|
||
if current.clientInfoAdmissionSeq > admissionSeq ||
|
||
(admissionSeq == 0 && current.clientInfoAdmissionSeq > 0) {
|
||
publishAuthMetadata = false
|
||
break
|
||
}
|
||
if admissionSeq > 0 && current.clientInfoAdmissionSeq == admissionSeq &&
|
||
current.hasClientInfo && current.clientInfo != info {
|
||
publishAuthMetadata = false
|
||
break
|
||
}
|
||
}
|
||
if publishAuthMetadata {
|
||
for _, id := range [][8]byte{rawAuthKeyID, authKeyID} {
|
||
if id == ([8]byte{}) {
|
||
continue
|
||
}
|
||
if r.authInfo == nil {
|
||
r.authInfo = make(map[[8]byte]clientSessionInfo)
|
||
}
|
||
if _, exists := r.authInfo[id]; !exists {
|
||
evictMapEntryIfFullLocked(r.authInfo, maxAuthInfoEntries)
|
||
}
|
||
current := r.authInfo[id]
|
||
current.clientInfo = info
|
||
current.hasClientInfo = true
|
||
if admissionSeq > 0 {
|
||
current.clientInfoAdmissionSeq = admissionSeq
|
||
}
|
||
r.authInfo[id] = current
|
||
}
|
||
}
|
||
r.clientInfoMu.Unlock()
|
||
// initConnection metadata is not fresh Layer evidence when admitted under an
|
||
// inherited default. Only rememberClientLayer (explicit invokeWithLayer)
|
||
// advances the auth-key-wide durable default.
|
||
if publishAuthMetadata {
|
||
r.persistAuthKeyClientInfo(ctx, clientSessionInfo{clientInfo: info, hasClientInfo: true})
|
||
}
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
func (r *Router) rememberClientAPIID(ctx context.Context, apiID int) {
|
||
if apiID == 0 {
|
||
return
|
||
}
|
||
info := normalizeClientInfo(ClientInfo{APIID: apiID, Type: clientTypeFromAPIID(apiID)})
|
||
sessionInfo := clientSessionInfo{clientInfo: info, hasClientInfo: true}
|
||
r.rememberClientSessionInfo(ctx, sessionInfo)
|
||
// api_id is weak evidence. If initConnection (or durable restoration) has
|
||
// already supplied stronger client metadata, persist that effective session
|
||
// fact instead of letting auth.sendCode overwrite it on an id collision.
|
||
if effective, ok, _ := r.clientSessionInfo(ctx); ok {
|
||
sessionInfo = effective
|
||
}
|
||
sessionInfo.layer = 0
|
||
r.persistAuthKeyClientInfo(ctx, sessionInfo)
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
func (r *Router) rememberClientLayer(ctx context.Context, layer int) {
|
||
r.rememberClientLayerAt(ctx, layer, 0)
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
func (r *Router) rememberClientLayerAt(ctx context.Context, layer int, msgID int64) {
|
||
if layer <= 0 {
|
||
return
|
||
}
|
||
rawAuthKeyID, ok := RawAuthKeyIDFrom(ctx)
|
||
if !ok {
|
||
return
|
||
}
|
||
sessionID, ok := SessionIDFrom(ctx)
|
||
if !ok {
|
||
return
|
||
}
|
||
if _, err := r.FreezeNegotiatedSessionLayerAt(rawAuthKeyID, sessionID, layer, msgID); err != nil {
|
||
// Only invalid identities and profiles not generated into this binary can
|
||
// fail. Never clamp a future persisted/wire Layer to canonical.
|
||
if r.log != nil {
|
||
r.log.Warn("refuse unsupported exact session layer",
|
||
zap.Int("layer", layer),
|
||
zap.Int64("session_id", sessionID),
|
||
zap.String("auth_key_id", fmt.Sprintf("%x", rawAuthKeyID[:])),
|
||
zap.Error(err))
|
||
}
|
||
return
|
||
}
|
||
authKeyID, hasAuthKeyID := AuthKeyIDFrom(ctx)
|
||
if !hasAuthKeyID {
|
||
authKeyID = rawAuthKeyID
|
||
}
|
||
unlockCommit := r.lockAuthLayerCommit(rawAuthKeyID, authKeyID)
|
||
defer unlockCommit()
|
||
if msgID > 0 {
|
||
currentLayer, currentMsgID, exists := r.NegotiatedSessionLayerEvidence(rawAuthKeyID, sessionID)
|
||
if !exists || currentLayer != layer || currentMsgID != msgID {
|
||
// A greater msg_id won after this request was admitted or while it
|
||
// waited for the auth-key commit stripe. The request remains valid,
|
||
// but its mutable default/binder effects are stale.
|
||
return
|
||
}
|
||
}
|
||
r.clientInfoMu.Lock()
|
||
if r.clientInfo == nil {
|
||
r.clientInfo = make(map[clientInfoSessionKey]clientSessionInfo)
|
||
}
|
||
sessionKey := clientInfoSessionKey{rawAuthKeyID: rawAuthKeyID, sessionID: sessionID}
|
||
sessionInfo, exists := r.clientInfo[sessionKey]
|
||
// session 级记录缺失或 layer 变化时把新值即时下推到连接：invokeWithLayer 在
|
||
// Dispatch 入口被处理（早于鉴权门与 updates 就绪置位），此时下推能保证同一请求
|
||
// handler 执行期间触发的 pending flush / 并发 push 已按正确 layer 降级。记录已
|
||
// 存在且相同（如客户端每条请求都带 wrapper）时跳过——连接侧已由注册播种或此前
|
||
// 下推持有同值。
|
||
notifyConn := !exists || sessionInfo.layer != layer
|
||
sessionInfo.layer = layer
|
||
if !exists {
|
||
evictMapEntryIfFullLocked(r.clientInfo, maxClientInfoEntries)
|
||
}
|
||
r.clientInfo[sessionKey] = sessionInfo
|
||
publishDefault := r.authInfo[rawAuthKeyID].layerAdmissionSeq == 0
|
||
if _, ordered := r.authLayerEvidence[rawAuthKeyID]; ordered {
|
||
publishDefault = false
|
||
}
|
||
if hasAuthKeyID && r.authInfo[authKeyID].layerAdmissionSeq != 0 {
|
||
publishDefault = false
|
||
}
|
||
if hasAuthKeyID {
|
||
if _, ordered := r.authLayerEvidence[authKeyID]; ordered {
|
||
publishDefault = false
|
||
}
|
||
}
|
||
defaultChanged := false
|
||
if publishDefault {
|
||
defaultChanged = r.authClientLayerLocked(rawAuthKeyID) != layer
|
||
r.rememberAuthClientLayerLocked(rawAuthKeyID, layer)
|
||
if hasAuthKeyID {
|
||
defaultChanged = defaultChanged || r.authClientLayerLocked(authKeyID) != layer
|
||
r.rememberAuthClientLayerLocked(authKeyID, layer)
|
||
}
|
||
}
|
||
r.clientInfoMu.Unlock()
|
||
if notifyConn {
|
||
if binder, ok := r.deps.Sessions.(ClientLayerBinder); ok {
|
||
binder.SetClientLayerForAuthKey(rawAuthKeyID, sessionID, layer)
|
||
}
|
||
}
|
||
// The newest explicit observation becomes the default for future sessions.
|
||
// A repeat from an older live session may legitimately move that default
|
||
// back without changing any sibling session's already-selected profile.
|
||
if publishDefault && (notifyConn || defaultChanged) {
|
||
r.persistAuthKeyClientInfo(ctx, clientSessionInfo{layer: layer})
|
||
}
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
func (r *Router) persistAuthKeyClientInfo(ctx context.Context, info clientSessionInfo) {
|
||
if r.deps.Auth == nil {
|
||
return
|
||
}
|
||
domainInfo := domainAuthKeyClientInfo(info)
|
||
if domainInfo.Layer == 0 && domainInfo.DeviceModel == "" && domainInfo.Platform == "" &&
|
||
domainInfo.SystemVersion == "" && domainInfo.APIID == 0 && domainInfo.AppVersion == "" {
|
||
return
|
||
}
|
||
seen := make(map[[8]byte]struct{}, 2)
|
||
if rawAuthKeyID, ok := RawAuthKeyIDFrom(ctx); ok && rawAuthKeyID != ([8]byte{}) {
|
||
seen[rawAuthKeyID] = struct{}{}
|
||
if err := r.deps.Auth.UpdateAuthKeyClientInfo(ctx, rawAuthKeyID, domainInfo); err != nil {
|
||
r.log.Warn("update auth key client info failed",
|
||
zap.String("auth_key_id", fmt.Sprintf("%x", rawAuthKeyID[:])),
|
||
zap.Error(err))
|
||
}
|
||
}
|
||
if authKeyID, ok := AuthKeyIDFrom(ctx); ok && authKeyID != ([8]byte{}) {
|
||
if _, done := seen[authKeyID]; done {
|
||
return
|
||
}
|
||
if err := r.deps.Auth.UpdateAuthKeyClientInfo(ctx, authKeyID, domainInfo); err != nil {
|
||
r.log.Warn("update auth key client info failed",
|
||
zap.String("auth_key_id", fmt.Sprintf("%x", authKeyID[:])),
|
||
zap.Error(err))
|
||
}
|
||
}
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
// NegotiatedLayer is the legacy exact-session lookup. Auth-key-wide inheritance
|
||
// is intentionally exposed separately by ResolveInheritedAuthKeyLayer so the
|
||
// edge can retain the source distinction and let a later explicit selector
|
||
// correct an inherited Conn profile.
|
||
func (r *Router) NegotiatedLayer(authKeyID [8]byte, sessionID int64) (int, bool) {
|
||
if layer, ok := r.NegotiatedSessionLayer(authKeyID, sessionID); ok {
|
||
return layer, true
|
||
}
|
||
return currentClientLayer, false
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
// NegotiatedSessionLayer returns only an exact same-session observation. The
|
||
// profile registry is deliberately independent from transient client metadata:
|
||
// ordinary transport offline removes presence/device cache entries but must not
|
||
// erase the immutable profile needed by same-session naked RPC replay.
|
||
func (r *Router) NegotiatedSessionLayer(authKeyID [8]byte, sessionID int64) (int, bool) {
|
||
layer, _, ok := r.NegotiatedSessionLayerEvidence(authKeyID, sessionID)
|
||
return layer, ok
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
// NegotiatedSessionLayerEvidence returns the latest explicit profile together
|
||
// with the MTProto message id that linearized it. msgID=0 denotes a legacy
|
||
// caller that had no wire-order evidence.
|
||
func (r *Router) NegotiatedSessionLayerEvidence(authKeyID [8]byte, sessionID int64) (layer int, msgID int64, ok bool) {
|
||
if r == nil || authKeyID == ([8]byte{}) || sessionID == 0 {
|
||
return 0, 0, false
|
||
}
|
||
key := clientInfoSessionKey{rawAuthKeyID: authKeyID, sessionID: sessionID}
|
||
now := r.clock.Now()
|
||
r.exactProfileMu.RLock()
|
||
entry, ok := r.exactProfiles[key]
|
||
r.exactProfileMu.RUnlock()
|
||
if !ok || entry.layer == 0 {
|
||
return 0, 0, false
|
||
}
|
||
if now.Before(entry.expiresAt) {
|
||
return entry.layer, entry.msgID, true
|
||
}
|
||
// Expiry is a state transition, not a read-time fallback. Delete only the
|
||
// value observed above so a concurrent refresh cannot be lost.
|
||
r.exactProfileMu.Lock()
|
||
if current, exists := r.exactProfiles[key]; exists && current == entry && !now.Before(current.expiresAt) {
|
||
delete(r.exactProfiles, key)
|
||
}
|
||
r.exactProfileMu.Unlock()
|
||
return 0, 0, false
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
// FreezeNegotiatedSessionLayer atomically records the latest explicit profile
|
||
// proven for one MTProto (raw auth key, session) identity. A later valid
|
||
// invokeWithLayer is an ordered correction, not a connection conflict: replace
|
||
// the old value and refresh its retention. Request/result encoding remains
|
||
// bound to each admitted request's immutable profile outside this registry.
|
||
func (r *Router) FreezeNegotiatedSessionLayer(authKeyID [8]byte, sessionID int64, layer int) error {
|
||
_, err := r.FreezeNegotiatedSessionLayerAt(authKeyID, sessionID, layer, 0)
|
||
return err
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
// FreezeNegotiatedSessionLayerAt linearizes explicit invokeWithLayer evidence
|
||
// by MTProto message id. Older evidence is ignored; the same message id is
|
||
// idempotent only for the same profile; a greater id may correct the session.
|
||
// msgID=0 is the legacy force API. Repeating the current layer through that API
|
||
// refreshes TTL without erasing a positive ordering watermark.
|
||
func (r *Router) FreezeNegotiatedSessionLayerAt(authKeyID [8]byte, sessionID int64, layer int, msgID int64) (bool, error) {
|
||
if r == nil || authKeyID == ([8]byte{}) || sessionID == 0 {
|
||
return false, errors.New("invalid exact session profile identity")
|
||
}
|
||
profile, ok := tg.ResolveLayerProfile(layer)
|
||
if !ok || int(profile) != layer {
|
||
return false, fmt.Errorf("unsupported exact session profile %d", layer)
|
||
}
|
||
if msgID < 0 {
|
||
return false, fmt.Errorf("invalid exact session profile message id %d", msgID)
|
||
}
|
||
unlockCommit := r.lockAuthLayerCommit(authKeyID)
|
||
defer unlockCommit()
|
||
now := r.clock.Now()
|
||
expiresAt := exactSessionLayerEvidenceExpiry(now, msgID)
|
||
key := clientInfoSessionKey{rawAuthKeyID: authKeyID, sessionID: sessionID}
|
||
r.exactProfileMu.Lock()
|
||
defer r.exactProfileMu.Unlock()
|
||
if r.exactProfiles == nil {
|
||
r.exactProfiles = make(map[clientInfoSessionKey]exactSessionProfileEntry)
|
||
}
|
||
if current, exists := r.exactProfiles[key]; exists && now.Before(current.expiresAt) {
|
||
if msgID == 0 {
|
||
if current.layer == layer {
|
||
current.expiresAt = expiresAt
|
||
r.exactProfiles[key] = current
|
||
r.noteExactSessionProfileExpiryLocked(current.expiresAt)
|
||
return false, nil
|
||
}
|
||
current = exactSessionProfileEntry{layer: layer, expiresAt: expiresAt}
|
||
r.exactProfiles[key] = current
|
||
r.noteExactSessionProfileExpiryLocked(current.expiresAt)
|
||
return true, nil
|
||
}
|
||
if current.msgID > msgID {
|
||
return false, nil
|
||
}
|
||
if current.msgID == msgID {
|
||
if current.layer != layer {
|
||
return false, fmt.Errorf("exact session profile conflict at msg_id %d: current=%d requested=%d", msgID, current.layer, layer)
|
||
}
|
||
// Duplicate replay never extends the original selector's mutable
|
||
// window; otherwise a client could retain exact state forever.
|
||
return false, nil
|
||
}
|
||
current = exactSessionProfileEntry{layer: layer, msgID: msgID, expiresAt: expiresAt}
|
||
r.exactProfiles[key] = current
|
||
r.noteExactSessionProfileExpiryLocked(current.expiresAt)
|
||
return true, nil
|
||
}
|
||
delete(r.exactProfiles, key)
|
||
if len(r.exactProfiles) >= maxExactSessionProfileEntries {
|
||
if r.exactProfileEarliestExpiry.IsZero() || !now.Before(r.exactProfileEarliestExpiry) {
|
||
r.purgeExpiredExactSessionProfilesLocked(now)
|
||
}
|
||
if len(r.exactProfiles) >= maxExactSessionProfileEntries {
|
||
return false, &ExactSessionProfileCapacityError{Limit: maxExactSessionProfileEntries}
|
||
}
|
||
}
|
||
entry := exactSessionProfileEntry{layer: layer, msgID: msgID, expiresAt: expiresAt}
|
||
r.exactProfiles[key] = entry
|
||
if len(r.exactProfiles) == 1 {
|
||
r.exactProfileEarliestExpiry = entry.expiresAt
|
||
} else {
|
||
r.noteExactSessionProfileExpiryLocked(entry.expiresAt)
|
||
}
|
||
return true, nil
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
func exactSessionLayerEvidenceExpiry(now time.Time, msgID int64) time.Time {
|
||
if msgID <= 0 {
|
||
return now.Add(exactSessionProfileLegacyTTL)
|
||
}
|
||
expiresAt := proto.MessageID(msgID).Time().Add(300*time.Second + time.Second)
|
||
if !now.Before(expiresAt) {
|
||
// Production freshness admission prevents this branch. Keep the force
|
||
// API/test seam short-lived instead of manufacturing a long watermark
|
||
// from an ancient or synthetic msg_id.
|
||
return now.Add(time.Second)
|
||
}
|
||
return expiresAt
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
func (r *Router) purgeExpiredExactSessionProfilesLocked(now time.Time) {
|
||
earliest := time.Time{}
|
||
for key, entry := range r.exactProfiles {
|
||
if !now.Before(entry.expiresAt) {
|
||
delete(r.exactProfiles, key)
|
||
continue
|
||
}
|
||
if earliest.IsZero() || entry.expiresAt.Before(earliest) {
|
||
earliest = entry.expiresAt
|
||
}
|
||
}
|
||
r.exactProfileEarliestExpiry = earliest
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
func (r *Router) noteExactSessionProfileExpiryLocked(expiry time.Time) {
|
||
if r.exactProfileEarliestExpiry.IsZero() || expiry.Before(r.exactProfileEarliestExpiry) {
|
||
r.exactProfileEarliestExpiry = expiry
|
||
}
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
// ForgetNegotiatedSessionLayer is reserved for explicit destroy_session.
|
||
func (r *Router) ForgetNegotiatedSessionLayer(authKeyID [8]byte, sessionID int64) {
|
||
if r == nil {
|
||
return
|
||
}
|
||
r.exactProfileMu.Lock()
|
||
delete(r.exactProfiles, clientInfoSessionKey{rawAuthKeyID: authKeyID, sessionID: sessionID})
|
||
r.exactProfileMu.Unlock()
|
||
r.clientInfoMu.Lock()
|
||
delete(r.clientInfo, clientInfoSessionKey{rawAuthKeyID: authKeyID, sessionID: sessionID})
|
||
r.clientInfoMu.Unlock()
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
// ForgetNegotiatedAuthKey is reserved for physical auth-key destruction. A
|
||
// business authorization logout/revoke must not call it: Layer is protocol
|
||
// metadata and survives authorization state. This is intentionally cold
|
||
// O(capacity); hot lookup and refresh stay O(1).
|
||
func (r *Router) ForgetNegotiatedAuthKey(authKeyID [8]byte) {
|
||
if r == nil || authKeyID == ([8]byte{}) {
|
||
return
|
||
}
|
||
r.exactProfileMu.Lock()
|
||
for key := range r.exactProfiles {
|
||
if key.rawAuthKeyID == authKeyID {
|
||
delete(r.exactProfiles, key)
|
||
}
|
||
}
|
||
r.exactProfileMu.Unlock()
|
||
r.clientInfoMu.Lock()
|
||
delete(r.authInfo, authKeyID)
|
||
delete(r.authLayerEvidence, authKeyID)
|
||
for key := range r.clientInfo {
|
||
if key.rawAuthKeyID == authKeyID {
|
||
delete(r.clientInfo, key)
|
||
}
|
||
}
|
||
r.clientInfoMu.Unlock()
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
// SessionDestroyed is the explicit lifecycle callback. SessionOffline must not
|
||
// call this: a physical TCP loss is not destruction of the logical MTProto
|
||
// session.
|
||
func (r *Router) SessionDestroyed(rawAuthKeyID [8]byte, sessionID int64) {
|
||
r.ForgetNegotiatedSessionLayer(rawAuthKeyID, sessionID)
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
// ObserveInitConnection records the protocol metadata of an initConnection
|
||
// whose inner request was aliased by mtprotoedge to an already-running naked
|
||
// request. It deliberately performs no handler dispatch and therefore cannot
|
||
// repeat business side effects.
|
||
func (r *Router) ObserveInitConnection(
|
||
ctx context.Context,
|
||
rawAuthKeyID [8]byte,
|
||
sessionID int64,
|
||
layer, apiID int,
|
||
deviceModel, systemVersion, appVersion, systemLangCode, langPack, langCode string,
|
||
) error {
|
||
if ctx == nil {
|
||
ctx = context.Background()
|
||
}
|
||
ctx = WithRawAuthKeyID(ctx, rawAuthKeyID)
|
||
effectiveAuthKeyID, err := r.effectiveAuthKeyID(ctx, rawAuthKeyID, sessionID)
|
||
if err != nil {
|
||
return err
|
||
}
|
||
ctx = WithAuthKeyID(ctx, effectiveAuthKeyID)
|
||
ctx = WithSessionID(ctx, sessionID)
|
||
ctx = WithLayer(ctx, layer)
|
||
// Exact Layer/default publication belongs to generated admission and has
|
||
// already happened before a rewrap alias can reach this legacy metadata
|
||
// observer. Replaying it here would have no msg_id/admission sequence and
|
||
// could reset a newer exact profile.
|
||
r.rememberClientInfo(ctx, ClientInfo{
|
||
APIID: apiID, DeviceModel: deviceModel, SystemVersion: systemVersion,
|
||
AppVersion: appVersion, SystemLangCode: systemLangCode,
|
||
LangPack: langPack, LangCode: langCode,
|
||
})
|
||
return nil
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
// mutateClientSessionInfo 在单个临界区内完成「读旧值-修改-写回」，避免
|
||
// RLock 读出与 Lock 写回之间被并发写覆盖的窗口。
|
||
func (r *Router) mutateClientSessionInfo(ctx context.Context, mutate func(*clientSessionInfo)) {
|
||
rawAuthKeyID, ok := RawAuthKeyIDFrom(ctx)
|
||
if !ok {
|
||
return
|
||
}
|
||
sessionID, ok := SessionIDFrom(ctx)
|
||
if !ok {
|
||
return
|
||
}
|
||
r.clientInfoMu.Lock()
|
||
defer r.clientInfoMu.Unlock()
|
||
if r.clientInfo == nil {
|
||
r.clientInfo = make(map[clientInfoSessionKey]clientSessionInfo)
|
||
}
|
||
sessionKey := clientInfoSessionKey{rawAuthKeyID: rawAuthKeyID, sessionID: sessionID}
|
||
sessionInfo, exists := r.clientInfo[sessionKey]
|
||
mutate(&sessionInfo)
|
||
if !exists {
|
||
evictMapEntryIfFullLocked(r.clientInfo, maxClientInfoEntries)
|
||
}
|
||
r.clientInfo[sessionKey] = sessionInfo
|
||
authInfo := sessionInfo
|
||
authInfo.layer = 0
|
||
authInfo.layerAdmissionSeq = 0
|
||
authInfo.clientInfoAdmissionSeq = 0
|
||
r.rememberAuthClientInfoLocked(rawAuthKeyID, authInfo)
|
||
if authKeyID, ok := AuthKeyIDFrom(ctx); ok {
|
||
r.rememberAuthClientInfoLocked(authKeyID, authInfo)
|
||
}
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
func (r *Router) rememberClientSessionInfo(ctx context.Context, sessionInfo clientSessionInfo) {
|
||
rawAuthKeyID, ok := RawAuthKeyIDFrom(ctx)
|
||
if !ok {
|
||
return
|
||
}
|
||
sessionID, ok := SessionIDFrom(ctx)
|
||
if !ok {
|
||
return
|
||
}
|
||
r.clientInfoMu.Lock()
|
||
defer r.clientInfoMu.Unlock()
|
||
if r.clientInfo == nil {
|
||
r.clientInfo = make(map[clientInfoSessionKey]clientSessionInfo)
|
||
}
|
||
sessionKey := clientInfoSessionKey{rawAuthKeyID: rawAuthKeyID, sessionID: sessionID}
|
||
if _, exists := r.clientInfo[sessionKey]; !exists {
|
||
evictMapEntryIfFullLocked(r.clientInfo, maxClientInfoEntries)
|
||
}
|
||
r.clientInfo[sessionKey] = mergeClientSessionInfo(r.clientInfo[sessionKey], sessionInfo)
|
||
r.rememberAuthClientInfoLocked(rawAuthKeyID, sessionInfo)
|
||
if authKeyID, ok := AuthKeyIDFrom(ctx); ok {
|
||
r.rememberAuthClientInfoLocked(authKeyID, sessionInfo)
|
||
}
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
func (r *Router) rememberClientSessionInfoIfMissing(ctx context.Context, sessionInfo clientSessionInfo) bool {
|
||
rawAuthKeyID, ok := RawAuthKeyIDFrom(ctx)
|
||
if !ok {
|
||
return false
|
||
}
|
||
sessionID, ok := SessionIDFrom(ctx)
|
||
if !ok {
|
||
return false
|
||
}
|
||
authKeyID, hasAuthKeyID := AuthKeyIDFrom(ctx)
|
||
if r.clientSessionInfoStored(rawAuthKeyID, sessionID, authKeyID, hasAuthKeyID, sessionInfo) {
|
||
return false
|
||
}
|
||
r.clientInfoMu.Lock()
|
||
defer r.clientInfoMu.Unlock()
|
||
if r.clientSessionInfoStoredLocked(rawAuthKeyID, sessionID, authKeyID, hasAuthKeyID, sessionInfo) {
|
||
return false
|
||
}
|
||
if r.clientInfo == nil {
|
||
r.clientInfo = make(map[clientInfoSessionKey]clientSessionInfo)
|
||
}
|
||
sessionKey := clientInfoSessionKey{rawAuthKeyID: rawAuthKeyID, sessionID: sessionID}
|
||
if _, exists := r.clientInfo[sessionKey]; !exists {
|
||
evictMapEntryIfFullLocked(r.clientInfo, maxClientInfoEntries)
|
||
}
|
||
r.clientInfo[sessionKey] = mergeClientSessionInfo(r.clientInfo[sessionKey], sessionInfo)
|
||
r.rememberAuthClientInfoLocked(rawAuthKeyID, sessionInfo)
|
||
if hasAuthKeyID {
|
||
r.rememberAuthClientInfoLocked(authKeyID, sessionInfo)
|
||
}
|
||
return true
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
func (r *Router) clientSessionInfoStored(rawAuthKeyID [8]byte, sessionID int64, authKeyID [8]byte, hasAuthKeyID bool, required clientSessionInfo) bool {
|
||
r.clientInfoMu.RLock()
|
||
defer r.clientInfoMu.RUnlock()
|
||
return r.clientSessionInfoStoredLocked(rawAuthKeyID, sessionID, authKeyID, hasAuthKeyID, required)
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
func (r *Router) clientSessionInfoStoredLocked(rawAuthKeyID [8]byte, sessionID int64, authKeyID [8]byte, hasAuthKeyID bool, required clientSessionInfo) bool {
|
||
if !clientSessionInfoContains(r.clientInfo[clientInfoSessionKey{rawAuthKeyID: rawAuthKeyID, sessionID: sessionID}], required) {
|
||
return false
|
||
}
|
||
// authInfo is deliberately auth-key-wide and can only cache the client
|
||
// description/check markers. Exact-session Layer is not a required fact in
|
||
// either auth-key fallback entry.
|
||
authRequired := required
|
||
authRequired.layer = 0
|
||
if !clientSessionInfoContains(r.authInfo[rawAuthKeyID], authRequired) {
|
||
return false
|
||
}
|
||
if hasAuthKeyID && !clientSessionInfoContains(r.authInfo[authKeyID], authRequired) {
|
||
return false
|
||
}
|
||
return true
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
func clientSessionInfoContains(current, required clientSessionInfo) bool {
|
||
if required.layer != 0 && current.layer != required.layer {
|
||
return false
|
||
}
|
||
if required.hasClientInfo && (!current.hasClientInfo || current.clientInfo != required.clientInfo) {
|
||
return false
|
||
}
|
||
if required.authorizationChecked && !current.authorizationChecked {
|
||
return false
|
||
}
|
||
if required.authKeyInfoChecked && !current.authKeyInfoChecked {
|
||
return false
|
||
}
|
||
return true
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
func (r *Router) rememberAuthClientInfoLocked(authKeyID [8]byte, info clientSessionInfo) {
|
||
if authKeyID == ([8]byte{}) {
|
||
return
|
||
}
|
||
// Wrapper ordering is a logical-session fact and must never leak into an
|
||
// auth-key-wide metadata/default entry. Ordered Layer publication uses
|
||
// rememberAuthClientLayerAtLocked directly.
|
||
info.wrapperMsgID = 0
|
||
info.layerAdmissionSeq = 0
|
||
info.clientInfoAdmissionSeq = 0
|
||
if r.authInfo == nil {
|
||
r.authInfo = make(map[[8]byte]clientSessionInfo)
|
||
}
|
||
if _, exists := r.authInfo[authKeyID]; !exists {
|
||
evictMapEntryIfFullLocked(r.authInfo, maxAuthInfoEntries)
|
||
}
|
||
current := r.authInfo[authKeyID]
|
||
r.authInfo[authKeyID] = mergeClientSessionInfo(current, info)
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
func (r *Router) rememberAuthClientLayerLocked(authKeyID [8]byte, layer int) {
|
||
r.rememberAuthClientLayerAtLocked(authKeyID, layer, 0)
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
func (r *Router) rememberAuthClientLayerAtLocked(authKeyID [8]byte, layer int, admissionSeq uint64) {
|
||
if authKeyID == ([8]byte{}) || !isSupportedLayer(layer) {
|
||
return
|
||
}
|
||
if r.authInfo == nil {
|
||
r.authInfo = make(map[[8]byte]clientSessionInfo)
|
||
}
|
||
if _, exists := r.authInfo[authKeyID]; !exists {
|
||
evictMapEntryIfFullLocked(r.authInfo, maxAuthInfoEntries)
|
||
}
|
||
info := r.authInfo[authKeyID]
|
||
if admissionSeq == 0 && info.layerObservationID > 0 {
|
||
// An unordered restoration/shadow write can never replace a durable
|
||
// observation. In particular, do not manufacture (new observation,
|
||
// old layer) by changing only the layer field.
|
||
return
|
||
}
|
||
if admissionSeq == 0 && info.layerAdmissionSeq > 0 {
|
||
// Store restoration and legacy callers carry no cross-session order and
|
||
// must not overwrite a default established by a fresh admission.
|
||
return
|
||
}
|
||
if admissionSeq > 0 && info.layerAdmissionSeq > admissionSeq {
|
||
return
|
||
}
|
||
info.layer = layer
|
||
info.layerBlocked = false
|
||
info.layerBlockedByAuthKey = false
|
||
if admissionSeq > 0 {
|
||
info.layerAdmissionSeq = admissionSeq
|
||
}
|
||
r.authInfo[authKeyID] = info
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
func (r *Router) rememberAuthClientLayerObservationLocked(authKeyID [8]byte, layer int, observationID int64) {
|
||
if authKeyID == ([8]byte{}) || !isSupportedLayer(layer) || observationID <= 0 {
|
||
return
|
||
}
|
||
if r.authInfo == nil {
|
||
r.authInfo = make(map[[8]byte]clientSessionInfo)
|
||
}
|
||
if _, exists := r.authInfo[authKeyID]; !exists {
|
||
evictMapEntryIfFullLocked(r.authInfo, maxAuthInfoEntries)
|
||
}
|
||
info := r.authInfo[authKeyID]
|
||
if info.layerObservationID > observationID {
|
||
return
|
||
}
|
||
if info.layerObservationID == observationID && info.layerObservationID > 0 && info.layer != 0 && info.layer != layer {
|
||
return
|
||
}
|
||
info.layer = layer
|
||
info.layerObservationID = observationID
|
||
// Durable database order supersedes any process-local admission order for
|
||
// the shared default. Exact request/session ordering remains in its own
|
||
// msg_id/flight structures.
|
||
info.layerAdmissionSeq = 0
|
||
info.layerBlocked = false
|
||
info.layerBlockedByAuthKey = false
|
||
r.authInfo[authKeyID] = info
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
func (r *Router) authClientLayerLocked(authKeyID [8]byte) int {
|
||
return r.authInfo[authKeyID].layer
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
// forgetClientSessionInfo removes only transport/session-local metadata. The
|
||
// auth-key default is durable protocol state and stays cached across ordinary
|
||
// disconnects; the bounded authInfo map handles eviction.
|
||
func (r *Router) forgetClientSessionInfo(rawAuthKeyID [8]byte, sessionID int64) {
|
||
r.clientInfoMu.Lock()
|
||
key := clientInfoSessionKey{rawAuthKeyID: rawAuthKeyID, sessionID: sessionID}
|
||
if current := r.clientInfo[key]; current.wrapperMsgID > 0 || current.layerAdmissionSeq > 0 {
|
||
// Preserve only the bounded ordering watermark across a physical
|
||
// reconnect; metadata is restored from the auth-key default/store.
|
||
r.clientInfo[key] = clientSessionInfo{
|
||
layerAdmissionSeq: current.layerAdmissionSeq,
|
||
wrapperMsgID: current.wrapperMsgID,
|
||
}
|
||
} else {
|
||
delete(r.clientInfo, key)
|
||
}
|
||
r.clientInfoMu.Unlock()
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
func (r *Router) claimSessionWrapperEffects(rawAuthKeyID [8]byte, sessionID, msgID int64) bool {
|
||
if msgID <= 0 {
|
||
return true
|
||
}
|
||
if rawAuthKeyID == ([8]byte{}) || sessionID == 0 {
|
||
return false
|
||
}
|
||
key := clientInfoSessionKey{rawAuthKeyID: rawAuthKeyID, sessionID: sessionID}
|
||
r.clientInfoMu.Lock()
|
||
defer r.clientInfoMu.Unlock()
|
||
if r.clientInfo == nil {
|
||
r.clientInfo = make(map[clientInfoSessionKey]clientSessionInfo)
|
||
}
|
||
current, exists := r.clientInfo[key]
|
||
if current.wrapperMsgID > msgID {
|
||
return false
|
||
}
|
||
if current.wrapperMsgID == msgID {
|
||
return true
|
||
}
|
||
if !exists {
|
||
evictMapEntryIfFullLocked(r.clientInfo, maxClientInfoEntries)
|
||
}
|
||
current.wrapperMsgID = msgID
|
||
r.clientInfo[key] = current
|
||
return true
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
func evictMapEntryIfFullLocked[K comparable, V any](m map[K]V, limit int) {
|
||
if len(m) < limit {
|
||
return
|
||
}
|
||
for k := range m {
|
||
delete(m, k)
|
||
return
|
||
}
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
func (r *Router) clientSessionInfo(ctx context.Context) (clientSessionInfo, bool, bool) {
|
||
rawAuthKeyID, ok := RawAuthKeyIDFrom(ctx)
|
||
if !ok {
|
||
return clientSessionInfo{}, false, false
|
||
}
|
||
sessionID, ok := SessionIDFrom(ctx)
|
||
if !ok {
|
||
return clientSessionInfo{}, false, false
|
||
}
|
||
r.clientInfoMu.RLock()
|
||
defer r.clientInfoMu.RUnlock()
|
||
info, ok := r.clientInfo[clientInfoSessionKey{rawAuthKeyID: rawAuthKeyID, sessionID: sessionID}]
|
||
authKeyID, hasAuthKeyID := AuthKeyIDFrom(ctx)
|
||
// For a bound temporary key, the permanent/business auth key is the
|
||
// canonical shared default. The raw shadow is only a pre-bind/restart aid.
|
||
if hasAuthKeyID {
|
||
if authInfo, authOK := r.authInfo[authKeyID]; authOK {
|
||
info = mergeClientSessionInfo(info, authInfo)
|
||
ok = true
|
||
}
|
||
}
|
||
if authInfo, authOK := r.authInfo[rawAuthKeyID]; authOK {
|
||
info = mergeClientSessionInfo(info, authInfo)
|
||
ok = true
|
||
}
|
||
if !ok {
|
||
return info, false, false
|
||
}
|
||
return info, true, r.clientSessionInfoStoredLocked(rawAuthKeyID, sessionID, authKeyID, hasAuthKeyID, info)
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
func (r *Router) cachedResolvedAuthClientInfo(authKeyID [8]byte) (clientSessionInfo, bool) {
|
||
r.clientInfoMu.RLock()
|
||
defer r.clientInfoMu.RUnlock()
|
||
info, ok := r.authInfo[authKeyID]
|
||
if !ok || clientSessionInfoNeedsAuthorization(info) {
|
||
return clientSessionInfo{}, false
|
||
}
|
||
return info, true
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
func (r *Router) cachedResolvedAuthKeyClientInfo(authKeyID [8]byte) (clientSessionInfo, bool) {
|
||
r.clientInfoMu.RLock()
|
||
defer r.clientInfoMu.RUnlock()
|
||
info, ok := r.authInfo[authKeyID]
|
||
if !ok || clientSessionInfoNeedsAuthKeyInfo(info) {
|
||
return clientSessionInfo{}, false
|
||
}
|
||
return info, true
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
func (r *Router) clientSessionInfoFromAuthKey(ctx context.Context, authKeyID [8]byte, current clientSessionInfo) (clientSessionInfo, bool) {
|
||
if !clientSessionInfoNeedsAuthKeyInfo(current) || r.deps.Auth == nil || authKeyID == ([8]byte{}) {
|
||
return clientSessionInfo{}, false
|
||
}
|
||
v, err, _ := r.authUserSF.Do(authKeyClientInfoSingleflightPrefix+string(authKeyID[:]), func() (any, error) {
|
||
if cached, ok := r.cachedResolvedAuthKeyClientInfo(authKeyID); ok {
|
||
return cached, nil
|
||
}
|
||
info, found, err := r.deps.Auth.AuthKeyClientInfo(ctx, authKeyID)
|
||
if err != nil {
|
||
return clientSessionInfo{}, err
|
||
}
|
||
if !found {
|
||
return clientSessionInfo{authKeyInfoChecked: true}, nil
|
||
}
|
||
return clientSessionInfoFromAuthKeyClientInfo(info), nil
|
||
})
|
||
if err != nil {
|
||
return clientSessionInfo{}, false
|
||
}
|
||
info := v.(clientSessionInfo)
|
||
if info.layer == 0 && !info.hasClientInfo && !info.authKeyInfoChecked {
|
||
return clientSessionInfo{}, false
|
||
}
|
||
return info, true
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
func mergeClientSessionInfo(base, fallback clientSessionInfo) clientSessionInfo {
|
||
switch {
|
||
case fallback.layerObservationID > base.layerObservationID:
|
||
base.layer = fallback.layer
|
||
base.layerObservationID = fallback.layerObservationID
|
||
base.layerBlocked = fallback.layerBlocked
|
||
base.layerBlockedByAuthKey = fallback.layerBlockedByAuthKey
|
||
case fallback.layerObservationID == base.layerObservationID && base.layer == 0:
|
||
base.layer = fallback.layer
|
||
}
|
||
if !base.hasClientInfo && fallback.hasClientInfo {
|
||
base.clientInfo = fallback.clientInfo
|
||
base.hasClientInfo = true
|
||
}
|
||
if fallback.authorizationChecked {
|
||
base.authorizationChecked = true
|
||
}
|
||
if fallback.authKeyInfoChecked {
|
||
base.authKeyInfoChecked = true
|
||
}
|
||
if fallback.layerBlocked && base.layer == 0 {
|
||
base.layerBlocked = true
|
||
}
|
||
if fallback.layerBlockedByAuthKey && base.layer == 0 {
|
||
base.layerBlockedByAuthKey = true
|
||
}
|
||
if base.layer != 0 {
|
||
base.layerBlocked = false
|
||
base.layerBlockedByAuthKey = false
|
||
}
|
||
if fallback.wrapperMsgID > base.wrapperMsgID {
|
||
base.wrapperMsgID = fallback.wrapperMsgID
|
||
}
|
||
return base
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
func clientSessionInfoFromAuthKeyClientInfo(item domain.AuthKeyClientInfo) clientSessionInfo {
|
||
info := clientSessionInfo{
|
||
authKeyInfoChecked: true,
|
||
layerObservationID: item.LayerObservationID,
|
||
clientInfo: ClientInfo{
|
||
APIID: item.APIID,
|
||
DeviceModel: item.DeviceModel,
|
||
SystemVersion: item.SystemVersion,
|
||
AppVersion: item.AppVersion,
|
||
Type: ClientType(item.Platform),
|
||
},
|
||
}
|
||
if isSupportedLayer(item.Layer) {
|
||
info.layer = item.Layer
|
||
} else if item.Layer != 0 {
|
||
// A non-zero auth_keys.layer is primary even when this binary has not
|
||
// generated it. Mark the mirror checked so an older authorization.layer
|
||
// cannot silently downgrade the future value.
|
||
info.authorizationChecked = true
|
||
info.layerBlocked = true
|
||
info.layerBlockedByAuthKey = true
|
||
}
|
||
info.clientInfo = restoreClientInfo(info.clientInfo)
|
||
info.hasClientInfo = info.clientInfo.ClientType() != ClientTypeUnknown ||
|
||
info.clientInfo.DeviceModel != "" ||
|
||
info.clientInfo.SystemVersion != "" ||
|
||
info.clientInfo.AppVersion != "" ||
|
||
info.clientInfo.APIID != 0
|
||
return info
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
func domainAuthKeyClientInfo(info clientSessionInfo) domain.AuthKeyClientInfo {
|
||
out := domain.AuthKeyClientInfo{Layer: info.layer}
|
||
if info.hasClientInfo {
|
||
out.APIID = info.clientInfo.APIID
|
||
out.DeviceModel = info.clientInfo.DeviceModel
|
||
out.SystemVersion = info.clientInfo.SystemVersion
|
||
out.AppVersion = info.clientInfo.AppVersion
|
||
out.Platform = string(info.clientInfo.ClientType())
|
||
}
|
||
return out
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
func (r *Router) clientSessionInfoFromAuthorization(ctx context.Context, userID int64, authKeyID [8]byte, current clientSessionInfo) (clientSessionInfo, bool) {
|
||
if !clientSessionInfoNeedsAuthorization(current) || r.deps.Auth == nil || userID == 0 {
|
||
return clientSessionInfo{}, false
|
||
}
|
||
v, err, _ := r.authUserSF.Do(authClientInfoSingleflightPrefix+string(authKeyID[:]), func() (any, error) {
|
||
if cached, ok := r.cachedResolvedAuthClientInfo(authKeyID); ok {
|
||
return cached, nil
|
||
}
|
||
item, found, err := r.deps.Auth.Authorization(ctx, authKeyID)
|
||
if err != nil {
|
||
return clientSessionInfo{}, err
|
||
}
|
||
if !found || item.UserID != userID || item.PasswordPending {
|
||
return clientSessionInfo{authorizationChecked: true}, nil
|
||
}
|
||
return clientSessionInfoFromAuthorizationRecord(item), nil
|
||
})
|
||
if err != nil {
|
||
return clientSessionInfo{}, false
|
||
}
|
||
return v.(clientSessionInfo), true
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
func clientSessionInfoFromAuthorizationRecord(item domain.Authorization) clientSessionInfo {
|
||
info := clientSessionInfo{
|
||
authorizationChecked: true,
|
||
clientInfo: ClientInfo{
|
||
APIID: item.APIID,
|
||
DeviceModel: item.DeviceModel,
|
||
SystemVersion: item.SystemVersion,
|
||
AppVersion: item.AppVersion,
|
||
Type: ClientType(item.Platform),
|
||
},
|
||
}
|
||
// authorizations.layer is only a materialized device-list projection.
|
||
// Protocol inheritance is exclusively sourced from auth_keys.layer with its
|
||
// observation watermark; promoting this mirror would fabricate provenance
|
||
// when the primary is zero or has been repaired independently.
|
||
info.clientInfo = restoreClientInfo(info.clientInfo)
|
||
info.hasClientInfo = info.clientInfo.ClientType() != ClientTypeUnknown ||
|
||
info.clientInfo.DeviceModel != "" ||
|
||
info.clientInfo.SystemVersion != "" ||
|
||
info.clientInfo.AppVersion != "" ||
|
||
info.clientInfo.APIID != 0
|
||
return info
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
func clientSessionInfoNeedsAuthorization(info clientSessionInfo) bool {
|
||
if info.authorizationChecked {
|
||
return false
|
||
}
|
||
return info.layer == 0 || !info.hasClientInfo || info.clientInfo.ClientType() == ClientTypeUnknown
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
func clientSessionInfoNeedsAuthKeyInfo(info clientSessionInfo) bool {
|
||
if info.authKeyInfoChecked {
|
||
return false
|
||
}
|
||
return info.layer == 0 || !info.hasClientInfo || info.clientInfo.ClientType() == ClientTypeUnknown
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
// fallback 处理未注册的 RPC：记录到 compatibility trace（落兼容矩阵），
|
||
// 返回 NOT_IMPLEMENTED rpc_error 让客户端继续运行而非断连。
|
||
func (r *Router) fallback(ctx context.Context, b *bin.Buffer) (bin.Encoder, error) {
|
||
id, _ := b.PeekID()
|
||
fields := append([]zap.Field{
|
||
zap.String("method", tlTypeName(id)),
|
||
zap.String("type_id", fmt.Sprintf("%#x", id)),
|
||
}, r.contextLogFields(ctx)...)
|
||
r.log.Warn("Unhandled RPC (compatibility trace)", fields...)
|
||
return nil, notImplementedErr()
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
func (r *Router) contextLogFields(ctx context.Context) []zap.Field {
|
||
fields := []zap.Field{
|
||
zap.Int("layer", LayerFrom(ctx)),
|
||
zap.String("client_type", string(ClientTypeFrom(ctx))),
|
||
}
|
||
if info, ok := ClientInfoFrom(ctx); ok && info.AppVersion != "" {
|
||
fields = append(fields, zap.String("app_version", info.AppVersion))
|
||
}
|
||
if sessionID, ok := SessionIDFrom(ctx); ok {
|
||
fields = append(fields, zap.Int64("session_id", sessionID))
|
||
}
|
||
if rawAuthKeyID, ok := RawAuthKeyIDFrom(ctx); ok {
|
||
fields = append(fields, zap.String("raw_auth_key_id", hex.EncodeToString(rawAuthKeyID[:])))
|
||
}
|
||
if authKeyID, ok := AuthKeyIDFrom(ctx); ok {
|
||
fields = append(fields, zap.String("auth_key_id", hex.EncodeToString(authKeyID[:])))
|
||
}
|
||
if userID, ok := UserIDFrom(ctx); ok {
|
||
fields = append(fields, zap.Int64("user_id", userID))
|
||
}
|
||
return fields
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
// rawObject 在解码 wrapper 时按原样捕获内层 query 的 TL 字节，供递归分发。
|
||
// 它实现 bin.Object（Encode/Decode），但只搬运字节、不解释内容。
|
||
type rawObject struct {
|
||
data []byte
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
func (o *rawObject) Decode(b *bin.Buffer) error {
|
||
o.data = append(o.data[:0], b.Buf...)
|
||
b.Skip(len(b.Buf))
|
||
return nil
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
func (o *rawObject) Encode(b *bin.Buffer) error {
|
||
b.Put(o.data)
|
||
return nil
|
||
}
|