596 lines
21 KiB
Go
596 lines
21 KiB
Go
package postgres
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import (
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"context"
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"crypto/sha256"
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"encoding/binary"
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"errors"
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"fmt"
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"github.com/jackc/pgx/v5"
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"telesrv/internal/domain"
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"telesrv/internal/store"
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"telesrv/internal/store/postgres/sqlcgen"
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)
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// AuthorizationStore 用 PostgreSQL 实现 store.AuthorizationStore。
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type AuthorizationStore struct {
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db sqlcgen.DBTX
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q *sqlcgen.Queries
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}
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// NewAuthorizationStore 基于 pgx 连接池（或事务）创建 AuthorizationStore。
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func NewAuthorizationStore(db sqlcgen.DBTX) *AuthorizationStore {
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return &AuthorizationStore{db: db, q: sqlcgen.New(db)}
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}
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func (s *AuthorizationStore) Bind(ctx context.Context, a domain.Authorization) error {
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if a.Hash == 0 {
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a.Hash = authorizationHash(a.AuthKeyID)
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}
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err := withAuthIdentityTx(ctx, s.db, "bind authorization", func(tx pgx.Tx) error {
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return bindAuthorization(ctx, tx, a)
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})
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if err != nil {
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return fmt.Errorf("upsert authorization: %w", err)
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}
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return nil
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}
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// bindAuthorization 把 auth_key→user 绑定和设备 update baseline 作为同一个状态边界提交。
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//
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// 锁顺序固定为：目标 user advisory/row → auth_keys 母行 →
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// user_update_watermarks → user_update_retention → 目标 update_states。其中 watermark
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// 与 retention 两个 row lock 的顺序和 pruneConfirmedUserPrefixTx 一致，使新授权的
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// observed baseline 和 retained floor 不会交叉提交成静默空洞。母行锁又能在首次
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// authorization 尚不存在时串行化同一
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// raw auth key 的并发登录/换号。user 锁与账号 tombstone 使用同一顺序；因此 Bind
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// 要么先提交并被随后删除事务撤销，要么等删除提交后看见 tombstone 并拒绝，不能在
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// 删除事务枚举 authorization 之后重新绑定账号。
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func bindAuthorization(ctx context.Context, db sqlcgen.DBTX, a domain.Authorization) error {
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keyID := authKeyIDToInt64(a.AuthKeyID)
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tx, ok := db.(pgx.Tx)
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if !ok {
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return fmt.Errorf("bind authorization requires a transaction")
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}
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if err := lockUsersForUpdate(ctx, tx, a.UserID); err != nil {
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return fmt.Errorf("lock authorization user: %w", err)
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}
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var active bool
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if err := db.QueryRow(ctx, `
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SELECT deleted_at IS NULL
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FROM users
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WHERE id = $1
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FOR UPDATE`, a.UserID).Scan(&active); err != nil {
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if errors.Is(err, pgx.ErrNoRows) {
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return domain.ErrUserNotFound
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}
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return fmt.Errorf("lock authorization user row: %w", err)
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}
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if !active {
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return domain.ErrAccountDeleted
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}
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if err := lockPermanentAuthIdentities(ctx, tx, []int64{keyID}); err != nil {
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return err
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}
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var (
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lockedKeyID int64
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expiresAt int
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authLayer int
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layerObservationID int64
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)
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if err := db.QueryRow(ctx, `
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SELECT auth_key_id, expires_at, layer, layer_observation_id
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FROM auth_keys
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WHERE auth_key_id = $1
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FOR UPDATE`, keyID).Scan(&lockedKeyID, &expiresAt, &authLayer, &layerObservationID); err != nil {
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return fmt.Errorf("lock auth key for authorization: %w", err)
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}
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if expiresAt != 0 {
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return store.ErrAuthKeyNotPermanent
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}
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if authLayer < 0 || layerObservationID < 0 || (layerObservationID > 0 && authLayer == 0) {
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return fmt.Errorf(
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"authorization auth-key layer invariant violation: auth key %x has layer %d observation %d",
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a.AuthKeyID, authLayer, layerObservationID,
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)
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}
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if _, err := db.Exec(ctx, `
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INSERT INTO user_update_watermarks (user_id, contiguous_pts)
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VALUES ($1, 0)
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ON CONFLICT (user_id) DO NOTHING`, a.UserID); err != nil {
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return fmt.Errorf("ensure authorization user update watermark: %w", err)
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}
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var currentPts int
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if err := db.QueryRow(ctx, `
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SELECT contiguous_pts
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FROM user_update_watermarks
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WHERE user_id = $1
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FOR UPDATE`, a.UserID).Scan(¤tPts); err != nil {
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return fmt.Errorf("lock authorization user update watermark: %w", err)
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}
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if _, err := db.Exec(ctx, `
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INSERT INTO user_update_retention (user_id)
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VALUES ($1)
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ON CONFLICT (user_id) DO NOTHING`, a.UserID); err != nil {
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return fmt.Errorf("ensure authorization user update retention: %w", err)
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}
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var retainedFloor int
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if err := db.QueryRow(ctx, `
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SELECT retained_through_pts
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FROM user_update_retention
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WHERE user_id = $1
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FOR UPDATE`, a.UserID).Scan(&retainedFloor); err != nil {
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return fmt.Errorf("lock authorization user update retention: %w", err)
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}
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if retainedFloor > currentPts {
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return fmt.Errorf(
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"authorization update baseline invariant violation: user %d retained floor %d exceeds contiguous watermark %d",
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a.UserID, retainedFloor, currentPts,
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)
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}
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// 每次 Bind 都是一次显式登录 baseline：delivered pts 推进到已锁定的账号连续水位；
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// observed 只推进到已删除的 retained floor，不把 live tail 伪装成客户端确认。
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// 历史遗留的 state 若超出账号 contiguous watermark，必须 fail-fast；不得用
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// GREATEST 把非法 future cursor 保留下来。WHERE 也封住“预检后并发插入”的竞态。
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tag, err := db.Exec(ctx, `
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INSERT INTO update_states (auth_key_id, user_id, pts, qts, date, seq, observed_pts)
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VALUES ($1, $2, $3, 0, EXTRACT(EPOCH FROM now())::int, 0, $4)
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ON CONFLICT (auth_key_id, user_id) DO UPDATE SET
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pts = GREATEST(update_states.pts, EXCLUDED.pts),
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qts = GREATEST(update_states.qts, EXCLUDED.qts),
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date = GREATEST(update_states.date, EXCLUDED.date),
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seq = GREATEST(update_states.seq, EXCLUDED.seq),
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observed_pts = GREATEST(update_states.observed_pts, EXCLUDED.observed_pts),
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updated_at = now()
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WHERE update_states.pts >= 0
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AND update_states.pts <= $3
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AND update_states.observed_pts <= $3`, keyID, a.UserID, currentPts, retainedFloor)
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if err != nil {
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return fmt.Errorf("upsert authorization update baseline: %w", err)
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}
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if tag.RowsAffected() != 1 {
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return fmt.Errorf(
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"authorization update baseline invariant violation: auth key %x user %d has pts or observed_pts outside contiguous watermark %d",
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a.AuthKeyID, a.UserID, currentPts,
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)
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}
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if _, err := db.Exec(ctx, `
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DELETE FROM update_states
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WHERE auth_key_id = $1
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AND user_id <> $2`, keyID, a.UserID); err != nil {
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return fmt.Errorf("delete stale cross-user update states: %w", err)
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}
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if _, err := db.Exec(ctx, `
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INSERT INTO authorizations (auth_key_id, user_id, hash, layer, device_model, platform, system_version, api_id, app_version, ip, password_pending)
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VALUES ($1,$2,$3,$4,$5,$6,$7,$8,$9,$10,$11)
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ON CONFLICT (auth_key_id) DO UPDATE SET
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user_id = EXCLUDED.user_id,
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hash = EXCLUDED.hash,
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layer = EXCLUDED.layer,
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device_model = EXCLUDED.device_model,
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platform = EXCLUDED.platform,
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system_version = EXCLUDED.system_version,
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api_id = EXCLUDED.api_id,
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app_version = EXCLUDED.app_version,
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ip = EXCLUDED.ip,
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password_pending = EXCLUDED.password_pending,
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created_at = now(),
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active_at = now()`,
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keyID, a.UserID, a.Hash, int32(authLayer), a.DeviceModel, a.Platform, a.SystemVersion, int32(a.APIID), a.AppVersion, a.IP, a.PasswordPending,
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); err != nil {
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return fmt.Errorf("write authorization: %w", err)
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}
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return nil
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}
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func (s *AuthorizationStore) ByAuthKey(ctx context.Context, id [8]byte) (domain.Authorization, bool, error) {
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row := s.db.QueryRow(ctx, `
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SELECT user_id, hash, layer, device_model, platform, system_version, api_id, app_version, ip, password_pending, created_at, active_at
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FROM authorizations WHERE auth_key_id = $1`, authKeyIDToInt64(id))
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a := domain.Authorization{AuthKeyID: id}
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if err := row.Scan(
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&a.UserID, &a.Hash, &a.Layer, &a.DeviceModel, &a.Platform, &a.SystemVersion,
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&a.APIID, &a.AppVersion, &a.IP, &a.PasswordPending, &a.CreatedAt, &a.ActiveAt,
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); err != nil {
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if errors.Is(err, pgx.ErrNoRows) {
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return domain.Authorization{}, false, nil
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}
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return domain.Authorization{}, false, fmt.Errorf("get authorization: %w", err)
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}
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return a, true, nil
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}
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func (s *AuthorizationStore) UpdateClientInfo(ctx context.Context, id [8]byte, info domain.AuthKeyClientInfo) error {
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if _, err := s.db.Exec(ctx, `
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UPDATE authorizations SET
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layer = CASE WHEN $2 > 0 THEN $2 ELSE layer END,
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device_model = CASE WHEN $3 <> '' THEN $3 ELSE device_model END,
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platform = CASE WHEN $4 <> '' THEN $4 ELSE platform END,
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system_version = CASE WHEN $5 <> '' THEN $5 ELSE system_version END,
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api_id = CASE WHEN $6 <> 0 THEN $6 ELSE api_id END,
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app_version = CASE WHEN $7 <> '' THEN $7 ELSE app_version END,
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ip = CASE WHEN $8 <> '' THEN $8 ELSE ip END,
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active_at = now()
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WHERE auth_key_id = $1`,
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authKeyIDToInt64(id), int32(info.Layer), info.DeviceModel, info.Platform,
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info.SystemVersion, int32(info.APIID), info.AppVersion, info.IP,
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); err != nil {
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return fmt.Errorf("update authorization client info: %w", err)
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}
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return nil
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}
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// MarkPasswordPassed atomically promotes only the pending identity whose
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// password was just verified. A concurrent cross-user Bind must not let A's
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// proof clear B's password_pending flag.
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func (s *AuthorizationStore) MarkPasswordPassed(ctx context.Context, id [8]byte, expectedUserID int64) error {
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tag, err := s.db.Exec(ctx, `
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UPDATE authorizations SET password_pending = false, created_at = now(), active_at = now()
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WHERE auth_key_id = $1 AND user_id = $2 AND password_pending`, authKeyIDToInt64(id), expectedUserID)
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if err != nil {
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return fmt.Errorf("mark authorization password passed: %w", err)
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}
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if tag.RowsAffected() != 1 {
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return store.ErrAuthorizationStateChanged
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}
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return nil
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}
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func (s *AuthorizationStore) ListByUser(ctx context.Context, userID int64) ([]domain.Authorization, error) {
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rows, err := s.q.ListAuthorizationsByUser(ctx, userID)
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if err != nil {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("list authorizations by user: %w", err)
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}
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out := make([]domain.Authorization, 0, len(rows))
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for _, row := range rows {
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out = append(out, authorizationFromRow(row))
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}
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return out, nil
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}
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func (s *AuthorizationStore) Delete(ctx context.Context, id [8]byte) error {
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if err := s.q.DeleteAuthorization(ctx, authKeyIDToInt64(id)); err != nil {
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return fmt.Errorf("delete authorization: %w", err)
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}
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return nil
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}
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func (s *AuthorizationStore) DeleteByHash(ctx context.Context, userID, hash int64) (domain.Authorization, bool, error) {
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row := s.db.QueryRow(ctx, `
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DELETE FROM authorizations
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WHERE user_id = $1 AND hash = $2
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RETURNING auth_key_id, user_id, hash, layer, device_model, platform, system_version, api_id, app_version, ip, created_at, active_at`, userID, hash)
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var a domain.Authorization
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var authKeyID int64
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if err := row.Scan(
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&authKeyID, &a.UserID, &a.Hash, &a.Layer, &a.DeviceModel, &a.Platform, &a.SystemVersion,
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&a.APIID, &a.AppVersion, &a.IP, &a.CreatedAt, &a.ActiveAt,
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); err != nil {
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if errors.Is(err, pgx.ErrNoRows) {
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return domain.Authorization{}, false, nil
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}
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return domain.Authorization{}, false, fmt.Errorf("delete authorization by hash: %w", err)
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}
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a.AuthKeyID = authKeyIDFromInt64(authKeyID)
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return a, true, nil
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}
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// RevokeByHash 是远程踢设备的持久化事实入口：删除业务 authorization 与
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// device update state，但保留 permanent/temp 协议 key 和 binding。这样被踢客户端
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// 重连后仍可完成 MTProto 解密，并由 RPC gate 返回 AUTH_KEY_UNREGISTERED；若先删除
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// 协议 key，客户端只能收到 transport -404，无法可靠清理本地登录态。
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func (s *AuthorizationStore) RevokeByHash(ctx context.Context, userID, hash int64) (domain.Authorization, bool, error) {
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var (
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a domain.Authorization
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found bool
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)
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err := withAuthIdentityTx(ctx, s.db, "revoke authorization by hash", func(tx pgx.Tx) error {
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var err error
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a, found, err = revokeByHashTx(ctx, tx, userID, hash)
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return err
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})
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if err != nil {
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return domain.Authorization{}, false, err
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}
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return a, found, nil
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}
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// revokeByHashTx deliberately uses separate READ COMMITTED statements. The first
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// lookup is only a candidate. Bind locks auth_keys before changing authorization
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// ownership, so revocation must lock the same parent row and then re-read the
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// owner/hash from a fresh statement snapshot. Otherwise an A->B re-login that
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// commits while revoke waits can be deleted using A's stale target snapshot.
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func revokeByHashTx(ctx context.Context, tx pgx.Tx, userID, hash int64) (domain.Authorization, bool, error) {
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var candidate int64
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if err := tx.QueryRow(ctx, `
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SELECT auth_key_id
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FROM authorizations
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WHERE user_id = $1 AND hash = $2`, userID, hash).Scan(&candidate); err != nil {
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if errors.Is(err, pgx.ErrNoRows) {
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return domain.Authorization{}, false, nil
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}
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return domain.Authorization{}, false, fmt.Errorf("select revoke candidate by hash: %w", err)
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}
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if err := lockPermanentAuthIdentities(ctx, tx, []int64{candidate}); err != nil {
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return domain.Authorization{}, false, err
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}
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var locked int64
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if err := tx.QueryRow(ctx, `
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SELECT auth_key_id
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FROM auth_keys
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WHERE auth_key_id = $1
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FOR UPDATE`, candidate).Scan(&locked); err != nil {
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if errors.Is(err, pgx.ErrNoRows) {
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return domain.Authorization{}, false, nil
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}
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return domain.Authorization{}, false, fmt.Errorf("lock revoke auth key by hash: %w", err)
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}
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a, found, err := scanRevokedAuthorization(tx.QueryRow(ctx, `
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SELECT auth_key_id, user_id, hash, layer, device_model, platform, system_version,
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api_id, app_version, ip, password_pending, created_at, active_at
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FROM authorizations
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WHERE auth_key_id = $1 AND user_id = $2 AND hash = $3
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FOR UPDATE`, candidate, userID, hash))
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if err != nil {
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return domain.Authorization{}, false, fmt.Errorf("revalidate revoke authorization by hash: %w", err)
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}
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if !found {
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return domain.Authorization{}, false, nil
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}
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if err := deleteRevokedAuthorizationStateTx(ctx, tx, []int64{candidate}); err != nil {
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return domain.Authorization{}, false, err
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}
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return a, true, nil
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}
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func (s *AuthorizationStore) DeleteByUserExcept(ctx context.Context, userID int64, keepAuthKeyID [8]byte) ([]domain.Authorization, error) {
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rows, err := s.db.Query(ctx, `
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DELETE FROM authorizations
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WHERE user_id = $1 AND auth_key_id <> $2
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RETURNING auth_key_id, user_id, hash, layer, device_model, platform, system_version, api_id, app_version, ip, created_at, active_at`, userID, authKeyIDToInt64(keepAuthKeyID))
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if err != nil {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("delete authorizations by user: %w", err)
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}
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defer rows.Close()
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out := make([]domain.Authorization, 0)
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for rows.Next() {
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var a domain.Authorization
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var authKeyID int64
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if err := rows.Scan(
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&authKeyID, &a.UserID, &a.Hash, &a.Layer, &a.DeviceModel, &a.Platform, &a.SystemVersion,
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&a.APIID, &a.AppVersion, &a.IP, &a.CreatedAt, &a.ActiveAt,
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); err != nil {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("scan deleted authorization: %w", err)
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}
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a.AuthKeyID = authKeyIDFromInt64(authKeyID)
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out = append(out, a)
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}
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if err := rows.Err(); err != nil {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("iterate deleted authorizations: %w", err)
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}
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return out, nil
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}
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// RevokeByUserExcept 批量删除业务 authorization，保留 keepAuthKeyID 对应的当前设备；
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// 被撤销设备的协议 key/binding 保留，以便重连后取得 RPC 401 并完成客户端退出。
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func (s *AuthorizationStore) RevokeByUserExcept(ctx context.Context, userID int64, keepAuthKeyID [8]byte) ([]domain.Authorization, error) {
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var out []domain.Authorization
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err := withAuthIdentityTx(ctx, s.db, "revoke authorizations by user", func(tx pgx.Tx) error {
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var err error
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out, err = revokeByUserExceptTx(ctx, tx, userID, authKeyIDToInt64(keepAuthKeyID))
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return err
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})
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return out, err
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}
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func revokeByUserExceptTx(ctx context.Context, tx pgx.Tx, userID, keepAuthKeyID int64) ([]domain.Authorization, error) {
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candidateRows, err := tx.Query(ctx, `
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SELECT auth_key_id
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FROM authorizations
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WHERE user_id = $1 AND auth_key_id <> $2
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ORDER BY auth_key_id`, userID, keepAuthKeyID)
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if err != nil {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("select revoke candidates by user: %w", err)
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}
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candidates := make([]int64, 0)
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for candidateRows.Next() {
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var id int64
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if err := candidateRows.Scan(&id); err != nil {
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candidateRows.Close()
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("scan revoke candidate by user: %w", err)
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}
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candidates = append(candidates, id)
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}
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if err := candidateRows.Err(); err != nil {
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candidateRows.Close()
|
||
return nil, fmt.Errorf("iterate revoke candidates by user: %w", err)
|
||
}
|
||
candidateRows.Close()
|
||
if len(candidates) == 0 {
|
||
return []domain.Authorization{}, nil
|
||
}
|
||
if err := lockPermanentAuthIdentities(ctx, tx, candidates); err != nil {
|
||
return nil, err
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
// Advisory keys are already all held in final int32-hash order. Parent rows
|
||
// are then locked by their real bigint IDs for deterministic batch behavior.
|
||
lockRows, err := tx.Query(ctx, `
|
||
SELECT auth_key_id
|
||
FROM auth_keys
|
||
WHERE auth_key_id = ANY($1::bigint[])
|
||
ORDER BY auth_key_id
|
||
FOR UPDATE`, candidates)
|
||
if err != nil {
|
||
return nil, fmt.Errorf("lock revoke auth keys by user: %w", err)
|
||
}
|
||
for lockRows.Next() {
|
||
var ignored int64
|
||
if err := lockRows.Scan(&ignored); err != nil {
|
||
lockRows.Close()
|
||
return nil, fmt.Errorf("scan locked revoke auth key: %w", err)
|
||
}
|
||
}
|
||
if err := lockRows.Err(); err != nil {
|
||
lockRows.Close()
|
||
return nil, fmt.Errorf("iterate locked revoke auth keys: %w", err)
|
||
}
|
||
lockRows.Close()
|
||
|
||
// This is intentionally a new statement snapshot after all parent locks.
|
||
// Keys that changed owner while waiting are omitted and must remain intact.
|
||
rows, err := tx.Query(ctx, `
|
||
SELECT auth_key_id, user_id, hash, layer, device_model, platform, system_version,
|
||
api_id, app_version, ip, password_pending, created_at, active_at
|
||
FROM authorizations
|
||
WHERE user_id = $1
|
||
AND auth_key_id <> $2
|
||
AND auth_key_id = ANY($3::bigint[])
|
||
ORDER BY created_at, auth_key_id
|
||
FOR UPDATE`, userID, keepAuthKeyID, candidates)
|
||
if err != nil {
|
||
return nil, fmt.Errorf("revalidate revoke authorizations by user: %w", err)
|
||
}
|
||
out := make([]domain.Authorization, 0)
|
||
for rows.Next() {
|
||
a, err := scanRevokedAuthorizationRow(rows)
|
||
if err != nil {
|
||
rows.Close()
|
||
return nil, err
|
||
}
|
||
out = append(out, a)
|
||
}
|
||
if err := rows.Err(); err != nil {
|
||
rows.Close()
|
||
return nil, fmt.Errorf("iterate revoked authorizations: %w", err)
|
||
}
|
||
rows.Close()
|
||
if len(out) == 0 {
|
||
return out, nil
|
||
}
|
||
targets := make([]int64, len(out))
|
||
for i := range out {
|
||
targets[i] = authKeyIDToInt64(out[i].AuthKeyID)
|
||
}
|
||
if err := deleteRevokedAuthorizationStateTx(ctx, tx, targets); err != nil {
|
||
return nil, err
|
||
}
|
||
return out, nil
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
func deleteRevokedAuthorizationStateTx(ctx context.Context, tx pgx.Tx, authKeyIDs []int64) error {
|
||
if len(authKeyIDs) == 0 {
|
||
return nil
|
||
}
|
||
if _, err := tx.Exec(ctx, `
|
||
DELETE FROM update_states
|
||
WHERE auth_key_id = ANY($1::bigint[])`, authKeyIDs); err != nil {
|
||
return fmt.Errorf("delete revoked update states: %w", err)
|
||
}
|
||
tag, err := tx.Exec(ctx, `
|
||
DELETE FROM authorizations
|
||
WHERE auth_key_id = ANY($1::bigint[])`, authKeyIDs)
|
||
if err != nil {
|
||
return fmt.Errorf("delete revoked authorizations: %w", err)
|
||
}
|
||
if tag.RowsAffected() != int64(len(authKeyIDs)) {
|
||
return fmt.Errorf("delete revoked authorizations: deleted %d of %d locked targets", tag.RowsAffected(), len(authKeyIDs))
|
||
}
|
||
return nil
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
// deleteProtocolAuthIdentitiesTx permanently removes permanent identities and
|
||
// their derived temp keys. Remote account.resetAuthorization/
|
||
// auth.resetAuthorizations must not use this helper: those clients need the
|
||
// protocol key long enough to reconnect and receive an RPC-level 401.
|
||
func deleteProtocolAuthIdentitiesTx(ctx context.Context, tx pgx.Tx, authKeyIDs []int64) error {
|
||
if len(authKeyIDs) == 0 {
|
||
return nil
|
||
}
|
||
if _, err := tx.Exec(ctx, `
|
||
DELETE FROM auth_keys
|
||
WHERE auth_key_id IN (
|
||
SELECT temp_auth_key_id
|
||
FROM temp_auth_key_bindings
|
||
WHERE perm_auth_key_id = ANY($1::bigint[])
|
||
)`, authKeyIDs); err != nil {
|
||
return fmt.Errorf("delete temporary auth keys: %w", err)
|
||
}
|
||
if _, err := tx.Exec(ctx, `
|
||
DELETE FROM update_states
|
||
WHERE auth_key_id = ANY($1::bigint[])`, authKeyIDs); err != nil {
|
||
return fmt.Errorf("delete protocol identity update states: %w", err)
|
||
}
|
||
tag, err := tx.Exec(ctx, `
|
||
DELETE FROM auth_keys
|
||
WHERE auth_key_id = ANY($1::bigint[])`, authKeyIDs)
|
||
if err != nil {
|
||
return fmt.Errorf("delete permanent auth keys: %w", err)
|
||
}
|
||
if tag.RowsAffected() != int64(len(authKeyIDs)) {
|
||
return fmt.Errorf("delete permanent auth keys: deleted %d of %d locked targets", tag.RowsAffected(), len(authKeyIDs))
|
||
}
|
||
return nil
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
func authorizationFromRow(row sqlcgen.Authorization) domain.Authorization {
|
||
return domain.Authorization{
|
||
AuthKeyID: authKeyIDFromInt64(row.AuthKeyID),
|
||
UserID: row.UserID,
|
||
Hash: row.Hash,
|
||
Layer: int(row.Layer),
|
||
DeviceModel: row.DeviceModel,
|
||
Platform: row.Platform,
|
||
SystemVersion: row.SystemVersion,
|
||
APIID: int(row.ApiID),
|
||
AppVersion: row.AppVersion,
|
||
IP: row.Ip,
|
||
CreatedAt: row.CreatedAt.Time,
|
||
ActiveAt: row.ActiveAt.Time,
|
||
}
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
type authorizationScanner interface {
|
||
Scan(dest ...any) error
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
func scanRevokedAuthorization(row authorizationScanner) (domain.Authorization, bool, error) {
|
||
a, err := scanRevokedAuthorizationRow(row)
|
||
if err != nil {
|
||
if errors.Is(err, pgx.ErrNoRows) {
|
||
return domain.Authorization{}, false, nil
|
||
}
|
||
return domain.Authorization{}, false, err
|
||
}
|
||
return a, true, nil
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
func scanRevokedAuthorizationRow(row authorizationScanner) (domain.Authorization, error) {
|
||
var a domain.Authorization
|
||
var authKeyID int64
|
||
if err := row.Scan(
|
||
&authKeyID, &a.UserID, &a.Hash, &a.Layer, &a.DeviceModel, &a.Platform, &a.SystemVersion,
|
||
&a.APIID, &a.AppVersion, &a.IP, &a.PasswordPending, &a.CreatedAt, &a.ActiveAt,
|
||
); err != nil {
|
||
return domain.Authorization{}, err
|
||
}
|
||
a.AuthKeyID = authKeyIDFromInt64(authKeyID)
|
||
return a, nil
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
func authorizationHash(authKeyID [8]byte) int64 {
|
||
sum := sha256.Sum256(authKeyID[:])
|
||
hash := int64(binary.LittleEndian.Uint64(sum[:8]))
|
||
if hash == 0 {
|
||
return 1
|
||
}
|
||
return hash
|
||
}
|