fix(mtproto): sync accept TDLib reconnect service parity
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iamxvbaba
parent
c854fc7b94
commit
c13fbf8885
9 changed files with 176 additions and 41 deletions
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@ -69,6 +69,72 @@ func (h *durableDestroyLayerRPC) deletion() ([8]byte, int64) {
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return h.authKeyID, h.sessionID
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}
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func TestClientMessageContentPolicy(t *testing.T) {
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tests := []struct {
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name string
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typeID uint32
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want clientMessageContentPolicy
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}{
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{name: "api_rpc", typeID: tg.HelpGetConfigRequestTypeID, want: clientMessageContentRequired},
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{name: "container", typeID: proto.MessageContainerTypeID, want: clientMessageContentForbidden},
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{name: "msgs_ack", typeID: mt.MsgsAckTypeID, want: clientMessageContentForbidden},
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{name: "msg_copy", typeID: mt.MsgCopyTypeID, want: clientMessageContentForbidden},
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{name: "bad_msg_notification", typeID: mt.BadMsgNotificationTypeID, want: clientMessageContentOptional},
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{name: "bad_server_salt", typeID: mt.BadServerSaltTypeID, want: clientMessageContentOptional},
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{name: "msg_detailed_info", typeID: mt.MsgDetailedInfoTypeID, want: clientMessageContentOptional},
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{name: "msg_new_detailed_info", typeID: mt.MsgNewDetailedInfoTypeID, want: clientMessageContentOptional},
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{name: "ping", typeID: mt.PingRequestTypeID, want: clientMessageContentOptional},
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{name: "ping_delay_disconnect", typeID: mt.PingDelayDisconnectRequestTypeID, want: clientMessageContentOptional},
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{name: "get_future_salts", typeID: mt.GetFutureSaltsRequestTypeID, want: clientMessageContentOptional},
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{name: "msgs_state_req", typeID: mt.MsgsStateReqTypeID, want: clientMessageContentOptional},
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{name: "msg_resend_req", typeID: mt.MsgResendReqTypeID, want: clientMessageContentOptional},
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{name: "msgs_all_info", typeID: mt.MsgsAllInfoTypeID, want: clientMessageContentOptional},
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{name: "msgs_state_info", typeID: mt.MsgsStateInfoTypeID, want: clientMessageContentOptional},
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{name: "destroy_session", typeID: mt.DestroySessionRequestTypeID, want: clientMessageContentOptional},
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{name: "http_wait", typeID: mt.HTTPWaitRequestTypeID, want: clientMessageContentOptional},
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{name: "rpc_drop_answer", typeID: mt.RPCDropAnswerRequestTypeID, want: clientMessageContentOptional},
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{name: "destroy_auth_key", typeID: destroyAuthKeyRequestTypeID, want: clientMessageContentOptional},
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}
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now := time.Now()
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msgID := proto.NewMessageIDGen(func() time.Time { return now }).New(proto.MessageFromClient)
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for _, test := range tests {
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t.Run(test.name, func(t *testing.T) {
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if got := clientMessageContentPolicyFor(test.typeID); got != test.want {
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t.Fatalf("content policy = %d, want %d", got, test.want)
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}
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evenCode := validateClientContainerEnvelope(msgID, 8, test.typeID)
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oddCode := validateClientContainerEnvelope(msgID, 9, test.typeID)
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directEvenCode := validateClientEnvelope(now, msgID, 8, test.typeID)
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directOddCode := validateClientEnvelope(now, msgID, 9, test.typeID)
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if directEvenCode != evenCode || directOddCode != oddCode {
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t.Fatalf(
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"top-level/container parity mismatch = top(%d,%d) container(%d,%d)",
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directEvenCode, directOddCode, evenCode, oddCode,
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)
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}
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switch test.want {
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case clientMessageContentRequired:
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if evenCode != badMsgSeqNotOdd || oddCode != 0 {
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t.Fatalf("required content parity codes = even:%d odd:%d", evenCode, oddCode)
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}
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case clientMessageContentForbidden:
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if evenCode != 0 || oddCode != badMsgSeqNotEven {
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t.Fatalf("forbidden content parity codes = even:%d odd:%d", evenCode, oddCode)
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}
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case clientMessageContentOptional:
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if evenCode != 0 || oddCode != 0 {
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t.Fatalf("optional content parity codes = even:%d odd:%d", evenCode, oddCode)
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}
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if clientMessageIsContentRelated(test.typeID, 8) || !clientMessageIsContentRelated(test.typeID, 9) {
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t.Fatal("optional service content bit was not derived from seq_no parity")
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}
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}
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})
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}
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}
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// TestEncryptedPingPong 验证 M2/M4：握手后 client 加密 ping，
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// server 回 new_session_created + pong + msgs_ack。
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func TestEncryptedPingPong(t *testing.T) {
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@ -79,7 +145,7 @@ func TestEncryptedPingPong(t *testing.T) {
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clientMsgID := proto.NewMessageIDGen(time.Now)
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const pingID int64 = 0x1234beef
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pingMsgID := clientMsgID.New(proto.MessageFromClient)
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sendEncrypted(t, conn, cipher, auth, pingMsgID, &mt.PingRequest{PingID: pingID})
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sendEncryptedWithSeq(t, conn, cipher, auth, pingMsgID, 1, &mt.PingRequest{PingID: pingID})
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replies := collectReplies(t, conn, cipher, auth.AuthKey, mt.PongTypeID)
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mustHave(t, replies, mt.NewSessionCreatedTypeID, "new_session_created")
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@ -230,6 +296,55 @@ func TestMsgsStateReq(t *testing.T) {
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}
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}
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// TestTDLibReconnectRecoveryContainerAcceptsEvenServiceMessages reproduces the
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// first container TDLib emits after reopening an authenticated session with
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// unknown queries. All service entries and the outer container use the current
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// even sequence number. Rejecting msgs_state_req as a content-only constructor
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// turns the valid inner message into bad_msg_notification(code=64), after which
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// TDLib closes the session and retries the same container forever.
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func TestTDLibReconnectRecoveryContainerAcceptsEvenServiceMessages(t *testing.T) {
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const dc = 2
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addr, pub, _ := startTestServer(t, Options{DC: dc})
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conn, auth, cipher := dialHandshake(t, addr, dc, pub)
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ids := proto.NewMessageIDGen(time.Now)
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pendingMsgID := ids.New(proto.MessageFromClient)
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ackMsgID := ids.New(proto.MessageFromClient)
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stateMsgID := ids.New(proto.MessageFromClient)
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pingMsgID := ids.New(proto.MessageFromClient)
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outerMsgID := ids.New(proto.MessageFromClient)
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const (
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pendingSeqNo int32 = 9
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serviceSeqNo int32 = 10
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)
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pendingBody := mustEncodeTL(t, &mt.PingRequest{PingID: 0xc01d})
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ackBody := mustEncodeTL(t, &mt.MsgsAck{MsgIDs: []int64{stateMsgID - 4}})
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stateBody := mustEncodeTL(t, &mt.MsgsStateReq{MsgIDs: []int64{pendingMsgID, stateMsgID - 4}})
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pingBody := mustEncodeTL(t, &mt.PingDelayDisconnectRequest{PingID: 0x5eed, DisconnectDelay: 60})
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container := &proto.MessageContainer{Messages: []proto.Message{
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{ID: pendingMsgID, SeqNo: int(pendingSeqNo), Bytes: len(pendingBody), Body: pendingBody},
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{ID: ackMsgID, SeqNo: int(serviceSeqNo), Bytes: len(ackBody), Body: ackBody},
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{ID: stateMsgID, SeqNo: int(serviceSeqNo), Bytes: len(stateBody), Body: stateBody},
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{ID: pingMsgID, SeqNo: int(serviceSeqNo), Bytes: len(pingBody), Body: pingBody},
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}}
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sendEncryptedWithSeq(t, conn, cipher, auth, outerMsgID, serviceSeqNo, container)
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frames := collectReplyFrames(t, conn, cipher, auth.AuthKey, map[uint32]int{
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mt.MsgsStateInfoTypeID: 1,
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mt.PongTypeID: 2,
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})
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for _, frame := range frames {
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if frame.TypeID == mt.BadMsgNotificationTypeID {
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var bad mt.BadMsgNotification
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if err := bad.Decode(frame.Plain); err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("decode bad_msg_notification: %v", err)
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}
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t.Fatalf("TDLib reconnect recovery container was rejected: %+v", bad)
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}
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}
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}
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// TestMsgResendReq 验证 MTProto msg_resend_req 由连接层按状态查询兜底响应，
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// 不会落入业务 RPC fallback。
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func TestMsgResendReq(t *testing.T) {
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